Narrative:

After repositioning to ZZZ; it was decided that we needed 110 gallons of additional fuel to make the trip with a patient to ZZZ1. Our company has a fuel farm at the ZZZ base; the conditions where night it had just rained and there was very little light on the aircraft. Our company does not have single point refueling at any of our fuel farms and we have to do an over the wing fueling process where the fueler climbs on top of the wing and fuels the fuselage tank and it gravity feeds to the whole aircraft fuel system. The captain decided to fuel the aircraft himself and I decided to help the captain by pulling the fuel hose to him. After he was done; I reeled up the hose for him. I jumped in the cockpit and ran our numbers and pulled a clearance. After loading the patient; the captain did a walk around the aircraft but failed to see a black rubber mat left on the wing during fueling. This was the second time the captain has ever fueled this aircraft in this manner and announced to me this was his first flight as a PIC in this make and model aircraft on a part 135 flight.after lining up on the runway and applying take off power; we heard a loud bang and we did an immediate abort. With no indication or EICAS message we taxied into the ramp and shut down. Upon inspection we discovered the rubber mat had been ingested into the right engine.our training was simulator based which is almost entirely based on the cockpit! There was very little actual training concerning the walk around and actual fueling and pre-flighting of the aircraft. This could have been prevented if there where crew preflight procedures regarding pre-flighting and fueling of the aircraft within the company. The chain of events that led up to this event was a lack of consistency in operations. We both are very new to this aircraft and are both trying to establish a good flow of operations using approved factory checklist and standard procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LJ45 flight crew reported preflight procedural mistakes resulted in a rejected takeoff and engine damage.

Narrative: After repositioning to ZZZ; it was decided that we needed 110 gallons of additional fuel to make the trip with a patient to ZZZ1. Our company has a fuel farm at the ZZZ base; the conditions where night it had just rained and there was very little light on the aircraft. Our company does not have single point refueling at any of our fuel farms and we have to do an over the wing fueling process where the fueler climbs on top of the wing and fuels the fuselage tank and it gravity feeds to the whole aircraft fuel system. The Captain decided to fuel the aircraft himself and I decided to help the Captain by pulling the fuel hose to him. After he was done; I reeled up the hose for him. I jumped in the cockpit and ran our numbers and pulled a clearance. After loading the patient; the Captain did a walk around the aircraft but failed to see a black rubber mat left on the wing during fueling. This was the second time the Captain has ever fueled this aircraft in this manner and announced to me this was his first flight as a PIC in this make and model aircraft on a Part 135 flight.After lining up on the runway and applying take off power; we heard a loud bang and we did an immediate abort. With no indication or EICAS message we taxied into the ramp and shut down. Upon inspection we discovered the rubber mat had been ingested into the right engine.Our training was simulator based which is almost entirely based on the cockpit! There was very little actual training concerning the walk around and actual fueling and pre-flighting of the aircraft. This could have been prevented if there where crew preflight procedures regarding pre-flighting and fueling of the aircraft within the company. The chain of events that led up to this event was a lack of consistency in operations. We both are very new to this aircraft and are both trying to establish a good flow of operations using approved factory checklist and standard procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.