Narrative:

Upon arrival to aircraft in ZZZ; the flight mechanic briefed us on the status of the aircraft. He discussed an issue related to the center hydraulic center #2 pump. He was explaining that this particular aircraft didn't behave like any other 767 in that it would not load shed for any reason. He stated that it ran continuously. He assured me that this was in accordance with the way boeing designed this particular jet. I told him I was going to need some further guidance on this matter as this aircraft already had a history of issues with the center hydraulic pump. He asked what our procedures were and if we had to see that the pump was load shedding during engine start. To which I told him we did and it was specified in our normal procedures section. I again asked him to provide further guidance on this 'special' airplane if we were to operate it outside of the normal procedures. He proceeded to procure some documentation regarding the operation of the center hydraulic system provided by boeing. On the first page of at least 20 the provided documentation described how the center pump #2 is load shed during engine start. Yet the flight mechanic still was adamant that this aircraft was supposed to work differently and that it was ok. After lots of discussion with him that this was not normal and outside of our normal procedures; he agreed to defer the center primary #2 pump. I continue to see maintenance knowingly push a known problem down the road. Furthermore; the lack of understanding on how the systems work complicates matters simply by not being able to communicate on a mutual level of basic knowledge. In this case; I felt this particular flight mechanic was pushing us to ignore this particular known problem. While the simple fix was to defer the item; which if fine considering it was not working as published; it seemed that maintenance just wanted us to take the aircraft as it. After we resolved the matter (cordially; I might add) the main cargo door failed to close. The flight mechanic was involved into this matter and we resumed our normal preflight duties. As a result of trying to maintain an on time departure; we did not coordinate the hydraulic pump deferral with our dispatcher and did not get the appropriate time and initials added to the flight release. While this seems rather mundane; there's a lot that we can learn from this event. First; we continue to see maintenance struggles with the appropriate actions to quickly return an aircraft to an airworthy status. That can be done by allowing the mechanics on sight to diagnose and fix the problem quickly or by deferring the appropriate item to accommodate a fix at maintenance base. Second; as a flight crew; we allowed ourselves to get intimately involved with the problems facing maintenance and this particular problem thus distracting us from our normal duties. Going forward; it's our responsibility as crew members to operate the aircraft in accordance with normal procedures and if any deviations arise; then deal with them appropriately. I feel this would have been a better course of action in the case.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 Captain reported a Maintenance Technician attempted to describe that one aircraft was unique in design and operation; but could not supply the requested supporting documents.

Narrative: Upon arrival to aircraft in ZZZ; the flight mechanic briefed us on the status of the aircraft. He discussed an issue related to the Center Hydraulic Center #2 Pump. He was explaining that this particular aircraft didn't behave like any other 767 in that it would not load shed for any reason. He stated that it ran continuously. He assured me that this was in accordance with the way Boeing designed this particular jet. I told him I was going to need some further guidance on this matter as this aircraft already had a history of issues with the center hydraulic pump. He asked what our procedures were and if we had to see that the pump was load shedding during engine start. To which I told him we did and it was specified in our Normal Procedures Section. I again asked him to provide further guidance on this 'special' airplane if we were to operate it outside of the normal procedures. He proceeded to procure some documentation regarding the operation of the center hydraulic system provided by Boeing. On the first page of at least 20 the provided documentation described how the Center Pump #2 is load shed during engine start. Yet the flight mechanic still was adamant that this aircraft was supposed to work differently and that it was ok. After lots of discussion with him that this was not normal and outside of our normal procedures; he agreed to defer the Center Primary #2 Pump. I continue to see Maintenance knowingly push a known problem down the road. Furthermore; the lack of understanding on how the systems work complicates matters simply by not being able to communicate on a mutual level of basic knowledge. In this case; I felt this particular flight mechanic was pushing us to ignore this particular known problem. While the simple fix was to defer the item; which if fine considering it was not working as published; it seemed that Maintenance just wanted us to take the aircraft as it. After we resolved the matter (cordially; I might add) the main cargo door failed to close. The flight mechanic was involved into this matter and we resumed our normal preflight duties. As a result of trying to maintain an on time departure; we did not coordinate the hydraulic pump deferral with our dispatcher and did not get the appropriate time and initials added to the flight release. While this seems rather mundane; there's a lot that we can learn from this event. First; we continue to see Maintenance struggles with the appropriate actions to quickly return an aircraft to an airworthy status. That can be done by allowing the mechanics on sight to diagnose and fix the problem quickly or by deferring the appropriate item to accommodate a fix at Maintenance base. Second; as a flight crew; we allowed ourselves to get intimately involved with the problems facing Maintenance and this particular problem thus distracting us from our normal duties. Going forward; it's our responsibility as crew members to operate the aircraft in accordance with normal procedures and if any deviations arise; then deal with them appropriately. I feel this would have been a better course of action in the case.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.