Narrative:

On a flight to ZZZ we experienced an engine shutdown. The background is that we had an MEL deferring the #4 fuel gauge. The MEL called for the tank to be checked with stick by the mechanic. Our company policy also states that we shall use the previous flights arrival fuel added to the uploaded fuel to verify the proper fuel load for the flight +/- 3%. Our ramp fuel requirement was 115;000 lbs. Based on my calculations we had 113;500 lbs of fuel on board. But based on the reported fuel from each tank gauge plus the reading the mechanic gave us on tank #4 the fuel on board was 115;300 lbs. Both figures were within 3% and the captain decided to use the 115;300 lbs figure. Additionally; the flight plan had a couple thousand pounds of extra fuel on board.in cruise we got an indication of low fuel and the captain called the mechanic to the flight deck. The mechanic assured us that it was a false indication because he had checked the fuel and we had more than enough in that tank. A short time later we had a low fuel pressure indication in the #4 tank. Eventually the engine shutdown from apparent fuel starvation. We [notified ATC]; descended the aircraft and spoke with company to formulate a plan. It was decided that is was equally safe to continue to our destination; less than an hour away; as it was to divert. After landing; the mechanic checked the tank and said that we still had over 7;000 lbs of fuel in the tank. I have heard through other sources however that actually we had significantly less than that and that the mechanic had been misreading the gauge.as for corrective actions in this situation; I suppose I could have told the captain that we either needed to use 113;500 for our fuel on board or get more fuel. However; I'm not sure that would have helped much since it was still within our allowable error and we easily had more than our minimum fuel for takeoff at the start of takeoff roll. It seems that the primary error was the mechanic's reading of the gauge with most likely not only affected the reading for our current flight but the previous flight as well. That would have led to a compounding error as the fuel I used and the arrival fuel from the previous flight was most likely incorrect.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747-400 First Officer reported the #4 engine shut down in flight due to fuel starvation with the #4 fuel gauge was deferred inoperative.

Narrative: On a flight to ZZZ we experienced an engine shutdown. The background is that we had an MEL deferring the #4 fuel gauge. The MEL called for the tank to be checked with stick by the mechanic. Our company policy also states that we shall use the previous flights arrival fuel added to the uploaded fuel to verify the proper fuel load for the flight +/- 3%. Our ramp fuel requirement was 115;000 lbs. Based on my calculations we had 113;500 lbs of fuel on board. But based on the reported fuel from each tank gauge plus the reading the mechanic gave us on tank #4 the fuel on board was 115;300 lbs. Both figures were within 3% and the Captain decided to use the 115;300 lbs figure. Additionally; the flight plan had a couple thousand pounds of extra fuel on board.In cruise we got an indication of low fuel and the Captain called the mechanic to the flight deck. The mechanic assured us that it was a false indication because he had checked the fuel and we had more than enough in that tank. A short time later we had a low fuel pressure indication in the #4 tank. Eventually the engine shutdown from apparent fuel starvation. We [notified ATC]; descended the aircraft and spoke with company to formulate a plan. It was decided that is was equally safe to continue to our destination; less than an hour away; as it was to divert. After landing; the mechanic checked the tank and said that we still had over 7;000 lbs of fuel in the tank. I have heard through other sources however that actually we had significantly less than that and that the mechanic had been misreading the gauge.As for corrective actions in this situation; I suppose I could have told the Captain that we either needed to use 113;500 for our fuel on board or get more fuel. However; I'm not sure that would have helped much since it was still within our allowable error and we easily had more than our minimum fuel for takeoff at the start of takeoff roll. It seems that the primary error was the mechanic's reading of the gauge with most likely not only affected the reading for our current flight but the previous flight as well. That would have led to a compounding error as the fuel I used and the arrival fuel from the previous flight was most likely incorrect.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.