Narrative:

There were numerous areas of clouds in the renton/seattle area, and the reports and forecasts for the route were variable. After takeoff, I departed renton to the east to clear the TCA and to circle up through a large hole (order of 20 mi in diameter) in the clouds. A check of the TCA chart indicated that the sea TCA did not exist east of renton and that the top of the TCA was 7000'. There was continuous light to moderate turbulence during the climb. It became apparently that I would have to go west before proceeding northbound in order to fly around higher clouds,which was not part of my initial plan. However, since the chart indicated that the top of the TCA was 7000', I proceeded westbound after leaving 7000'. This allowed me to circumnav the higher buildups by a wide margin and proceed to friday harbor in good VFR conditions. During the return to renton, I noticed that the TCA had changed drastically. Specifically, the top of the TCA was 10000' MSL, not 7000', and that the area east of renton now had airspace designated as part of the sea TCA between 6000 and 10000'. The problem was quickly idented as a result of having 2 sea TCA charts on board, one which was significantly out of date. The top of the TCA had increased from 7000-10000', and the area east of renton changed as noted above. I had bought a new chart in klamath falls on the trip from home base in torrance, ca to renton 2 days earlier. Unfortunately, the old chart was not thrown away, and was used during the climb from renton. The added workload of negotiating WX, moderate turbulence, navigating over an unfamiliar area, and tending to 3 passenger probably contributed to the error of not noticing that I was dealing with 2 TCA charts. The 7000' top of the TCA seemed reasonable, since I had just completed an extensive x-country trip from toa to quebec city to patuxent river, md to tao, and noted that many TCA's (including busy north.Y.) still have tops at 7000'. The primary cause of the problem was not throwing away the old TCA chart. The very high workload associated with negotiating complex TCA's, which had no uniform dimensions, as a single pilot operation, with WX and turbulence as significant side tasks, was a definite contributing factor. In addition, the sea air traffic controllers appear to be overworked and give the distinct impression that assisting VFR traffic is a burden. Example: on arriving in seattle from toa (2 days earlier), it took 5 calls to get an answer. Once radar idented, I was told to fly over chkpoint that could only be known by lcls, or idented by extensive looking down at the TCA charts. Vectors were never offered (or requested). This was a definite factor in my not requesting flight following during the climb out to renton, especially considering that my course of action was uncertain due to WX. On returning to renton I requested radar advisories and noted the same lack of interest on the part of the sea air traffic controllers (i.e., numerous calls to get an answer, and an 'I'm too busy for this' attitude).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT USES WRONG CHART, PENETRATES NEW DIMENSIONS OF TCA.

Narrative: THERE WERE NUMEROUS AREAS OF CLOUDS IN THE RENTON/SEATTLE AREA, AND THE RPTS AND FORECASTS FOR THE RTE WERE VARIABLE. AFTER TKOF, I DEPARTED RENTON TO THE E TO CLR THE TCA AND TO CIRCLE UP THROUGH A LARGE HOLE (ORDER OF 20 MI IN DIAMETER) IN THE CLOUDS. A CHK OF THE TCA CHART INDICATED THAT THE SEA TCA DID NOT EXIST E OF RENTON AND THAT THE TOP OF THE TCA WAS 7000'. THERE WAS CONTINUOUS LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB DURING THE CLB. IT BECAME APPARENTLY THAT I WOULD HAVE TO GO W BEFORE PROCEEDING NBND IN ORDER TO FLY AROUND HIGHER CLOUDS,WHICH WAS NOT PART OF MY INITIAL PLAN. HOWEVER, SINCE THE CHART INDICATED THAT THE TOP OF THE TCA WAS 7000', I PROCEEDED WBND AFTER LEAVING 7000'. THIS ALLOWED ME TO CIRCUMNAV THE HIGHER BUILDUPS BY A WIDE MARGIN AND PROCEED TO FRIDAY HARBOR IN GOOD VFR CONDITIONS. DURING THE RETURN TO RENTON, I NOTICED THAT THE TCA HAD CHANGED DRASTICALLY. SPECIFICALLY, THE TOP OF THE TCA WAS 10000' MSL, NOT 7000', AND THAT THE AREA E OF RENTON NOW HAD AIRSPACE DESIGNATED AS PART OF THE SEA TCA BTWN 6000 AND 10000'. THE PROB WAS QUICKLY IDENTED AS A RESULT OF HAVING 2 SEA TCA CHARTS ON BOARD, ONE WHICH WAS SIGNIFICANTLY OUT OF DATE. THE TOP OF THE TCA HAD INCREASED FROM 7000-10000', AND THE AREA E OF RENTON CHANGED AS NOTED ABOVE. I HAD BOUGHT A NEW CHART IN KLAMATH FALLS ON THE TRIP FROM HOME BASE IN TORRANCE, CA TO RENTON 2 DAYS EARLIER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE OLD CHART WAS NOT THROWN AWAY, AND WAS USED DURING THE CLB FROM RENTON. THE ADDED WORKLOAD OF NEGOTIATING WX, MODERATE TURB, NAVIGATING OVER AN UNFAMILIAR AREA, AND TENDING TO 3 PAX PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR OF NOT NOTICING THAT I WAS DEALING WITH 2 TCA CHARTS. THE 7000' TOP OF THE TCA SEEMED REASONABLE, SINCE I HAD JUST COMPLETED AN EXTENSIVE X-COUNTRY TRIP FROM TOA TO QUEBEC CITY TO PATUXENT RIVER, MD TO TAO, AND NOTED THAT MANY TCA'S (INCLUDING BUSY N.Y.) STILL HAVE TOPS AT 7000'. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE PROB WAS NOT THROWING AWAY THE OLD TCA CHART. THE VERY HIGH WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH NEGOTIATING COMPLEX TCA'S, WHICH HAD NO UNIFORM DIMENSIONS, AS A SINGLE PLT OPERATION, WITH WX AND TURB AS SIGNIFICANT SIDE TASKS, WAS A DEFINITE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. IN ADDITION, THE SEA AIR TFC CTLRS APPEAR TO BE OVERWORKED AND GIVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT ASSISTING VFR TFC IS A BURDEN. EXAMPLE: ON ARRIVING IN SEATTLE FROM TOA (2 DAYS EARLIER), IT TOOK 5 CALLS TO GET AN ANSWER. ONCE RADAR IDENTED, I WAS TOLD TO FLY OVER CHKPOINT THAT COULD ONLY BE KNOWN BY LCLS, OR IDENTED BY EXTENSIVE LOOKING DOWN AT THE TCA CHARTS. VECTORS WERE NEVER OFFERED (OR REQUESTED). THIS WAS A DEFINITE FACTOR IN MY NOT REQUESTING FLT FOLLOWING DURING THE CLBOUT TO RENTON, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT MY COURSE OF ACTION WAS UNCERTAIN DUE TO WX. ON RETURNING TO RENTON I REQUESTED RADAR ADVISORIES AND NOTED THE SAME LACK OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE SEA AIR TFC CTLRS (I.E., NUMEROUS CALLS TO GET AN ANSWER, AND AN 'I'M TOO BUSY FOR THIS' ATTITUDE).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.