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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1631493 |
Time | |
Date | 201903 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | BWI.Airport |
State Reference | MD |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met Deviation - Altitude Overshoot Deviation - Procedural Clearance |
Narrative:
We were descending via the ANTHM3 landing runway 10 at bwi. The FMC was programmed correctly; autopilot 2 was engaged and the aircraft was managing the STAR as published. Event began approximately 16;000 feet outside of eagll in a managed descent. The ANTHM3 has multiple altitude and airspeed restrictions; the final altitude is 4;000 feet at strps. The altitude restriction at eagll is: -13;000/+12;000; then roktt is: 11;000; distance between eagll and roktt is 23.7NM. We were with potomac approach on frequency. Approximately 16;000 feet descending via the ANTHM3; outside of eagll; potomac approach revised our clearance; 'descend to 11;000 for traffic; then continue descend via ANTHM3.' pm (pilot monitoring) read back the clearance verbatim. PF (pilot flying) decided the managed descent would be sufficient; however pm understood the clearance to descend immediately to 11;000; which would level the aircraft just prior or at eagll. After a brief discussion to ensure we both understood the revised clearance; PF set 11;000 in the altitude selector and pulled for open des. The aircraft was nearing 11;000 at or shortly after eagll. Satisfied that the instructions were understood; pm shifted attention to another task. We were in a higher than normal workload and at some point PF reset the altitude selector to 4;000 and inadvertently pushed the selector to manage the descent. Both pilots distracted by an ATC call did not realize the aircraft began to descend to 4;000. With 4;000 set in the altitude window; there was no altitude warning horn. Potomac approach inquired our altitude as we slowly descended through 10;500. The PF stopped the descent at 10;300 and began to climb back to 11;000. Potomac approach revised our clearance again to maintain 10;000 until roktt; then descend via remainder of ANTHM3. We were handed off to another potomac approach controller and pm advised the new altitude. Potomac approach reaffirmed the revised clearance; we continued the STAR and approach to landing as normal and uneventful. Both pilots are highly experienced in both total time and time in type. Both pilots had flown together; have mutual respect for each other; used SOP and CRM. The issues that led to the event are: the timing of the revision led to confusion; both pilots understood the revised clearance differently; but assumed they understood it the same; another similar sounding call sign on ATC led to slight distraction; pm multi-tasking in a higher workload environment. Lessons learned are: pm should have paused other tasks at altitude changes to confirm and back up PF. PF confirm altitude changes with pm to ensure both pilots are in agreement of descent mode/initiation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier pilot monitoring reported confusion attributed to not understanding ATC clearance; and ATC altitude changes from the procedure while on the ANTHM3 landing Runway 10 at BWI.
Narrative: We were descending via the ANTHM3 landing Runway 10 at BWI. The FMC was programmed correctly; autopilot 2 was engaged and the aircraft was managing the STAR as published. Event began approximately 16;000 feet outside of EAGLL in a managed descent. The ANTHM3 has multiple altitude and airspeed restrictions; the final altitude is 4;000 feet at STRPS. The altitude restriction at EAGLL is: -13;000/+12;000; then ROKTT is: 11;000; distance between EAGLL and ROKTT is 23.7NM. We were with Potomac Approach on frequency. Approximately 16;000 feet descending via the ANTHM3; outside of EAGLL; Potomac Approach revised our clearance; 'descend to 11;000 for traffic; then continue descend via ANTHM3.' PM (Pilot Monitoring) read back the clearance verbatim. PF (Pilot Flying) decided the managed descent would be sufficient; however PM understood the clearance to descend immediately to 11;000; which would level the aircraft just prior or at EAGLL. After a brief discussion to ensure we both understood the revised clearance; PF set 11;000 in the altitude selector and pulled for OPEN DES. The aircraft was nearing 11;000 at or shortly after EAGLL. Satisfied that the instructions were understood; PM shifted attention to another task. We were in a higher than normal workload and at some point PF reset the altitude selector to 4;000 and inadvertently pushed the selector to manage the descent. Both pilots distracted by an ATC call did not realize the aircraft began to descend to 4;000. With 4;000 set in the altitude window; there was no altitude warning horn. Potomac Approach inquired our altitude as we slowly descended through 10;500. The PF stopped the descent at 10;300 and began to climb back to 11;000. Potomac Approach revised our clearance again to maintain 10;000 until ROKTT; then descend via remainder of ANTHM3. We were handed off to another Potomac Approach Controller and PM advised the new altitude. Potomac Approach reaffirmed the revised clearance; we continued the STAR and approach to landing as normal and uneventful. Both pilots are highly experienced in both total time and time in type. Both pilots had flown together; have mutual respect for each other; used SOP and CRM. The issues that led to the event are: the timing of the revision led to confusion; both pilots understood the revised clearance differently; but assumed they understood it the same; another similar sounding call sign on ATC led to slight distraction; PM multi-tasking in a higher workload environment. Lessons learned are: PM should have paused other tasks at altitude changes to confirm and back up PF. PF confirm altitude changes with PM to ensure both pilots are in agreement of descent mode/initiation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.