Narrative:

Staffing was very short this morning. The supervisor was on the phone calling for overtime when I came into the area. We were all working sectors without a d-side because of the lack of staffing. I sat down and worked our low altitude sectors combined at pkb lo. This means cmh lo and pik lo were combined with pkb lo. I worked until I was forced out and took a 40 minute break. When I came back from break; the controller I relieved said that the sectors just blew up with traffic after I left. The brushy creek MOA below 50; buckeye MOA and atcaa 50b500; charlie a atcaa 190b500; charlie B 190b220 were in use with 2 groups of F16s still actively using it. So I accepted the relief briefing and worked the sectors without a d-side. Well; the sectors' traffic quickly escalated. I had a military [aircraft] requesting vectors for the VOR21 cir 03 at pkb. I had 3 aircraft in my airspace doing VFR photo work in very active paths of airspace; 2 of which flew through other facilities' airspace as part of their path. I had multiple departures and a zzv arrival. The zzv frequency had cross talk on our main and standby receivers. The buecs [backup emergency communication] for zzv were fine; but I needed to stay on the main and standby for the zzv arrival. Not to mention we have our standard pik lo frequency that is located at 2 different sites that we always need to bounce back and forth in selection for aircraft coverage. The pkb lo frequency was fine; but none of these frequencies are cross coupled; so the aircraft are always talking all over each other. So; in the thick of things and one set of F16s calls to leave as single ships. I tell them to stay in the MOA until I can get them their clearances. I change the F16 flight plan to reflect only one ship and route it into direct tol. I start a vp [VFR plan; (controller starts a tag and then builds a flight plan)] flight plan on the second F16 that wants to go to ffo. I issue the first clearance to the F16 going to tol. At this time I am also answering other aircraft and working through the sectors. A radar associate controller then arrives. He came in early for his shift; per the supervisor's call for overtime. I was very glad to see him! I radar identify the second aircraft going to ffo and issue his clearance. He is pointed out to the adjacent sector; but cmh approach calls and tells the d-side that ffo is closed. I tell the F16 the status of ffo. The F16 says he has prior approval to land for certification of items at ffo. I call cmh approach back and cmh says that there are drones at ffo and that ffo was trying to get the drones out of the way as soon as possible. I explain it to the F16 who is now 15nm northwest of my airspace. Cmh approach has the hand off and the F16 asks if he could just hold in the buckeye MOA. At this point with all this communication taking place; I am far behind in getting other things done. My radar associate controller is certified; but he is very new and not well versed in unusual situations. I just tell the F16 that he will have to hold with cmh approach until the drones are cleared and switch him to cmh approach. I take care of a few other things; such as vectoring for the VOR 21 approach and issuing crossing restrictions and frequency changes. The next set of F16s want to leave. Aircraft X; a VFR from ckb approach wants to start his photo work. He is setting up for his line of flight eastbound and heads for another aircraft that is VFR/65 inbound to pkb. I call the traffic to both aircraft and vector the inbound to pkb. The pkb arrival has aircraft X in sight. Aircraft X says he is having problems with some of his equipment and wants to orbit until it gets fixed. Aircraft X starts his turns (of which are left and right and not really an orbit) and then is traffic again with the pkb arrival. I call traffic and vector again. I issue the clearance to the F16s out of the buckeye MOA and hand them off. I frequency switch several aircraft. I scan back around and notice that aircraft X is entering ckb approach airspace; heading northbound. I ask the d-side to call ckb approach and update them about aircraft X. The d-side says he really doesn't know if ckb ever received a point out. I think about it and wonder if ckb approach ever knew that this aircraft was going to do photo work. So I call ckb approach and do the late point out. Aircraft X was approximately at [waypoint] and heading northbound to start his first line for about 15 nm and then southbound about 50-60nm; heading westerly on each track. The reason for this report is that I violated ckb appch's airspace with aircraft X. I then continued to plug away at the sectors. Upon hearing during the relief briefing that the sector blew up; I should have asked the supervisor for a d-side. However; the sectors were very quiet. The edst [enroute decision support tool] did not have many aircraft in the active fp [flight plan] list. It is very hard to ask for sectors to be split out when the sectors are this slow. However; as I wrote in the previous narrative; the sectors blow up very quickly. With the frequency issues; 7 adjacent approach controls; 2 adjacent artccs; a VFR tower (pkb); a busy flight school; several uncontrolled airports that were are responsible for (hoc; eop; geo; amt; 22I; I71; zzv; 42I; I40; 10G; and I10) ; and the brush creek MOA; buckeye MOA and atcaa above it; charlie a atcaa; and charlie B atcaa (of which all altitudes we must monitor when it is hot---which is usually up to FL500); and the monitoring of the tactical frequency for the military aircraft; it all gets very busy immediately. Anything out the ordinary; such as the ffo drone issue; causes the complexity to climb with other clearances not being completed because the frequency and coordination tied up dealing with the issue. The adjacent facilities at times do not have much patience with us. Sometimes we cannot answer the line automatically. Sometimes we cannot take a handoff from approach control; the aircraft may have to level in approach control altitudes until we can get to it. Obviously; the d-side was not enough help for me. I needed a tracker. Next time I will call for a tracker. I doubt that we had someone available; but the supervisor could have paged someone back after a few minutes on break. As summer is rapidly approaching with more low altitude aircraft asking for advisories and more photo surveys; I must say the words; 'I need a tracker.' I never called ckb approach back to see if they were actually already watching aircraft X since he did depart from one of their airports (mgw). One must never assume. I should have clarified aircraft X's first line for his photo survey work and called ckb approach to point him out. I will do this next time. Next time; I will also be telling the tracker to do the coordination. Thanks for your patience in reading this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Indianapolis Center Controller reported several concerns occurring during a session; which resulted in an airspace deviation.

Narrative: Staffing was very short this morning. The Supervisor was on the phone calling for overtime when I came into the area. We were all working sectors without a D-side because of the lack of staffing. I sat down and worked our low altitude sectors combined at PKB LO. This means CMH LO and PIK LO were combined with PKB LO. I worked until I was forced out and took a 40 minute break. When I came back from break; the controller I relieved said that the sectors just blew up with traffic after I left. The Brushy Creek MOA below 50; Buckeye MOA and ATCAA 50B500; Charlie A ATCAA 190B500; Charlie B 190B220 were in use with 2 groups of F16s still actively using it. So I accepted the relief briefing and worked the sectors without a D-side. Well; the sectors' traffic quickly escalated. I had a military [aircraft] requesting vectors for the VOR21 CIR 03 at PKB. I had 3 aircraft in my airspace doing VFR photo work in very active paths of airspace; 2 of which flew through other facilities' airspace as part of their path. I had multiple departures and a ZZV arrival. The ZZV frequency had cross talk on our main and standby receivers. The BUECS [Backup Emergency Communication] for ZZV were fine; but I needed to stay on the main and standby for the ZZV arrival. Not to mention we have our standard PIK LO frequency that is located at 2 different sites that we always need to bounce back and forth in selection for aircraft coverage. The PKB LO frequency was fine; but none of these frequencies are cross coupled; so the aircraft are always talking all over each other. So; in the thick of things and one set of F16s calls to leave as single ships. I tell them to stay in the MOA until I can get them their clearances. I change the F16 flight plan to reflect only one ship and route it into direct TOL. I start a VP [VFR Plan; (Controller starts a tag and then builds a flight plan)] flight plan on the second F16 that wants to go to FFO. I issue the first clearance to the F16 going to TOL. At this time I am also answering other aircraft and working through the sectors. A radar associate controller then arrives. He came in early for his shift; per the supervisor's call for overtime. I was very glad to see him! I radar identify the second aircraft going to FFO and issue his clearance. He is pointed out to the adjacent sector; but CMH Approach calls and tells the D-side that FFO is closed. I tell the F16 the status of FFO. The F16 says he has prior approval to land for certification of items at FFO. I call CMH Approach back and CMH says that there are drones at FFO and that FFO was trying to get the drones out of the way ASAP. I explain it to the F16 who is now 15nm NW of my airspace. CMH Approach has the hand off and the F16 asks if he could just hold in the BUCKEYE MOA. At this point with all this communication taking place; I am far behind in getting other things done. My radar associate controller is certified; but he is very new and not well versed in unusual situations. I just tell the F16 that he will have to hold with CMH APCH until the drones are cleared and switch him to CMH APCH. I take care of a few other things; such as vectoring for the VOR 21 APCH and issuing crossing restrictions and frequency changes. The next set of F16s want to leave. Aircraft X; a VFR from CKB Approach wants to start his photo work. He is setting up for his line of flight eastbound and heads for another aircraft that is VFR/65 inbound to PKB. I call the traffic to both aircraft and vector the inbound to PKB. The PKB arrival has Aircraft X in sight. Aircraft X says he is having problems with some of his equipment and wants to orbit until it gets fixed. Aircraft X starts his turns (of which are left and right and not really an orbit) and then is traffic again with the PKB arrival. I call traffic and vector again. I issue the clearance to the F16s out of the BUCKEYE MOA and hand them off. I frequency switch several aircraft. I scan back around and notice that Aircraft X is entering CKB Approach airspace; heading northbound. I ask the D-side to call CKB Approach and update them about Aircraft X. The D-side says he really doesn't know if CKB ever received a point out. I think about it and wonder if CKB Approach ever knew that this aircraft was going to do photo work. So I call CKB Approach and do the late point out. Aircraft X was approximately at [waypoint] and heading northbound to start his first line for about 15 nm and then southbound about 50-60nm; heading westerly on each track. The reason for this report is that I violated CKB APPCH's airspace with Aircraft X. I then continued to plug away at the sectors. Upon hearing during the relief briefing that the sector blew up; I should have asked the supervisor for a D-side. However; the sectors were very quiet. The EDST [Enroute Decision Support Tool] did not have many aircraft in the active FP [Flight Plan] list. It is very hard to ask for sectors to be split out when the sectors are this slow. However; as I wrote in the previous narrative; the sectors blow up very quickly. With the frequency issues; 7 adjacent approach controls; 2 adjacent ARTCCs; a VFR TWR (PKB); a busy flight school; several uncontrolled airports that were are responsible for (HOC; EOP; GEO; AMT; 22I; I71; ZZV; 42I; I40; 10G; and I10) ; and the BRUSH CREEK MOA; BUCKEYE MOA and ATCAA above it; CHARLIE A ATCAA; and CHARLIE B ATCAA (of which all altitudes we must monitor when it is hot---which is usually up to FL500); and the monitoring of the tactical frequency for the military aircraft; it all gets very busy immediately. Anything out the ordinary; such as the FFO drone issue; causes the complexity to climb with other clearances not being completed because the frequency and coordination tied up dealing with the issue. The adjacent facilities at times do not have much patience with us. Sometimes we cannot answer the line automatically. Sometimes we cannot take a handoff from Approach Control; the aircraft may have to level in Approach Control altitudes until we can get to it. Obviously; the D-side was not enough help for me. I needed a Tracker. Next time I will call for a Tracker. I doubt that we had someone available; but the supervisor could have paged someone back after a few minutes on break. As summer is rapidly approaching with more low altitude aircraft asking for advisories and more photo surveys; I must say the words; 'I need a Tracker.' I never called CKB Approach back to see if they were actually already watching Aircraft X since he did depart from one of their airports (MGW). One must never assume. I should have clarified Aircraft X's first line for his photo survey work and called CKB Approach to point him out. I will do this next time. Next time; I will also be telling the Tracker to do the coordination. Thanks for your patience in reading this.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.