Narrative:

When attempting to operate the above flight we completed a normal cockpit set up and checklists for an on-time departure from ZZZ. The aircraft was towed to spot 'B;' and the number 2 engine started. At my request; ramp tower coordinated a runway xx departure assignment which would have resulted in a very short taxi; therefore I instructed the first officer (first officer) to start the number 1 engine prior to further movement.as the number one engine reached a stabilized idle condition; an engine master caution light illuminated and the number 1 engine control light illuminated. The QRH was called for and directed a 'do not take off' condition. Maintenance was consulted over the appropriate radio frequency and then some analysis was directed by maintenance personal via the service interphone (man on ramp; plugged in to aircraft). The engine displayed eec faults immediately upon reaching idle. Maintenance then directed us to shut down the engine and return to the gate. Operations was called on the appropriate frequency and directed me to park the aircraft at gate. Upon arriving at the gate alignment stripe; I directed the first officer to advise operations that we were in a non-normal configuration after shutting down the number 1 engine - and to re-state in a conspicuous manner that ramp personnel needed to be aware that number 2 would be running throughout the parking maneuver. They acknowledged. With the aircraft stopped at the lead-in line of the gate; there were no wing walkers present; no marshaller; and several red plastic cones just inside the safe zone (red lines). I directed the first officer to request ramp personnel to assist in parking (see note; below). A male voice; self-identified as the 'operations manager' responded by directing me to self-park without ramp personnel. I then directed the first officer to re-state our non-standard configuration; non-normal aircraft state; and that I needed ramp personnel to assist. The same male voice responded by repeating his 'manager' status; and that he didn't have personnel to spare for our irregular operation (gate return); and that I needed to use the self-park procedure and 'clear the taxiway.' I then keyed the mic; identified myself as the captain and stated; again; that I needed parking assistance. Shortly thereafter; a marshaller appeared; moved the cones behind the red lines; and guided us in.note: while I am aware of the various parking systems described in fom - tables/codes/signals and the procedural direction in fom - operating information that addresses gate parking; I have not observed or been informed that fully autonomous; automatic parking is approved without any ramp personnel in position - especially with items inside the safe zone boundary. I have also researched pilot bulletins; and the station pages for ZZZ. I am; however; completely comfortable with the knowledge that all pertinent instructions regarding parking uncertainty; confusion; or conflicting signals mandate that I stop the aircraft and obtain clarity; direction; and assistance commensurate with safe operations. In this case a clearly communicated need was transmitted from my flight deck to operations 3 times and acknowledged with nothing short of belligerence and arguing.further: the attempted operation of this flight in the 737 max was the first and only time that either my first officer or I had occupied the flight deck of this 737 variant; used the displays; started the engines; and then had to use non-normal procedures complete with a gate return. The aircraft feels quite different to maneuver and the residual thrust of even one engine during parking (especially the non-standard; number 2 engine) indicated extra caution and the use of all available assets. The requests made of the station to assist me in this effort would easily be sited as an error of omission should I have chosen not to make them with a resulting incident or accident. This situation was made exponentially more complex with the lack of professionalism displayed by operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported engine malfunction on start-up as well as a conflict with station management during the gate return.

Narrative: When attempting to operate the above flight we completed a normal cockpit set up and checklists for an on-time departure from ZZZ. The aircraft was towed to spot 'B;' and the number 2 engine started. At my request; ramp tower coordinated a RWY XX departure assignment which would have resulted in a very short taxi; therefore I instructed the FO (First Officer) to start the number 1 engine prior to further movement.As the number one engine reached a stabilized idle condition; an Engine Master Caution light illuminated and the number 1 Engine Control light illuminated. The QRH was called for and directed a 'Do not take off' condition. Maintenance was consulted over the appropriate radio frequency and then some analysis was directed by maintenance personal via the service interphone (man on ramp; plugged in to aircraft). The engine displayed EEC faults immediately upon reaching idle. Maintenance then directed us to shut down the engine and return to the gate. Operations was called on the appropriate frequency and directed me to park the aircraft at gate. Upon arriving at the gate alignment stripe; I directed the FO to advise Operations that we were in a non-normal configuration after shutting down the number 1 engine - and to re-state in a conspicuous manner that ramp personnel needed to be aware that number 2 would be running throughout the parking maneuver. They acknowledged. With the aircraft stopped at the lead-in line of the gate; there were no wing walkers present; no marshaller; and several red plastic cones just inside the safe zone (red lines). I directed the FO to request ramp personnel to assist in parking (see note; below). A male voice; self-identified as the 'Operations Manager' responded by directing me to self-park without ramp personnel. I then directed the FO to re-state our non-standard configuration; non-normal aircraft state; and that I needed ramp personnel to assist. The same male voice responded by repeating his 'manager' status; and that he didn't have personnel to spare for our irregular operation (gate return); and that I needed to use the self-park procedure and 'clear the taxiway.' I then keyed the mic; identified myself as the Captain and stated; again; that I needed parking assistance. Shortly thereafter; a marshaller appeared; moved the cones behind the red lines; and guided us in.Note: While I am aware of the various parking systems described in FOM - Tables/Codes/Signals and the procedural direction in FOM - Operating Information that addresses gate parking; I have not observed or been informed that fully autonomous; automatic parking is approved without any ramp personnel in position - especially with items inside the safe zone boundary. I have also researched Pilot Bulletins; and the station pages for ZZZ. I am; however; completely comfortable with the knowledge that all pertinent instructions regarding parking uncertainty; confusion; or conflicting signals mandate that I stop the aircraft and obtain clarity; direction; and assistance commensurate with safe operations. In this case a clearly communicated need was transmitted from my flight deck to Operations 3 times and acknowledged with nothing short of belligerence and arguing.Further: The attempted operation of this flight in the 737 Max was the first and only time that either my FO or I had occupied the flight deck of this 737 variant; used the displays; started the engines; and then had to use non-normal procedures complete with a gate return. The aircraft feels quite different to maneuver and the residual thrust of even one engine during parking (especially the non-standard; number 2 engine) indicated extra caution and the use of all available assets. The requests made of the station to assist me in this effort would easily be sited as an error of omission should I have chosen not to make them with a resulting incident or accident. This situation was made exponentially more complex with the lack of professionalism displayed by Operations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.