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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1618987 |
Time | |
Date | 201902 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB-505 / Phenom 300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Wheels/Tires/Brakes |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I departed as flying pilot; right seat; sic (second-in-command). About an hour out from ZZZ1; the brake fail cas (crew alert system) message came on. We referenced the QRH for brake fail cas message and realized that we needed to make a landing using the emergency brake system. I maintained control of the aircraft and the radios while the captain called the company to confer on what to do and where to divert. He then called [the FBO] to coordinate ground handling then spoke with the passengers. I notified ATC that we needed to divert to ZZZ and that we were [requesting priority handling]. I also let them know that we needed to stop on runway and be towed off. At this point the captain and I reviewed the QRH again and reviewed what needed to be done. We decided it would be better if he landed and operated the brakes; so we switched controls and I became the non-flying pilot. At this point I went back and briefed the passengers in greater detail on what to expect and how to evacuate. I used test as a basic guide. After reassuring them; I returned to my seat. We ran all appropriate checklists. We were vectored onto the GPS 27 and picked up the runway visually. We flew a standard stabilized approach; except the captain got low on glideslope. I called for him to correct and he did. We touched down normally; and the captain began using the emergency brake handle. He applied gradual; soft pressure; and we seemed to be slowing normally. Suddenly both tires blew and we rapidly came to a stop. There was a momentary pause; then I realized that we should run the emergency evacuation checklist; which we did to shut down and secured the plane. When I completed that checklist; I jumped out of my seat and went to main cabin door. I looked out window and saw no fire. I tentatively opened door to look out and saw a firefighter walking towards me. I opened door and walked down to talk to him and found everyone else followed me off the plane. The FBO took the passengers to the FBO; operations towed the aircraft off the runway. We secured passenger bags and then secured aircraft.I thought we did a pretty good job. I would suggest in training this emergency to emphasize not to try to duck under glideslope to make an early touch down. I don't think blowing the tires could have been avoided; the captain very slightly and gently pulled on the brake handle (I watched closely to see) and the tires blew regardless. Later; I heard a maintenance controller ask if we had tried the brake pedals first but we hadn't because that was not in the QRH checklist. We had briefed a lot about the approach and landing; and towing the airplane off the runway; but we didn't brief that we would do an evacuation checklist. We should have so it would have been a seamless transition from landing to securing the aircraft. I wish I had waited for an all clear signal from the firefighters before opening the door and I should have maintained better control over the passengers (they basically followed me out of the plane).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB-505 First Officer reported a brake system failure; leading to a diversion and 2 blown tires.
Narrative: I departed as flying pilot; right seat; SIC (Second-in-Command). About an hour out from ZZZ1; the BRAKE FAIL CAS (Crew Alert System) message came on. We referenced the QRH for Brake Fail CAS message and realized that we needed to make a landing using the emergency brake system. I maintained control of the aircraft and the radios while the Captain called the company to confer on what to do and where to divert. He then called [the FBO] to coordinate ground handling then spoke with the passengers. I notified ATC that we needed to divert to ZZZ and that we were [requesting priority handling]. I also let them know that we needed to stop on runway and be towed off. At this point the Captain and I reviewed the QRH again and reviewed what needed to be done. We decided it would be better if he landed and operated the brakes; so we switched controls and I became the non-flying pilot. At this point I went back and briefed the passengers in greater detail on what to expect and how to evacuate. I used TEST as a basic guide. After reassuring them; I returned to my seat. We ran all appropriate checklists. We were vectored onto the GPS 27 and picked up the runway visually. We flew a standard stabilized approach; except the Captain got low on glideslope. I called for him to correct and he did. We touched down normally; and the Captain began using the emergency brake handle. He applied gradual; soft pressure; and we seemed to be slowing normally. Suddenly both tires blew and we rapidly came to a stop. There was a momentary pause; then I realized that we should run the emergency evacuation checklist; which we did to shut down and secured the plane. When I completed that checklist; I jumped out of my seat and went to main cabin door. I looked out window and saw no fire. I tentatively opened door to look out and saw a firefighter walking towards me. I opened door and walked down to talk to him and found everyone else followed me off the plane. The FBO took the passengers to the FBO; Operations towed the aircraft off the runway. We secured passenger bags and then secured aircraft.I thought we did a pretty good job. I would suggest in training this emergency to emphasize not to try to duck under glideslope to make an early touch down. I don't think blowing the tires could have been avoided; the Captain very slightly and gently pulled on the brake handle (I watched closely to see) and the tires blew regardless. Later; I heard a Maintenance Controller ask if we had tried the brake pedals first but we hadn't because that was not in the QRH checklist. We had briefed a lot about the approach and landing; and towing the airplane off the runway; but we didn't brief that we would do an evacuation checklist. We should have so it would have been a seamless transition from landing to securing the aircraft. I wish I had waited for an all clear signal from the firefighters before opening the door and I should have maintained better control over the passengers (they basically followed me out of the plane).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.