37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1602402 |
Time | |
Date | 201812 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Challenger 350 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Cabin Furnishing |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
During preflight; non-flying pilot discovered several loose screws and spacers in cup holder at seat 2R. The aircraft had been released from ZZZ line maintenance just few minutes prior to discovery of loose screws. Maintenance records will reflect that line maintenance had been performed on the window shade at seat 2R just prior to release from maintenance and dispatch release for revenue flight to ZZZ1 with passengers. I picked up the loose items and walked into ZZZ maintenance office. I placed the loose screws and spacers on the desk and asked if they could explain where these items went on the plane? I got dead silence and shocked look of omg from the two maintenance techs in the office. I explained that they were discovered at seat 2R cup holder and that the window at 2R had been repaired. I asked if they help figure out what happened and what else might be improperly repaired. I stated I need to document this and notify [company]. They nodded their heads and stated they understood. I photographed the items and emailed to [company] maintenance control. I then placed a call to [company] maintenance control; explained the situation and informed the maintenance controller that I would be aog'ing the aircraft until we resolved the issue. Approximately 90 minutes later; I returned to aircraft after being towed back in hangar. There were 4 maintenance techs working the issue. They removed the pax oxygen panels and removed the sidewall panel to gain access to the window shade area. They showed me that the loose screws and spacers belong to the sidewall panel attachment. The explained they removing the entire panel to inspect all attachments points. Approximately an hour or so later; aircraft re-leased from maintenance. I asked the maintenance techs to explain the sign off on the work order and that all items where accounted for and airworthy. They explained their work to my satisfaction. They also remarked that they felt that this is a process and procedure error that needs to be addressed so that this does not happen again. One mx tech felt that there is some confusion with the new electronic log book process by not physically placing a physical log book back in aircraft and doing one last over view of log book and physically looking over work performed one last time. My concern is that an unairworthy aircraft was released from [contract maintenance] and that [company maintenance] rts [return to service] process did not catch the issue; leading to dispatch releasing an unairworthy aircraft for flight operations. I wonder what else might be getting through the gaps in the system. What if this was an issue with major critical component of the aircraft? There seems to be a trend with maintenance across [company] that needs to be addressed before someone gets injured. Possibly; have [company maintenance] representative at all major [company] locations physically do a review of both paper work and physical inspection of repaired items on aircraft prior to release of aircraft. [Also]; a heightened review of vendor [contract] maintenance process and procedures. Possibly; have a maintenance supervisor preform the final inspection.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CL-350 Captain reported delivering to Maintenance several loose screws & spacers found in cabin during preflight after aircraft released for flight.
Narrative: During preflight; Non-flying Pilot discovered several loose screws and spacers in cup holder at seat 2R. The aircraft had been released from ZZZ Line Maintenance just few minutes prior to discovery of loose screws. Maintenance records will reflect that Line Maintenance had been performed on the window shade at seat 2R just prior to release from Maintenance and Dispatch release for revenue flight to ZZZ1 with passengers. I picked up the loose items and walked into ZZZ Maintenance office. I placed the loose screws and spacers on the desk and asked if they could explain where these items went on the plane? I got dead silence and shocked look of OMG from the two maintenance techs in the office. I explained that they were discovered at seat 2R cup holder and that the window at 2R had been repaired. I asked if they help figure out what happened and what else might be improperly repaired. I stated I need to document this and notify [Company]. They nodded their heads and stated they understood. I photographed the items and emailed to [Company] Maintenance Control. I then placed a call to [Company] Maintenance Control; explained the situation and informed the Maintenance Controller that I would be AOG'ing the aircraft until we resolved the issue. Approximately 90 minutes later; I returned to aircraft after being towed back in hangar. There were 4 maintenance techs working the issue. They removed the pax oxygen panels and removed the sidewall panel to gain access to the window shade area. They showed me that the loose screws and spacers belong to the sidewall panel attachment. The explained they removing the entire panel to inspect all attachments points. Approximately an hour or so later; aircraft re-leased from Maintenance. I asked the maintenance techs to explain the sign off on the work order and that all items where accounted for and airworthy. They explained their work to my satisfaction. They also remarked that they felt that this is a process and procedure error that needs to be addressed so that this does not happen again. One MX Tech felt that there is some confusion with the new electronic log book process by not physically placing a physical log book back in aircraft and doing one last over view of log book and physically looking over work performed one last time. My concern is that an unairworthy aircraft was released from [contract Maintenance] and that [Company Maintenance] RTS [Return To Service] process did not catch the issue; leading to Dispatch releasing an unairworthy aircraft for flight operations. I wonder what else might be getting through the gaps in the system. What if this was an issue with major critical component of the aircraft? There seems to be a trend with maintenance across [Company] that needs to be addressed before someone gets injured. Possibly; have [Company Maintenance] representative at all major [Company] locations physically do a review of both paper work and physical inspection of repaired items on aircraft prior to release of aircraft. [Also]; a heightened review of vendor [Contract] Maintenance process and procedures. Possibly; have a Maintenance Supervisor preform the final inspection.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.