Narrative:

Two separate events; similar in nature.a: a small transport aircraft was found to have several existing pilot holes through the exterior skin in a lap just below the window belt on the left hand side of the fuselage. The holes were in the exterior skin only; thus no leak. A work lead grabbed me to get my opinion and we may eventually work on the repair when engineering comes back with a fix. While evaluating the identified aircraft; 3 others were in the hanger and we compared the nearest one and discovered the same exposed pilot holes. They all had them. We went to engineering to request that the repair cover the fleet; a supervisor was in the room. He acknowledged that he knew about the other aircraft but didn't want to write them up because it may effect delivery schedule. I wrote up the 3 aircraft in question the next morning.B: a small transport aircraft was noted to have a small tear in the nacelle skin just aft of the lwr [lower] aft engine cowling o/b [outboard] side. I generated a non-routine and once I passed it to the supervisor for signature he was upset and told me that I need to stop. He told me that I must tell a supervisor prior to writing up any non-routines. I was told that my expectations are too high; the aircraft are old. A second supervisor told me to 'stop writing stuff up!' the first supervisor told me that we are getting carried away writing things up that are not 'safety of flight' too close to the delivery date of scheduled checks.I have word docs detailing specifics of both events in greater detail if requested.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Maintenance Technician reports Management resistance to accomplish repair work due to aircraft schedule.

Narrative: Two separate events; similar in nature.A: A small transport aircraft was found to have several existing pilot holes through the exterior skin in a lap just below the window belt on the left hand side of the fuselage. The holes were in the exterior skin only; thus no leak. A work lead grabbed me to get my opinion and we may eventually work on the repair when Engineering comes back with a fix. While evaluating the identified aircraft; 3 others were in the hanger and we compared the nearest one and discovered the same exposed pilot holes. They all had them. We went to Engineering to request that the repair cover the fleet; a supervisor was in the room. He acknowledged that he knew about the other aircraft but didn't want to write them up because it may effect delivery schedule. I wrote up the 3 aircraft in question the next morning.B: A small transport aircraft was noted to have a small tear in the nacelle skin just aft of the lwr [lower] aft engine cowling o/b [outboard] side. I generated a non-routine and once I passed it to the supervisor for signature he was upset and told me that I need to stop. He told me that I must tell a supervisor prior to writing up any non-routines. I was told that my expectations are too high; the aircraft are old. A second supervisor told me to 'stop writing stuff up!' The first supervisor told me that we are getting carried away writing things up that are not 'Safety of Flight' too close to the delivery date of scheduled checks.I have Word Docs detailing specifics of both events in greater detail if requested.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.