Narrative:

I was assigned to fly flight to bgr as part of my originally awarded schedule. That morning; the captain I had been flying the trip [when he] notified me that he had been removed from the flight and was now dead heading in the back. He called scheduling to find out the reason and learned he was removed because it was our last leg of the day and we had no connection times; while a reserve captain that was assigned to fly the return flight would not have the required connection time if he was dead heading going up. Because of this; he had been removed to allow the reserve captain to fly both directions; removing the required connection time and protecting the schedule.when I got to the gate; the reserve captain was already there and informed me that he hadn't flown a lot as he was new. We also discussed the snow storm with reports of icing in bgr and that we had an alternate of pwm. Once we got on the plane; we went through a normal preflight without issue. The captain then requested weather updates at bgr through the FMS and was concerned about the current and forecasted winds. With a contaminated runway; our crosswind limit is 15; and at the time; bgr was reporting a direct crosswind of approximately 25 [knots] with gust over 30 [knots]. With this information; the captain called our dispatcher about the winds in bgr to discuss if the flight would depart. Following the phone call; it was determined we would be going; but if the winds were out of limits when we arrived we would be diverting to our alternate of pwm. We finished boarding; pushed back; started the aircraft; taxied and took off without incident.the flight proceeded with nothing of note until we began our decent into bgr. The ATIS stated that a boeing 737 over an hour ago had reported severe icing. We looked up the signs of severe icing and procedures. We both concluded because it was over an hour ago; we would proceed but would keep checking for ice formation on the side windows which is listed as a sign of severe icing. As we were descending from our cruising altitude; I checked in with approach. We were then informed the winds were from the north at approximately 9 knots and they were landing runway 15. The captain told me to request runway 33 due to the winds combined with a contaminated runway. I agreed; requested; and we were given vectors for the ILS runway 33. We were also informed by the controller of the 737 that had reported severe icing over an hour ago.prior to passing through 10;000 feet.; we were in the clouds with both our wing and cowl anti-ice turned on at 250 KIAS. Passing through 7;000 feet.; we had light rime ice momentarily and it shed right off. As I was reporting this to approach; I noticed our airspeed was starting to increase and I noticed the captain was moving the thrust levers a lot; adjusting the vertical descent speed and amount of spoilers. Adjusting all three of these continuously; I observed him working hard and 'fighting' the aircraft. A moment later I noticed our speed and called out 'speed 280.' he acknowledged my call out and I continued to observed him fighting the aircraft for a few more moments. I then told him 'just set the thrust at the bottom of the green arc and work from there.' he set the thrust as I suggested and only adjusted the spoilers and vertical speed allowing him to manage the aircraft better. ATC gave us a vector to intercept the localizer; we did as instructed but went through the localizer because of their timing and our airspeed. When the controller offered us a new vector to come back and intercept the localizer; the captain told me to ask for a 360 [turn]; which I did; and we were given. The captain continued to work on the airspeed and configuration of the plane in the 360 [turn]. Our final vector had us intercept the localizer just past the glide slope. After we passed the glide slope; I called it out and the captain instantly disconnected the autopilot and proceededto descend. I then set the altitude to 500 ft. (MDA was 470 [feet] based on high mins) and put the vertical speed to 900 FPM while announcing what I was doing; stating his flight director would now give him guidance back onto the glide slope. I believe at one point I increased the rate of descent for him as high as 1;100 FPM and reset the altitude to the missed approach altitude. At 1;000 [feet] above ground level (AGL); we were still a full dot above glide slope and the captain called for a go-around. The go-around was flown correctly and I announced it to tower; who then gave us runway heading and 3;000 feet. As we were climbing to 3;000 feet.; tower was talking to us and I noticed some ice on my side window; looked back and saw ice on the entire leading edge of the winglet and in front of the navigation lights (the wing itself was clean). As tower was still talking to us; I tapped the captain; pointed to the window and motioned up with my thumb. He shook his head in agreement and I asked tower for higher due to ice as we were assigned a downwind leg. We climbed to 5;000 feet and proceeded in the downwind. The ice melted off the window; winglet and in-front of the lights quickly.in the downwind; the captain started to reference fuel numbers; started to verbally do math to figure out if we could do another approach. I stopped him; showed him my bingo calculation of 3;250 lbs that I done prior to take off; pointed and stated we had 3;900 lbs onboard and we were good for another approach. I also then stated I noticed he had been working hard for a while and asked if he would like me to take the controls. He asked if I thought we should request for the exception to fly the approach to CAT 1 mins by flying it per CAT 2 procedures. I told him I didn't believe we needed to - the MDA was 470 [feet]; the ceiling was 800 [feet] and we went around at 1;000 feet. Because we were a dot above glide slope. I said we would be fine and then restated that he had been working hard and asked if he wanted me to take the controls. He agreed and gave me the controls.we stayed at 5;000 feet as long as possible; the captain re-sequenced the approach and we were vectored onto a long final. We were on the localizer long enough that by the time they cleared us for the approach; I missed the call and never armed the approach. As soon as I missed the glide slope I noticed it; initially started to use the autopilot to get back on glide slope but disconnected it; and hand flew onto the glide slope. At one point; I verbally acknowledged to the captain that I was descending at 1;800 FPM but was still 2000-1800 feet AGL. By approximately 1;200 feet. AGL I was on glide slope and stable. I continued to hand fly the approach; broke out between 900 and 800 feet and at the 100 feet call; I cracked the power less than normal. At the 50 feet call; I reduced the power slower than normal; and at approximately 2 ft.; the stick shakers started (which the captain then announced) and remained on until I touch down a few moments later.the runway was all white with compacted snow except approximately a 100 - 150 feet area in the center which had a slightly visible runway surface area. I rolled the landing out using almost no brakes and barely had the thrust reversers past engagement. I passed the controls back to the captain and we got off the runway at taxiway mike. We taxied to the gate and safely parked the aircraft.after landing; the aircraft had icing on the wiper blade arms; navigation lights; landing gear struts and winglets.several factors lead the events while on approach into bgr. Placing the reserve captain on the flight as the flying captain put him on the controls; I do not believe it lead to the events. However; the captain's lack of proficiency; over controlling of the aircraft; and inability to stay ahead of the aircraft coupled with poor vectors from approach directly lead to undesirable aircraft states and his unstable approach. That being said; a go-around was called right away by the captain at 1;000 feet - where the first criterial for an unstable approach is checked.on my approach into bgr; my aggressive descent rate to re-gain the glide slope prior to 1;000 feet was a direct result of me missing selection of the approach mode after receiving clearance. This mistake was partly due to a long final on the localizer prior to receiving approach clearance and it was also due to my increased work load of flying while monitoring the aircraft and captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew reported an unstable approach during icing conditions due to weather and multiple crew errors during the approach; subsequent go-around; and second approach.

Narrative: I was assigned to fly flight to BGR as part of my originally awarded schedule. That morning; the Captain I had been flying the trip [when he] notified me that he had been removed from the flight and was now dead heading in the back. He called Scheduling to find out the reason and learned he was removed because it was our last leg of the day and we had no connection times; while a Reserve Captain that was assigned to fly the return flight would not have the required connection time if he was dead heading going up. Because of this; he had been removed to allow the Reserve Captain to fly both directions; removing the required connection time and protecting the schedule.When I got to the gate; the Reserve Captain was already there and informed me that he hadn't flown a lot as he was new. We also discussed the snow storm with reports of icing in BGR and that we had an alternate of PWM. Once we got on the plane; we went through a normal preflight without issue. The Captain then requested weather updates at BGR through the FMS and was concerned about the current and forecasted winds. With a contaminated runway; our crosswind limit is 15; and at the time; BGR was reporting a direct crosswind of approximately 25 [knots] with gust over 30 [knots]. With this information; the Captain called our Dispatcher about the winds in BGR to discuss if the flight would depart. Following the phone call; it was determined we would be going; but if the winds were out of limits when we arrived we would be diverting to our alternate of PWM. We finished boarding; pushed back; started the aircraft; taxied and took off without incident.The flight proceeded with nothing of note until we began our decent into BGR. The ATIS stated that a Boeing 737 over an hour ago had reported severe icing. We looked up the signs of severe icing and procedures. We both concluded because it was over an hour ago; we would proceed but would keep checking for ice formation on the side windows which is listed as a sign of severe icing. As we were descending from our cruising altitude; I checked in with Approach. We were then informed the winds were from the north at approximately 9 knots and they were landing Runway 15. The Captain told me to request Runway 33 due to the winds combined with a contaminated runway. I agreed; requested; and we were given vectors for the ILS Runway 33. We were also informed by the Controller of the 737 that had reported severe icing over an hour ago.Prior to passing through 10;000 feet.; we were in the clouds with both our wing and cowl anti-ice turned on at 250 KIAS. Passing through 7;000 feet.; we had light rime ice momentarily and it shed right off. As I was reporting this to Approach; I noticed our airspeed was starting to increase and I noticed the Captain was moving the thrust levers a lot; adjusting the vertical descent speed and amount of spoilers. Adjusting all three of these continuously; I observed him working hard and 'fighting' the aircraft. A moment later I noticed our speed and called out 'speed 280.' He acknowledged my call out and I continued to observed him fighting the aircraft for a few more moments. I then told him 'just set the thrust at the bottom of the green arc and work from there.' He set the thrust as I suggested and only adjusted the spoilers and vertical speed allowing him to manage the aircraft better. ATC gave us a vector to intercept the localizer; we did as instructed but went through the localizer because of their timing and our airspeed. When the Controller offered us a new vector to come back and intercept the localizer; the Captain told me to ask for a 360 [turn]; which I did; and we were given. The Captain continued to work on the airspeed and configuration of the plane in the 360 [turn]. Our final vector had us intercept the localizer just past the glide slope. After we passed the glide slope; I called it out and the Captain instantly disconnected the autopilot and proceededto descend. I then set the altitude to 500 ft. (MDA was 470 [feet] based on high mins) and put the vertical speed to 900 FPM while announcing what I was doing; stating his flight director would now give him guidance back onto the glide slope. I believe at one point I increased the rate of descent for him as high as 1;100 FPM and reset the altitude to the missed approach altitude. At 1;000 [feet] above ground level (AGL); we were still a full dot above glide slope and the Captain called for a go-around. The go-around was flown correctly and I announced it to Tower; who then gave us runway heading and 3;000 feet. As we were climbing to 3;000 feet.; Tower was talking to us and I noticed some ice on my side window; looked back and saw ice on the entire leading edge of the winglet and in front of the navigation lights (the wing itself was clean). As Tower was still talking to us; I tapped the Captain; pointed to the window and motioned up with my thumb. He shook his head in agreement and I asked Tower for higher due to ice as we were assigned a downwind leg. We climbed to 5;000 feet and proceeded in the downwind. The ice melted off the window; winglet and in-front of the lights quickly.In the downwind; the Captain started to reference fuel numbers; started to verbally do math to figure out if we could do another approach. I stopped him; showed him my Bingo calculation of 3;250 lbs that I done prior to take off; pointed and stated we had 3;900 lbs onboard and we were good for another approach. I also then stated I noticed he had been working hard for a while and asked if he would like me to take the controls. He asked if I thought we should request for the exception to fly the approach to CAT 1 mins by flying it per CAT 2 procedures. I told him I didn't believe we needed to - the MDA was 470 [feet]; the ceiling was 800 [feet] and we went around at 1;000 feet. because we were a dot above glide slope. I said we would be fine and then restated that he had been working hard and asked if he wanted me to take the controls. He agreed and gave me the controls.We stayed at 5;000 feet as long as possible; the Captain re-sequenced the approach and we were vectored onto a long final. We were on the localizer long enough that by the time they cleared us for the approach; I missed the call and never armed the approach. As soon as I missed the glide slope I noticed it; initially started to use the autopilot to get back on glide slope but disconnected it; and hand flew onto the glide slope. At one point; I verbally acknowledged to the Captain that I was descending at 1;800 FPM but was still 2000-1800 feet AGL. By approximately 1;200 feet. AGL I was on glide slope and stable. I continued to hand fly the approach; broke out between 900 and 800 feet and at the 100 feet call; I cracked the power less than normal. At the 50 feet call; I reduced the power slower than normal; and at approximately 2 ft.; the stick shakers started (which the Captain then announced) and remained on until I touch down a few moments later.The runway was all white with compacted snow except approximately a 100 - 150 feet area in the center which had a slightly visible runway surface area. I rolled the landing out using almost no brakes and barely had the thrust reversers past engagement. I passed the controls back to the Captain and we got off the runway at Taxiway Mike. We taxied to the gate and safely parked the aircraft.After landing; the aircraft had icing on the wiper blade arms; navigation lights; landing gear struts and winglets.Several factors lead the events while on approach into BGR. Placing the Reserve Captain on the flight as the Flying Captain put him on the controls; I do not believe it lead to the events. However; the Captain's lack of proficiency; over controlling of the aircraft; and inability to stay ahead of the aircraft coupled with poor vectors from approach directly lead to undesirable aircraft states and his unstable approach. That being said; a go-around was called right away by the captain at 1;000 feet - where the first criterial for an unstable approach is checked.On my approach into BGR; my aggressive descent rate to re-gain the glide slope prior to 1;000 feet was a direct result of me missing selection of the approach mode after receiving clearance. This mistake was partly due to a long final on the localizer prior to receiving approach clearance and it was also due to my increased work load of flying while monitoring the aircraft and captain.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.