Narrative:

First officer and captain completed the before pushback checklist. Captain began to try and make contact with push crew while first officer called for pushback clearance from ground control. Push clearance was received with a caution that gate X had recently pushed; to use caution. After several attempts; the captain was unable to communicate with push crew. A new wireless communication device was retrieved and hooked up successfully. Captain made contact with push crew; with no further problems with wireless communication. Captain and push crew exchanged company standard dialog prior to pushback. Captain instructed push crew that 'brakes are released; cleared to push; use caution for the aircraft that just pushed off of gate X.' push crew acknowledged. Almost immediately; the captain and first officer noticed the push was veering off in the direction of the other aircraft off [gate] X. First officer advised captain that the aircraft was becoming uncomfortably close to the other. Seconds later; the aircraft came to a stop; just at the top of the j-line and turned at a thirty degree angle to the j-line. The first officer suggested to captain that we would be unable to make a turn with the other aircraft so close and due to our close proximity to ground equipment. Captain acknowledged. After a short time at a stop and with no additional communication from the push crew; the captain and first officer saw the aircraft off of gate X make a turn to the right safely clearing our aircraft. As soon as the captain saw the aircraft off [gate] X cleared safely; he instructed the push crew to 'please push the aircraft further back and straighten the aircraft out; there is not enough room for me to make a turn out of here.' tug driver acknowledged with an 'ok.' at this point; the first officer had completed starting both engines. Several seconds after the 'ok' acknowledgment; the aircraft began to be towed forward and slightly to the left. Captain immediately and aggressively said to the push driver; 'do not pull us forward; do not tow forward; we have both engines running.' no response was received immediately from push driver. However; a few seconds later; with the aircraft still moving forward; the captain and first officer heard push driver yelling to 'set brake; captain set brake.' the captain applied the aircraft brakes immediately bringing the aircraft to a safe but abrupt stop. Captain set the parking brake. Captain asked tug driver what the problem was; no response was received. Captain asked tug driver if we had a problem and what was going on; no response from tug driver. Captain asked tug driver do we have a problem; and tug driver responded; but neither captain nor first officer were able to understand what he said. Captain instructed tug driver to call for ramp supervisor immediately; again response was unintelligible by captain and first officer. Captain called operations on company frequency and asked for a ramp supervisor to come to gate Y immediately. A ramp supervisor; after several minutes; showed up to the aircraft and took over communication for the push driver. Captain asked what was going on. Ramp supervisor advised captain that the tow bar was lodged into the forward landing gear; between and under the two wheels. Captain acknowledged and began to secure the aircraft by shutting down both engines and turning off all hydraulics. Maintenance showed up to aircraft quickly without the crew calling; flight crew began working with multiple maintenance people to find a solution. Captain advised passengers there was a problem during pushback and that it would be a few minutes until we could get some things sorted out. After approximately 20 minutes; maintenance removed tow bar successfully from under gear and advised captain the aircraft was safe to return to the gate under its own power. First officer started number one engine after ensuring area was clear. Captain taxied the aircraft to gate without any further complications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 flight crew reported deviations from SOP on pushback led to the tow bar becoming lodged into the nose gear.

Narrative: First Officer and Captain completed the Before Pushback Checklist. Captain began to try and make contact with push crew while First Officer called for pushback clearance from Ground Control. Push clearance was received with a caution that Gate X had recently pushed; to use caution. After several attempts; the Captain was unable to communicate with push crew. A new wireless communication device was retrieved and hooked up successfully. Captain made contact with push crew; with no further problems with wireless communication. Captain and push crew exchanged company standard dialog prior to pushback. Captain instructed push crew that 'brakes are released; cleared to push; use caution for the aircraft that just pushed off of Gate X.' Push crew acknowledged. Almost immediately; the Captain and First Officer noticed the push was veering off in the direction of the other aircraft off [Gate] X. First Officer advised Captain that the aircraft was becoming uncomfortably close to the other. Seconds later; the aircraft came to a stop; just at the top of the J-line and turned at a thirty degree angle to the J-line. The First Officer suggested to Captain that we would be unable to make a turn with the other aircraft so close and due to our close proximity to ground equipment. Captain acknowledged. After a short time at a stop and with no additional communication from the push crew; the Captain and First Officer saw the aircraft off of Gate X make a turn to the right safely clearing our aircraft. As soon as the Captain saw the aircraft off [Gate] X cleared safely; he instructed the push crew to 'please push the aircraft further back and straighten the aircraft out; there is not enough room for me to make a turn out of here.' Tug driver acknowledged with an 'ok.' At this point; the First Officer had completed starting both engines. Several seconds after the 'ok' acknowledgment; the aircraft began to be towed forward and slightly to the left. Captain immediately and aggressively said to the Push Driver; 'Do not pull us forward; do not tow forward; we have both engines running.' No response was received immediately from Push Driver. However; a few seconds later; with the aircraft still moving forward; the Captain and First Officer heard push driver yelling to 'set brake; Captain set brake.' The Captain applied the aircraft brakes immediately bringing the aircraft to a safe but abrupt stop. Captain set the parking brake. Captain asked Tug Driver what the problem was; no response was received. Captain asked Tug Driver if we had a problem and what was going on; no response from Tug Driver. Captain asked Tug Driver do we have a problem; and Tug Driver responded; but neither Captain nor First Officer were able to understand what he said. Captain instructed Tug Driver to call for Ramp Supervisor immediately; again response was unintelligible by Captain and First Officer. Captain called Operations on company frequency and asked for a Ramp Supervisor to come to Gate Y immediately. A Ramp Supervisor; after several minutes; showed up to the aircraft and took over communication for the Push Driver. Captain asked what was going on. Ramp Supervisor advised Captain that the tow bar was lodged into the forward landing gear; between and under the two wheels. Captain acknowledged and began to secure the aircraft by shutting down both engines and turning off all hydraulics. Maintenance showed up to aircraft quickly without the Crew calling; Flight Crew began working with multiple maintenance people to find a solution. Captain advised passengers there was a problem during pushback and that it would be a few minutes until we could get some things sorted out. After approximately 20 minutes; Maintenance removed tow bar successfully from under gear and advised Captain the aircraft was safe to return to the gate under its own power. First Officer started number one engine after ensuring area was clear. Captain taxied the aircraft to gate without any further complications.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.