Narrative:

This was the day of my first student solo. I had completed an hour of solo flight in the pattern earlier that day after 3 laps in the pattern with my instructor.on the seventh lap of the second session; I practiced a slip to landing to xx; leveled out at about 10 feet AGL; and believe I caught a wake from a previously departing aircraft; even though I had taken precautions to avoid the affected parts of the runway. I immediately went around.during the upwind I set cruise rpms of 2;400; noted the correct airspeed of ~120kts; noted that I was a touch high and pulled some power; called downwind to the tower; was cleared to land; and completed my pre-landing checklist.I started my setup for descent (pull power from 2;400 RPM to ~1;575 while gradually adding back pressure to increase the nose-up attitude appropriate for level flight with slower speed as the plane as the decelerated; pull carb heat which further drops the power to 1;500; put in three rolls down on the trim wheel; wait and watch for airspeed to indicate ~80 KTS; then add 3 seconds of flaps (~10 degrees of flaps); verify flaps; push over to nose down to set my descent picture; check correct trim with only fingertip pressure required on the yoke; verify FPM; clear right and start the turn to base. During this process; before pushing the nose over; I noted that when I was still in a 'level' to 'nose-up' picture; with speed dropping from 90-80 IAS; I was descending already at almost 500 FPM. This was with just over 80 KTS indicated and a slightly nose-high attitude. This confused me a bit because I usually don't see much vertical speed until I purposefully drop the nose after adding flaps.I then dropped the nose as usual and started a shallow right turn. A few seconds after the stable turn was established at about 20 degrees with the controls neutralized; I felt and saw the plane nose down even more; felt I was falling toward the right door and was 'light' in my seat and saw the plane suddenly started increasing its roll to the right. I immediately corrected with left aileron and rudder to level the plane; which took more effort and time than normal; saw the vsi was pointing down (about 1;000 FPM down); checked the IAS (around 80); and started pulling up as I knew I had enough airspeed to do so without stalling. While pulling up my airspeed decayed to an IAS under 70 KTS and I started to feel some buffeting; which I took as an indication of an accelerated stall. At this point I didn't understand what was going on felt there must be something wrong with the controls related to the left ball I had seen earlier and released back pressure; which again accelerated me downward visually; while not increasing airspeed much.I was extremely confused. I wondered if that left ball meant I was slipping without intending to; or that some control had 'let go' or cable had slipped; or did I have a split flap or ????? And why did pulling up at 70 KTS feel like I was stalling? I had never been in this situation before: I had enough indicated airspeed to do typical maneuvers; had tried to level out but felt I was still dropping while nose-up and potentially stalling (this plane usually stalls at under 45 KTS IAS); was descending extremely rapidly for the control inputs; and seemed to be accelerating downward with reference to the outside even though my airspeed wasn't keeping pace with the view of the landscape now getting closer by the second. In the flight recorder; my pull up shows a GPS speed of 107 KTS and continued drop of -401 FPM while at +.5 degrees pitch; even though I believe my IAS showed about 80. Again; normally at +.5 degrees pitch; I would have ballooned upwards and slowed down at the same time. At this point I was roughly 300 feet AGL; which put me 250 feet above buildings and obstacles. I was mystified and scared and thought I was going to crash.I could not figure out what else to do; and was convinced at that moment that there was something wrongwith the plane. I radioed tower to [advise them].I remembered what my instructor had said and what the books said: fly the plane; fly the plane; fly the plane; fly it to the ground. All this time I could hear the tower calling to clear the space airport and keep planes away from the runway.I then looked for a place to land or crash; feeling there was no way I could make the airfield at these descent rates; continued a shallow turn to the right to line up with a large street; and added full throttle to delay/lessen vertical impact while again pulling up. I believe I radioed the tower again telling them I had lost control and was headed for the street; but I am not sure I remember correctly whether I radioed that or just thought it.at that very moment; above the power lines; I noticed that my descent had stopped increasing in rate; and even though I was still descending (per recorder over 500 FPM) that I was able to pull the nose up with a more 'normal' response: my descent slowed dramatically more than it had slowed about 20 seconds before when I tried pulling up; and since I was at full power; I was not decreasing IAS dramatically while pulling up. My IAS looked to be climbing from ~75 to 80. At that point I saw the grass of the airfield to the right between two buildings and thought I would try to put the plane into the grass or some empty spot rather than on top of a busy street; and turned right between the buildings where I could see the grass of the airfield. At this point I was roughly 80 AGL and about 50 feet over the power lines and building roofs; the plane was pitched up at 2.5 degrees; I was now accelerating with full throttle and my last glance at the IAS showed 90 KTS. Usually this configuration is good for ~4-500 FPM of climb but I was still descending at over 200 FPM at 60 feet AGL. I still didn't feel the plane was responding 'normally;' but could see the 'light at the end of the tunnel' as I thought I would at least clear the airfield fence and get into the grass. As I came over the airport fence; I saw the taxiway was clear to my right; and that [an aircraft] was taxiing toward it from the left; and right at that moment heard the tower call to ask him to stop so I knew they could see me (I think they called 'he's going for the taxiway'); although I think the pilot had seen me already because I saw his nose squat and plane stop right as the tower keyed the mike. With the length of the taxiway clear and nobody heading for it I decided to land there instead of the grass. I also noted that as I cleared the fence; the dramatic downward 'fall' had stopped and the plane; at this point in ground effect; was behaving close to normal. As I thought to deploy flaps; a final check on the IAS to verify within the white arc showed about 90 KTS. I was in a shallow bank over the taxiway; so pulled power; dropped full flaps; landed ungracefully but uneventfully in the taxiway; rolled to the end to be clear of traffic; and started talking with the tower for instructions.they had me wait there for a few moments; and during that time I visually manipulated and inspected all the controls from the cockpit because I was sure I had experienced some kind of control failure. I moved every control and secondary control and could not see anything abnormal.after a few moments; with tower permission I taxied the plane back to the ramp uneventfully and felt a deep sense of shame and fear. I felt I had failed as a student pilot; let my instructor down; must not have been ready for a solo; had 'freaked out;' almost harmed myself and others; and caused everybody at the airport inconvenience and potentially harm. I was embarrassed to have decided to fly that second hour; and questioned my own judgment.back at the hangar; I shut down; and my flight instructor and I then checked the flight controls and surfaces and found everything normal and operational. During the weekend I spent hours and hours reviewing the flight recorder data and comparing the 60-second section to other normal laps and descents; and trying things out in the flight simulator and reading in forums and other accident reports; as well as re-reading several books about GA accidents. During that time I had several different hypothesis that could explain what had happened:1) I had accidentally flipped the flaps lever to the 'up' (retract) position after lowering them to 10 degrees; causing the plane to drop quickly during the turn (this 172 has a flap lever with a down position that must be held; a neutral position above that; and another neutral position above that which retracts the flaps).2) and/or I had rolled the trim wheel up three times instead of down; creating a strong nose-down tendency and strong control pressures which I interpreted as 'normal' and didn't fight strongly enough.3) and/or I had lost proprioception/orientation during VMC and nosed the plane down and entered a dive.4) and/or I had stalled a wing during my turn to base with incorrect control inputs.5) and/or I had experienced some kind of downdraft/tailwind/wind shear.I cannot conclusively rule out any of the above; but felt that I could safely return to flying because no matter which of the above were to blame; I should have done things differently; and indeed will do things differently going forward; and that if I took the right corrective action promptly; I could not only avoid this situation; but do it safely and without any drama or fear. My personal 'learnings' are as follows:* I will be much more conservative of how much I fly during this learning period; and also the amount of stress I put on myself to learn quickly. * Even as a new student; I should have trusted my gut and not second-thought my instincts; and created time; altitude; and space to get 100% ahead of the plane before staying in the pattern. * Although I have learned that the yaw I experienced on climb-out was due to fuel moving to the low wing from a previous extended slip (I re-created this scenario afterwards to verify); I should have kept on the same heading after my climb and taken some time as I didn't understand the change to the flight dynamics. Subsequently I have found that about 3-4 minutes of level flight will re-balance the fuel levels; but I will trust myself to create time and space whenever I find that something doesn't conform to my experience. * This initial 'ball' indication caused me to feel something was amiss; and might have slowed my responses later. I should have set a safe altitude and direction to do what troubleshooting was necessary; and should not have dismissed anything I didn't understand. This can be very challenging because as a student; we constantly see things we don't understand; but can't tell which are really 'out of normal' and which are just 'normal' things we haven't encountered yet.* when things 'feel wrong;' immediately abort descent; get to straight and level or a climb if safe and possible; and create time and space to troubleshoot. * When the right wing dropped; I feel I did the right thing to kick top rudder and ailerons to level and try to pull up. I would do that again; but add full throttle. * At the point of leveling out after the turn to base I should have also gone to full power; even though I felt I was speeding up; because the IAS didn't show that speed increase. While I already knew and practiced many times increasing power to slow a descent rate; I didn't do this right away because I was 'aimed down' and could sense a strong disconnect between my 'observed' speed (the scenery speeding up and the nose dropping) and the indicated and felt 'plane speed'.* the pattern is extremely dangerous: proximity to other planes; multiple turns; and low altitude AGL means that in ~30-45 seconds you can go from pattern altitude to impact; and one needs to be ready at all times to take immediate corrective action:

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 student pilot reported a loss of control on final approach resulting in a landing on the taxiway.

Narrative: This was the day of my first student solo. I had completed an hour of solo flight in the pattern earlier that day after 3 laps in the pattern with my instructor.On the seventh lap of the second session; I practiced a slip to landing to XX; leveled out at about 10 feet AGL; and believe I caught a wake from a previously departing aircraft; even though I had taken precautions to avoid the affected parts of the runway. I immediately went around.During the upwind I set cruise RPMs of 2;400; noted the correct airspeed of ~120kts; noted that I was a touch high and pulled some power; called downwind to the tower; was cleared to land; and completed my pre-landing checklist.I started my setup for descent (pull power from 2;400 RPM to ~1;575 while gradually adding back pressure to increase the nose-up attitude appropriate for level flight with slower speed as the plane as the decelerated; pull carb heat which further drops the power to 1;500; put in three rolls down on the trim wheel; wait and watch for airspeed to indicate ~80 KTS; then add 3 seconds of flaps (~10 degrees of flaps); verify flaps; push over to nose down to set my descent picture; check correct trim with only fingertip pressure required on the yoke; verify FPM; clear right and start the turn to base. During this process; before pushing the nose over; I noted that when I was still in a 'level' to 'nose-up' picture; with speed dropping from 90-80 IAS; I was descending already at almost 500 FPM. This was with just over 80 KTS indicated and a slightly nose-high attitude. This confused me a bit because I usually don't see much vertical speed until I purposefully drop the nose after adding flaps.I then dropped the nose as usual and started a shallow right turn. A few seconds after the stable turn was established at about 20 degrees with the controls neutralized; I felt and saw the plane nose down even more; felt I was falling toward the right door and was 'light' in my seat and saw the plane suddenly started increasing its roll to the right. I immediately corrected with left aileron and rudder to level the plane; which took more effort and time than normal; saw the VSI was pointing down (about 1;000 FPM down); checked the IAS (around 80); and started pulling up as I knew I had enough airspeed to do so without stalling. While pulling up my airspeed decayed to an IAS under 70 KTS and I started to feel some buffeting; which I took as an indication of an accelerated stall. At this point I didn't understand what was going on felt there must be something wrong with the controls related to the left ball I had seen earlier and released back pressure; which again accelerated me downward visually; while not increasing airspeed much.I was extremely confused. I wondered if that left ball meant I was slipping without intending to; or that some control had 'let go' or cable had slipped; or did I have a split flap or ????? And why did pulling up at 70 KTS feel like I was stalling? I had never been in this situation before: I had enough indicated airspeed to do typical maneuvers; had tried to level out but felt I was still dropping while nose-up and potentially stalling (this plane usually stalls at under 45 KTS IAS); was descending extremely rapidly for the control inputs; and seemed to be accelerating downward with reference to the outside even though my airspeed wasn't keeping pace with the view of the landscape now getting closer by the second. In the flight recorder; my pull up shows a GPS speed of 107 KTS and continued drop of -401 FPM while at +.5 degrees pitch; even though I believe my IAS showed about 80. Again; normally at +.5 degrees pitch; I would have ballooned upwards and slowed down at the same time. At this point I was roughly 300 feet AGL; which put me 250 feet above buildings and obstacles. I was mystified and scared and thought I was going to crash.I could not figure out what else to do; and was convinced at that moment that there was something wrongwith the plane. I radioed tower to [advise them].I remembered what my instructor had said and what the books said: fly the plane; fly the plane; fly the plane; fly it to the ground. All this time I could hear the tower calling to clear the space airport and keep planes away from the runway.I then looked for a place to land or crash; feeling there was no way I could make the airfield at these descent rates; continued a shallow turn to the right to line up with a large street; and added full throttle to delay/lessen vertical impact while again pulling up. I believe I radioed the tower again telling them I had lost control and was headed for the street; but I am not sure I remember correctly whether I radioed that or just thought it.At that very moment; above the power lines; I noticed that my descent had stopped increasing in rate; and even though I was still descending (per recorder over 500 FPM) that I was able to pull the nose up with a more 'normal' response: my descent slowed dramatically more than it had slowed about 20 seconds before when I tried pulling up; and since I was at full power; I was not decreasing IAS dramatically while pulling up. My IAS looked to be climbing from ~75 to 80. At that point I saw the grass of the airfield to the right between two buildings and thought I would try to put the plane into the grass or some empty spot rather than on top of a busy street; and turned right between the buildings where I could see the grass of the airfield. At this point I was roughly 80 AGL and about 50 feet over the power lines and building roofs; The plane was pitched up at 2.5 degrees; I was now accelerating with full throttle and my last glance at the IAS showed 90 KTS. Usually this configuration is good for ~4-500 FPM of climb but I was still descending at over 200 FPM at 60 feet AGL. I still didn't feel the plane was responding 'normally;' but could see the 'light at the end of the tunnel' as I thought I would at least clear the airfield fence and get into the grass. As I came over the airport fence; I saw the taxiway was clear to my right; and that [an aircraft] was taxiing toward it from the left; and right at that moment heard the tower call to ask him to stop so I knew they could see me (I think they called 'he's going for the taxiway'); although I think the pilot had seen me already because I saw his nose squat and plane stop right as the tower keyed the mike. With the length of the taxiway clear and nobody heading for it I decided to land there instead of the grass. I also noted that as I cleared the fence; the dramatic downward 'fall' had stopped and the plane; at this point in ground effect; was behaving close to normal. As I thought to deploy flaps; a final check on the IAS to verify within the white arc showed about 90 KTS. I was in a shallow bank over the taxiway; so pulled power; dropped full flaps; landed ungracefully but uneventfully in the taxiway; rolled to the end to be clear of traffic; and started talking with the tower for instructions.They had me wait there for a few moments; and during that time I visually manipulated and inspected all the controls from the cockpit because I was sure I had experienced some kind of control failure. I moved every control and secondary control and could not see anything abnormal.After a few moments; with tower permission I taxied the plane back to the ramp uneventfully and felt a deep sense of shame and fear. I felt I had failed as a student pilot; let my instructor down; must not have been ready for a solo; had 'freaked out;' almost harmed myself and others; and caused everybody at the airport inconvenience and potentially harm. I was embarrassed to have decided to fly that second hour; and questioned my own judgment.Back at the hangar; I shut down; and my flight instructor and I then checked the flight controls and surfaces and found everything normal and operational. During the weekend I spent hours and hours reviewing the flight recorder data and comparing the 60-second section to other normal laps and descents; and trying things out in the flight simulator and reading in forums and other accident reports; as well as re-reading several books about GA accidents. During that time I had several different hypothesis that could explain what had happened:1) I had accidentally flipped the flaps lever to the 'up' (retract) position after lowering them to 10 degrees; causing the plane to drop quickly during the turn (this 172 has a flap lever with a down position that must be held; a neutral position above that; and another neutral position above that which retracts the flaps).2) and/or I had rolled the trim wheel up three times instead of down; creating a strong nose-down tendency and strong control pressures which I interpreted as 'normal' and didn't fight strongly enough.3) and/or I had lost proprioception/orientation during VMC and nosed the plane down and entered a dive.4) and/or I had stalled a wing during my turn to base with incorrect control inputs.5) and/or I had experienced some kind of downdraft/tailwind/wind shear.I cannot conclusively rule out any of the above; but felt that I could safely return to flying because no matter which of the above were to blame; I should have done things differently; and indeed will do things differently going forward; and that if I took the right corrective action promptly; I could not only avoid this situation; but do it safely and without any drama or fear. My personal 'learnings' are as follows:* I will be much more conservative of how much I fly during this learning period; and also the amount of stress I put on myself to learn quickly. * Even as a new student; I should have trusted my gut and not second-thought my instincts; and created time; altitude; and space to get 100% ahead of the plane before staying in the pattern. * Although I have learned that the yaw I experienced on climb-out was due to fuel moving to the low wing from a previous extended slip (I re-created this scenario afterwards to verify); I should have kept on the same heading after my climb and taken some time as I didn't understand the change to the flight dynamics. Subsequently I have found that about 3-4 minutes of level flight will re-balance the fuel levels; but I will trust myself to create time and space whenever I find that something doesn't conform to my experience. * This initial 'ball' indication caused me to feel something was amiss; and might have slowed my responses later. I should have set a safe altitude and direction to do what troubleshooting was necessary; and should not have dismissed anything I didn't understand. This can be very challenging because as a student; we constantly see things we don't understand; but can't tell which are really 'out of normal' and which are just 'normal' things we haven't encountered yet.* When things 'feel wrong;' immediately abort descent; get to straight and level or a climb if safe and possible; and create time and space to troubleshoot. * When the right wing dropped; I feel I did the right thing to kick top rudder and ailerons to level and try to pull up. I would do that again; but add full throttle. * At the point of leveling out after the turn to base I should have also gone to full power; even though I felt I was speeding up; because the IAS didn't show that speed increase. While I already knew and practiced many times increasing power to slow a descent rate; I didn't do this right away because I was 'aimed down' and could sense a strong disconnect between my 'observed' speed (the scenery speeding up and the nose dropping) and the indicated and felt 'plane speed'.* The pattern is extremely dangerous: proximity to other planes; multiple turns; and low altitude AGL means that in ~30-45 seconds you can go from pattern altitude to impact; and one needs to be ready at all times to take immediate corrective action:

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.