Narrative:

While descending into clear area. During brief of ILS 23L (approach plate 11-3), realized could not conduct approach to less than MDA of 1460' (676') due to both G/south and DME out. Shortly thereafter ATIS received, attempted to clarify with clear approach control actual status of ground equipment: was told DME operating. Initial clearance (from cle approach control) was for ILS 23L, sidestep 23R. Subsequently cleared ILS 23L, land 23L. In both clrncs, no mention made of fact that it would be a localizer only (no G/south) approach. While actual approach was conducted under G/south out procedures, it was not clear to this captain and crew until inside engel (IAF) that we were to land on 23L or 23R. Nor, was it understood exactly what ground equipment was or was not operational. Upon breaking out approximately 500' AGL, airport and runway (23L and 23R) clearly visible ahead. Cleared to land runway 23L. Transition from instruments to visibility was made more difficult than normal due to the apr lgts OTS, the illuminated of a single red light left side approach end runway 23L, and 1899' of closed and unlighted runway at approach end. (The normal landing area was not readily apparent). Landing and roll out uneventful. A lack of clear understanding of condition/status of ground equipment and landing runway until well into approach, coupled with the unusual lighting abnormalities and closed section runway runway 23L, created an unnecessarily confusing and potentially dangerous situation during a critical phase of flight. Fortunately, the crew was alert, well rested, and in short, up to the task. I would not care to encounter this situation at the end of a long duty day. Recommendations: ATC more closely monitor status of equipment and accurately report same on ATIS. Equipment to a reasonable level under IFR conditions. Approach control personnel correctly indent and verbally communication the type approach and its limitations upon initial contact with arriving aircraft. General: ATC (approach control and tower NOTAMS cover some of the long term abnormal conditions at an airport, not all crews operate into and verbal 'heads up' would be greatly appreciated when situation compounded with combination of IFR WX, darkness, abnormal/inoperative lighting, closed section of runway, conflicting ATIS reports, possible side step, G/south out and VASI inoperative. Don't assume this is a common occurrence, even to experienced flight crews. In fact, I question the safety of an operation under these conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON APCH TO RWY 23 AT CLE ATIS ADVISED GLIDE SLOPE OUT OF SERVICE, APR LIGHTS OUT OF SERVICE, VASI OUT OF SERVICE, 1899' APCH END RWY 23L CLOSED, SIDE STEP RWY 23R. REPORTER BROKE OUT OF OVERCAST AND WAS CLEARED TO LAND RWY 23L. SUCCESSFUL LNDG. NO INCIDENT REPORT.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING INTO CLR AREA. DURING BRIEF OF ILS 23L (APCH PLATE 11-3), REALIZED COULD NOT CONDUCT APCH TO LESS THAN MDA OF 1460' (676') DUE TO BOTH G/S AND DME OUT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER ATIS RECEIVED, ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY WITH CLR APCH CTL ACTUAL STATUS OF GND EQUIP: WAS TOLD DME OPERATING. INITIAL CLRNC (FROM CLE APCH CTL) WAS FOR ILS 23L, SIDESTEP 23R. SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED ILS 23L, LAND 23L. IN BOTH CLRNCS, NO MENTION MADE OF FACT THAT IT WOULD BE A LOC ONLY (NO G/S) APCH. WHILE ACTUAL APCH WAS CONDUCTED UNDER G/S OUT PROCS, IT WAS NOT CLR TO THIS CAPT AND CREW UNTIL INSIDE ENGEL (IAF) THAT WE WERE TO LAND ON 23L OR 23R. NOR, WAS IT UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY WHAT GND EQUIP WAS OR WAS NOT OPERATIONAL. UPON BREAKING OUT APPROX 500' AGL, ARPT AND RWY (23L AND 23R) CLRLY VISIBLE AHEAD. CLRED TO LAND RWY 23L. TRANSITION FROM INSTRUMENTS TO VIS WAS MADE MORE DIFFICULT THAN NORMAL DUE TO THE APR LGTS OTS, THE ILLUMINATED OF A SINGLE RED LIGHT L SIDE APCH END RWY 23L, AND 1899' OF CLOSED AND UNLIGHTED RWY AT APCH END. (THE NORMAL LNDG AREA WAS NOT READILY APPARENT). LNDG AND ROLL OUT UNEVENTFUL. A LACK OF CLR UNDERSTANDING OF CONDITION/STATUS OF GND EQUIP AND LNDG RWY UNTIL WELL INTO APCH, COUPLED WITH THE UNUSUAL LIGHTING ABNORMALITIES AND CLOSED SECTION RWY RWY 23L, CREATED AN UNNECESSARILY CONFUSING AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. FORTUNATELY, THE CREW WAS ALERT, WELL RESTED, AND IN SHORT, UP TO THE TASK. I WOULD NOT CARE TO ENCOUNTER THIS SITUATION AT THE END OF A LONG DUTY DAY. RECOMMENDATIONS: ATC MORE CLOSELY MONITOR STATUS OF EQUIP AND ACCURATELY RPT SAME ON ATIS. EQUIP TO A REASONABLE LEVEL UNDER IFR CONDITIONS. APCH CTL PERSONNEL CORRECTLY INDENT AND VERBALLY COM THE TYPE APCH AND ITS LIMITATIONS UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ARRIVING ACFT. GENERAL: ATC (APCH CTL AND TWR NOTAMS COVER SOME OF THE LONG TERM ABNORMAL CONDITIONS AT AN ARPT, NOT ALL CREWS OPERATE INTO AND VERBAL 'HEADS UP' WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED WHEN SITUATION COMPOUNDED WITH COMBINATION OF IFR WX, DARKNESS, ABNORMAL/INOPERATIVE LIGHTING, CLOSED SECTION OF RWY, CONFLICTING ATIS RPTS, POSSIBLE SIDE STEP, G/S OUT AND VASI INOPERATIVE. DON'T ASSUME THIS IS A COMMON OCCURRENCE, EVEN TO EXPERIENCED FLT CREWS. IN FACT, I QUESTION THE SAFETY OF AN OPERATION UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.