Narrative:

This leg was the first leg of a four-day sequence which was; for both the ca (captain) and I; the first experience with the procedural changes from challenge and response checklist to 'triggers and flows.' both of us had reviewed the new checklist as well as accomplished the 'training' provided by the company. Regardless of that preparation; we found the transition to be substantially more difficult. Upon recognizing this issue; we identified our new checklist/flows as a threat; not only to our operation but to our CRM. Throughout this four-day sequence (which I flew with two different cas) our new procedures were a focal point; and it often created confusion and obstacles to effective CRM. The triggers in many cases are at weird times. The 'flows' are cumbersome and have some portions that are very sporadic.....and don't 'flow'. The 'silent' portions include some very critical information which breaks down cockpit communication and CRM. The so called 'training' we received....a 12 minute video....on a procedural change...that doesn't seem like it was put together by pilots. In my opinion; it was very eye opening to see how much those changes in our checklist created confusion and impacted CRM. This needs to be look at again closely. The checklist needs to be changed to make more logical sense (from a pilot perspective) on the triggers; and the flows need to be more intuitive to include making some of the silent items; not silent to facilitate CRM. Training needs to be accomplished in a simulator.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 737-800 First officer reported the new checklist; 'Triggers and Flows;' created confusion.

Narrative: This leg was the first leg of a four-day sequence which was; for both the CA (Captain) and I; the first experience with the procedural changes from challenge and response checklist to 'triggers and flows.' Both of us had reviewed the new checklist as well as accomplished the 'training' provided by the company. Regardless of that preparation; we found the transition to be substantially more difficult. Upon recognizing this issue; we identified our new checklist/flows as a threat; not only to our operation but to our CRM. Throughout this four-day sequence (which I flew with two different CAs) our new procedures were a focal point; and it often created confusion and obstacles to effective CRM. The triggers in many cases are at weird times. The 'flows' are cumbersome and have some portions that are very sporadic.....and don't 'flow'. The 'silent' portions include some very critical information which breaks down cockpit communication and CRM. The so called 'training' we received....a 12 minute video....on a procedural change...that doesn't seem like it was put together by pilots. In my opinion; it was very eye opening to see how much those changes in our checklist created confusion and impacted CRM. This needs to be look at again closely. The checklist needs to be changed to make more logical sense (from a pilot perspective) on the triggers; and the flows need to be more intuitive to include making some of the silent items; not silent to facilitate CRM. Training needs to be accomplished in a simulator.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.