Narrative:

After pushback; we started the engines and I called for flaps 5 and the after start checklist. While observing the flight control synoptic screen; I performed the required flight control check per the FM. I observed that the #11 spoiler indication on the synoptic screen was not going fully up as per the FM; therefore failing the flight control check. Before moving the aircraft; we contacted maintenance concerning the issue. Maintenance was unsure how to handle the issue and requested that we contact [maintenance control]. We were asked to taxi the aircraft to another location to allow for other aircraft to taxi. Once relocated to another allocation with the parking brake set; we once again performed another flight control check resulting in a failure. As allowed per the FM; I referenced the maintenance information page (flight controls) to gather further information to relay to [maintenance control] for a more detailed explanation of the issue. We were then directed to return to the gate.once at the gate; maintenance boarded the aircraft and performed approximately seven flight control checks. One out of the seven checks passed. Maintenance had another mechanic positioned on the ground visually observing the flight control check. With only his eyes; he said over the radio that the spoilers were going fully up. I mentioned that there is no possible way he would know if they were going fully up and that the cockpit indications; both the pilot flight control synoptic display and the maintenance information (flight controls) display page both indicated a failure. The maintenance supervisor indicated to me that he was going to make a logbook entry showing that the spoilers were operating properly.I made it very clear to the maintenance supervisor that that is fine with me; but when I pushback and do the flight control check and the #11 spoiler does not fully deploy; I will return to the gate. He said that was not going to happen and keep telling me that as the outside temperature increased; the spoiler will operate within tolerance.from my past experience with this type of issue; the outside temperature was not going to correct the issue. The #4 and #11 spoilers are the roll control spoilers and are the only spoilers that cannot be deferred. If I was going to rely on the outside temperature to correct the issue; what was I going to do inflight where the outside temperature will be 50 degrees colder? The company asked if I would be willing to load the passengers; start the engine and perform a flight control check at the gate. I refused because we cannot pushback with both engines running. They then offered the same; but I can shut down one engine for the pushback. That was fine; but I informed them that I would have to do another flight control check after restarting the engine. Then flight operations came back with another offer to load up the aircraft; pushback; start the engines and then perform the after start checklist; including the flight control check with a mechanic in the cockpit. Their stated intention was that if the flight control synoptic screen still indicated a flight control failure; the mechanic would then view the maintenance information page (flight controls) to observe the #11 spoiler value. If it was within the allowable limits; he would sign off the logbook as such and we would be able to continue. He would then exit the aircraft via the maintenance hatch (with reluctance from the entire flight crew) which later was determined to be a security violation. I then asked if we were to [do] that; would maintenance then make a logbook entry that the flight control synoptic indications were not correct; therefore requiring a deferral. The company refused to allow such a logbook entry as that would not allow the aircraft to be flown.I [decided] that the best course of action as the captain was to go to the flight office and have a discussion with the appropriate flight management to properly rectify this issue in the interest of the passengers; but more so; in the interest of safety. I was numerous times asked to do things that were not allowed either per the fom; FM or FAA regulations. Another example was that when it was determined that the mechanic could not exit via the maintenance hatch; it was suggested that they use portable stairs while still running both engines. I said that was not allowed; nor was it safe to allow someone to do so with the engine running. I also insisted in that if the flight control synoptic page indicated a flight control failure; but the maintenance information page indicated proper movement; that there must be a logbook write-up showing the failure. The company would not allow the write-up because that would not be deferrable.[flight operation management] then informed me that I was not cooperative and that all available options have been exhausted and informed me that I will be removed from the flight without pay and they would assign another captain to fly the flight. Furthermore; I would be allowed to pick up an open trip to make up for the flight pay loss and that I would be contacted should flight management pursue disciplinary action against me.I then returned to the aircraft to retrieve my person belongings. There in the cockpit I meet the replacement captain who was originally scheduled to DH [elsewhere]. Once he was informed that I was being replaced because I refused to operate an unairworthy aircraft; he contact the company and refused the aircraft.I was also informed by the crew that while I was in the flight office for the meeting discussed above; maintenance came back onboard the aircraft and performed five more flight control checks. Every flight control check failed! Even knowing that the aircraft was not airworthy; maintenance signed off the aircraft as airworthy.I gathered my personal belongings and then exited the aircraft. I later discovered that after [the replacement] captain refused the aircraft; maintenance then decided to bring the aircraft to the hangar to fix the issue. Then; a new departure time was quoted. Soon later; it was discovered that there was a real issue and that the resolution was going to take much longer than originally thought. A replacement aircraft was ferried to operate the flight.in my thirty years at company; I have never been treated in such a terrible manner as the way the assistant chief pilot treated me; and worse; trying to get me to violate company and FAA regulations/policies. I asked for assistance in the matter by contacting my representative. After a couple of hours; I received a telephone call from the assistant chief pilot to inform me that they had regrouped and decided that they would restore my lost flight pay and to file a pay claim.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew reported pre-taxi flight control check failure. Flight canceled.

Narrative: After pushback; we started the engines and I called for flaps 5 and the After Start Checklist. While observing the flight control synoptic screen; I performed the required flight control check per the FM. I observed that the #11 spoiler indication on the synoptic screen was not going fully up as per the FM; therefore failing the flight control check. Before moving the aircraft; we contacted Maintenance concerning the issue. Maintenance was unsure how to handle the issue and requested that we contact [Maintenance Control]. We were asked to taxi the aircraft to another location to allow for other aircraft to taxi. Once relocated to another allocation with the parking brake set; we once again performed another flight control check resulting in a failure. As allowed per the FM; I referenced the maintenance information page (Flight Controls) to gather further information to relay to [Maintenance Control] for a more detailed explanation of the issue. We were then directed to return to the gate.Once at the gate; Maintenance boarded the aircraft and performed approximately seven flight control checks. One out of the seven checks passed. Maintenance had another mechanic positioned on the ground visually observing the flight control check. With only his eyes; he said over the radio that the spoilers were going fully up. I mentioned that there is no possible way he would know if they were going fully up and that the cockpit indications; both the pilot flight control synoptic display and the maintenance information (Flight Controls) display page both indicated a failure. The Maintenance Supervisor indicated to me that he was going to make a logbook entry showing that the spoilers were operating properly.I made it very clear to the Maintenance Supervisor that that is fine with me; but when I pushback and do the flight control check and the #11 spoiler does not fully deploy; I will return to the gate. He said that was not going to happen and keep telling me that as the outside temperature increased; the spoiler will operate within tolerance.From my past experience with this type of issue; the outside temperature was not going to correct the issue. The #4 and #11 spoilers are the roll control spoilers and are the only spoilers that cannot be deferred. If I was going to rely on the outside temperature to correct the issue; what was I going to do inflight where the outside temperature will be 50 degrees colder? The Company asked if I would be willing to load the passengers; start the engine and perform a flight control check at the gate. I refused because we cannot pushback with both engines running. They then offered the same; but I can shut down one engine for the pushback. That was fine; but I informed them that I would have to do another flight control check after restarting the engine. Then Flight Operations came back with another offer to load up the aircraft; pushback; start the engines and then perform the after start checklist; including the flight control check with a mechanic in the cockpit. Their stated intention was that if the flight control synoptic screen still indicated a flight control failure; the mechanic would then view the maintenance information page (Flight Controls) to observe the #11 spoiler value. If it was within the allowable limits; he would sign off the logbook as such and we would be able to continue. He would then exit the aircraft via the maintenance hatch (with reluctance from the entire flight crew) which later was determined to be a security violation. I then asked if we were to [do] that; would Maintenance then make a logbook entry that the flight control synoptic indications were not correct; therefore requiring a deferral. The Company refused to allow such a logbook entry as that would not allow the aircraft to be flown.I [decided] that the best course of action as the Captain was to go to the Flight Office and have a discussion with the appropriate Flight Management to properly rectify this issue in the interest of the passengers; but more so; in the interest of safety. I was numerous times asked to do things that were not allowed either per the FOM; FM or FAA regulations. Another example was that when it was determined that the mechanic could not exit via the maintenance hatch; it was suggested that they use portable stairs while still running both engines. I said that was not allowed; nor was it safe to allow someone to do so with the engine running. I also insisted in that if the flight control synoptic page indicated a flight control failure; but the maintenance information page indicated proper movement; that there must be a logbook write-up showing the failure. The Company would not allow the write-up because that would not be deferrable.[Flight Operation Management] then informed me that I was not cooperative and that all available options have been exhausted and informed me that I will be removed from the flight without pay and they would assign another Captain to fly the flight. Furthermore; I would be allowed to pick up an open trip to make up for the flight pay loss and that I would be contacted should Flight Management pursue disciplinary action against me.I then returned to the aircraft to retrieve my person belongings. There in the cockpit I meet the replacement Captain who was originally scheduled to DH [elsewhere]. Once he was informed that I was being replaced because I refused to operate an unairworthy aircraft; he contact the Company and refused the aircraft.I was also informed by the crew that while I was in the flight office for the meeting discussed above; Maintenance came back onboard the aircraft and performed five more flight control checks. Every flight control check failed! Even knowing that the aircraft was not airworthy; Maintenance signed off the aircraft as airworthy.I gathered my personal belongings and then exited the aircraft. I later discovered that after [the replacement] Captain refused the aircraft; Maintenance then decided to bring the aircraft to the hangar to fix the issue. Then; a new departure time was quoted. Soon later; it was discovered that there was a real issue and that the resolution was going to take much longer than originally thought. A replacement aircraft was ferried to operate the flight.In my thirty years at Company; I have never been treated in such a terrible manner as the way the Assistant Chief Pilot treated me; and worse; trying to get me to violate Company and FAA regulations/policies. I asked for assistance in the matter by contacting my representative. After a couple of hours; I received a telephone call from the Assistant Chief Pilot to inform me that they had regrouped and decided that they would restore my lost flight pay and to file a pay claim.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.