Narrative:

Entire event day VMC. First officer (first officer) [was] PF (pilot flying) at start of event. We set 310K in VNAV page and executed. Just after this; the rt AC bus failed with many associated failures. [Aircraft] started a gentle climb. Pm (pilot monitoring) announced 'you're climbing;' PF acknowledged and disconnected [autopilot]. Both pilots at this moment know a system has failed; but have yet to determine what failed. The bottom EICAS was failed; and compressed onto top screen. The top caution item presented on the EICAS was autothrottle disconnected. Just as the pm was beginning to assess the EICAS screen; the PF announced he had multiple failures and needed to pass the controls (PF had no FD; ehsi; CDU; and numerous other flags on his ADI).the ca (captain) accepted the controls; while asking center for vectors and altitudes to ZZZ due to a system failure (logic being we needed relief from the numerous above and below altitudes associated with the STAR). Center provided headings and altitudes. We were set up to fly the approach to xxl. Center asked if we could accept xxr (which is 2;000 feet longer). We agreed we could (day VMC) and knew we would have to change our set up. I don't recall all the headings and altitudes; however; approach requested we slow as much as practical to prepare for our arrival on xxr. Thusly; we started to configure with flaps and later gear to slow down and get down. At some point we did get below bugged airspeed simply due to being behind the power curve on autothrottles inoperative.the pm was a bit overtasked due to running the QRH; internal and external comms; runway change set-up; etc. However; at no time did either of us have any doubt about continuing the arrival to ZZZ because we essentially had the airport in sight. Later; approach asked us to change back to runway xxl; again not a problem due to day VMC. What it did was slow down the pm ability to fully complete the QRH checklist. What he was essentially able to accomplish was cycling the generator; and starting the APU; and announcing we had to land at the nearest suitable airfield which is what we were doing. We landed safely and wrote up the rt AC bus failure. Had we been IMC or night VMC (due terrain); we would have had to ask for vectors/holding etc; buy more time to complete all QRH checklists and accomplish the same safe landing.this event happened in the last 15 minutes of a 4.5 hour flight. The nature of an AC bus failure causes so many items to fail; it takes some time to figure out what the root cause of the failure was. In our case; right AC bus off was not the item at the top of the compressed EICAS screen; it was beneath autothrot disc. Thusly; it took awhile for the first officer to arrive at the correct QRH checklist (in fact; at one point he actually asked me if we had 'lost an engine'; I said no and pointed to both good motors on the upper EICAS); and then; we didn't get past the 2nd page of the 9 page checklist. Why? In this case; we were aviating; navigating and communicating a perfectly flyable aircraft to an airfield we could 'essentially' see from the outset.as the ca; and pm at the beginning of the event; I would have preferred to let the first officer continue flying while I took care of troubleshooting and communicating. That wasn't an option in this case; as the first officer rightfully passed the controls to me due to the multiple pfd malfunctions on his side. Once I took the aircraft; it was a handful to fly for the first minute or so (trim; autopilot off; etc.) and then again a little later when it came time to get throttles/airspeed in sync. I think that realizing immediately that we needed relief from the 'via' portion of our arrival was good; however a couple items approach threw at us made our task more difficult. They asked if we could accept xxr (my initial thought was just stay with our set-up on xxl; but the first officer accurately pointed out it was 2000 ft. Longer....so I agreed); but then they ask us to slow as much as possible to prepare for our arrival on xxr. Thusly; we started configuring far earlier than SOP to accommodate the ATC request. And it cost us time in the cockpit (changing). The kicker ends up being they ask us to change back to xxl. I would like to have that time back. As you read this; you need to know that the first officer had to reach across the throttle quadrant to make any FMC changes; as his FMC was dead; and my hand was on the throttles. At one point I reached around him to select the next required flap setting (yes; I realize non-standard...but in the moment it was necessary; expedient; and kept from interrupting the first officer's task on my FMC). If given this system failure again at the same start point; could we handle it more cleanly...yes. But; we did an after action review of our thought process throughout and are satisfied with each decision we made as a crew during this event. Suggestion; it seems we may have taken the cheap route on reproducing QRH checklists on the aircraft. The color version provided in my opinion provides subtle cognitive clues that were placed there for a reason and present worthwhile information. Suggest applying the resources for proper color qrhs.suggestion; my first officer and I haven't exactly arrived at how the QRH could be cleaner on this failure; but this is one of those procedures where (at least in the heat of the moment) isn't that easy to understand. Maybe a tasker for safety in conjunction with training department to see if the solution we have is the best practice going forward. I honestly don't know.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300ER flight crew reported experiencing confusion and workload issues while dealing with the loss of an AC bus on approach.

Narrative: Entire event Day VMC. FO (First Officer) [was] PF (Pilot Flying) at start of event. We set 310K in VNAV page and executed. Just after this; the RT AC Bus failed with many associated failures. [Aircraft] started a gentle climb. PM (Pilot Monitoring) announced 'you're climbing;' PF acknowledged and disconnected [autopilot]. Both pilots at this moment know a system has failed; but have yet to determine what failed. The bottom EICAS was failed; and compressed onto top screen. The top caution item presented on the EICAS was Autothrottle Disconnected. Just as the PM was beginning to assess the EICAS screen; the PF announced he had multiple failures and needed to pass the controls (PF had no FD; EHSI; CDU; and numerous other flags on his ADI).The CA (Captain) accepted the controls; while asking Center for vectors and altitudes to ZZZ due to a system failure (logic being we needed relief from the numerous above and below altitudes associated with the STAR). Center provided headings and altitudes. We were set up to fly the approach to XXL. Center asked if we could accept XXR (which is 2;000 feet longer). We agreed we could (day VMC) and knew we would have to change our set up. I don't recall all the headings and altitudes; however; approach requested we slow as much as practical to prepare for our arrival on XXR. Thusly; we started to configure with flaps and later gear to slow down and get down. At some point we did get below bugged airspeed simply due to being behind the power curve on autothrottles inoperative.The PM was a bit overtasked due to running the QRH; internal and external comms; runway change set-up; etc. However; at no time did either of us have any doubt about continuing the arrival to ZZZ because we essentially had the airport in sight. Later; Approach asked us to change back to Runway XXL; again not a problem due to day VMC. What it did was slow down the PM ability to fully complete the QRH checklist. What he was essentially able to accomplish was cycling the generator; and starting the APU; and announcing we had to land at the nearest suitable airfield which is what we were doing. We landed safely and wrote up the RT AC Bus Failure. Had we been IMC or night VMC (due terrain); we would have had to ask for vectors/holding etc; buy more time to complete all QRH checklists and accomplish the same safe landing.This event happened in the last 15 minutes of a 4.5 hour flight. The nature of an AC Bus failure causes so many items to fail; it takes some time to figure out what the root cause of the failure was. In our case; R AC BUS OFF was not the item at the top of the compressed EICAS screen; it was beneath AUTOTHROT DISC. Thusly; it took awhile for the FO to arrive at the correct QRH checklist (in fact; at one point he actually asked me if we had 'lost an engine'; I said no and pointed to both good motors on the upper EICAS); and then; we didn't get past the 2nd page of the 9 page checklist. Why? In this case; we were Aviating; Navigating and Communicating a perfectly flyable aircraft to an airfield we could 'essentially' see from the outset.As the CA; and PM at the beginning of the event; I would have preferred to let the FO continue flying while I took care of troubleshooting and communicating. That wasn't an option in this case; as the FO rightfully passed the controls to me due to the multiple PFD malfunctions on his side. Once I took the aircraft; it was a handful to fly for the first minute or so (trim; autopilot off; etc.) and then again a little later when it came time to get throttles/airspeed in sync. I think that realizing immediately that we needed relief from the 'VIA' portion of our arrival was good; however a couple items Approach threw at us made our task more difficult. They asked if we could accept XXR (my initial thought was just stay with our set-up on XXL; but the FO accurately pointed out it was 2000 ft. longer....so I agreed); but then they ask us to slow as much as possible to prepare for our arrival on XXR. Thusly; we started configuring far earlier than SOP to accommodate the ATC request. And it cost us time in the cockpit (changing). The kicker ends up being they ask us to change back to XXL. I would like to have that time back. As you read this; you need to know that the FO had to reach across the throttle quadrant to make any FMC changes; as his FMC was dead; and my hand was on the throttles. At one point I reached around him to select the next required flap setting (yes; I realize non-standard...but in the moment it was necessary; expedient; and kept from interrupting the FO's task on my FMC). If given this system failure again at the same start point; could we handle it more cleanly...yes. But; we did an after action review of our thought process throughout and are satisfied with each decision we made as a crew during this event. Suggestion; it seems we may have taken the cheap route on reproducing QRH checklists on the aircraft. The color version provided in my opinion provides subtle cognitive clues that were placed there for a reason and present worthwhile information. Suggest applying the resources for proper color QRHs.Suggestion; my FO and I haven't exactly arrived at how the QRH could be cleaner on this failure; but this is one of those procedures where (at least in the heat of the moment) isn't that easy to understand. Maybe a tasker for safety in conjunction with training department to see if the solution we have is the best practice going forward. I honestly don't know.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.