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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1604694 |
Time | |
Date | 201812 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Speed All Types Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
Approach into ZZZ that was flown through severely inclement weather. Captain (ca) recognized issues with the approach and called for a go around; however ca had a tendency to not speak up during the flight. As such; it took 2 calls for the first officer (first officer) to realize the ca called for a go around. Ca kept hands on the throttles after calling for go around thrust; flaps eight. First officer got distracted by trying to set both thrust and retract the flaps and never called 'positive rate' informing the ca that the airplane was climbing. The gear was not retracted prior to reaching speed limits. Once the gear was up a 'gear disagree' warning message was observed and not addressed correctly. Ca and first officer had issues with communication during the entire trip. Ca failed to speak both loudly and clearly enough to communicate with first officer. First officer failed to address communication issues and simply sat back and did what was required rather than work to get the ca and first officer into a shared mental model about how they were going to operate the plane and manage the cockpit during the trip. Weather on the approach was not significantly discussed; nor was weather radar used to the appropriate level. Ca and first officer did not brief the approach in enough detail; and first officer was not considering a go around as a possibility; and as such; was unprepared for both the go around; and the procedures and correct calls required during a go around. First officer's frustration with lack of communication from ca allowed the first officer to 'disconnect' from the flight and not be actively involved during the approach. First officer should have found a way to address communication issues with the ca and not allow those issues to allow the first officer to disconnect from the flight. First officer should also be thinking about the possibility of a go around and practice both call outs and procedures.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported deviating from SOP during a go-around; in part because of poor CRM with the Captain.
Narrative: Approach into ZZZ that was flown through severely inclement weather. Captain (CA) recognized issues with the approach and called for a go around; however CA had a tendency to not speak up during the flight. As such; it took 2 calls for the First Officer (FO) to realize the CA called for a go around. CA kept hands on the throttles after calling for go around thrust; flaps eight. FO got distracted by trying to set both thrust and retract the flaps and never called 'positive rate' informing the CA that the airplane was climbing. The gear was not retracted prior to reaching speed limits. Once the gear was up a 'gear disagree' warning message was observed and not addressed correctly. CA and FO had issues with communication during the entire trip. CA failed to speak both loudly and clearly enough to communicate with FO. FO failed to address communication issues and simply sat back and did what was required rather than work to get the CA and FO into a shared mental model about how they were going to operate the plane and manage the cockpit during the trip. Weather on the approach was not significantly discussed; nor was weather radar used to the appropriate level. CA and FO did not brief the approach in enough detail; and FO was not considering a go around as a possibility; and as such; was unprepared for both the go around; and the procedures and correct calls required during a go around. FO's frustration with lack of communication from CA allowed the FO to 'disconnect' from the flight and not be actively involved during the approach. FO should have found a way to address communication issues with the CA and not allow those issues to allow the FO to disconnect from the flight. FO should also be thinking about the possibility of a go around and practice both call outs and procedures.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.