Narrative:

(Flight) was assigned the anjll 4 arrival with a modification to maintain 300 knots to crcus and 250 knots after for the ILS to runway 25L. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight around fuelr. We called the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach to runway 25L and to maintain 250 knots. This led us to believe we were #1 for the runway. We replied that we would maintain 250 as long as possible. At 19 DME the controller said to slow to 210 knots. Just then [another aircraft] joined the frequency on a high left base in front of us just inside of hunda. The controller never advised us that we would be following a heavy 767 but we knew what type of aircraft it was from their call sign. We leveled off and dropped the gear to slow to 210 by gaate. The controller then told us to maintain at least 180 knots to limma and contact tower.at this point we could see that the 767 was about 5 miles in front of us and well above our flight path. We briefed to expect a wake encounter with a possible go around. Just after hunda we encountered some wake and experienced a 10 knot loss of airspeed. The 767 was rejoining the glideslope and appeared to be below our path. We determined that we could stay above their wake if we stayed slightly above glideslope. This would put us in the end of the touchdown zone but runway length and landing performance would not be an issue as long as we did not encounter any more wake. We were able to be stable by 1;000 feet but had to work unnecessarily hard to keep the aircraft within the touchdown zone.socal approach did not provide any advance notice that we would be following a heavy. Had he done so I would have refused the maintain 250 knot instruction. Furthermore; aircraft on the olaaa 1 arrival are often kept too high and fast after sli (as this 767 was) to join a visual final on the glideslope. Instructing a non-heavy to fly above standard STAR speeds to join behind a heavy is a setup for wake and unstable approaches.sfo approach used to often turn aircraft on base high and fast for visual approaches. I have not seen it happen since the 777 accident. Just because an ATC procedure is legal does not mean it's in the best interest of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to LAX in trail of a B767. Reporter was critical of arrival procedures that put aircraft at risk of wake turbulence encounters.

Narrative: (Flight) was assigned the ANJLL 4 Arrival with a modification to maintain 300 knots to CRCUS and 250 knots after for the ILS to Runway 25L. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight around FUELR. We called the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 25L and to maintain 250 knots. This led us to believe we were #1 for the runway. We replied that we would maintain 250 as long as possible. At 19 DME the Controller said to slow to 210 knots. Just then [another aircraft] joined the frequency on a high left base in front of us just inside of HUNDA. The Controller never advised us that we would be following a heavy 767 but we knew what type of aircraft it was from their call sign. We leveled off and dropped the gear to slow to 210 by GAATE. The Controller then told us to maintain at least 180 knots to LIMMA and contact Tower.At this point we could see that the 767 was about 5 miles in front of us and well above our flight path. We briefed to expect a wake encounter with a possible go around. Just after HUNDA we encountered some wake and experienced a 10 knot loss of airspeed. The 767 was rejoining the glideslope and appeared to be below our path. We determined that we could stay above their wake if we stayed slightly above glideslope. This would put us in the end of the touchdown zone but runway length and landing performance would not be an issue as long as we did not encounter any more wake. We were able to be stable by 1;000 feet but had to work unnecessarily hard to keep the aircraft within the touchdown zone.SoCal Approach did not provide any advance notice that we would be following a heavy. Had he done so I would have refused the maintain 250 knot instruction. Furthermore; aircraft on the OLAAA 1 Arrival are often kept too high and fast after SLI (as this 767 was) to join a visual final on the glideslope. Instructing a non-heavy to fly above standard STAR speeds to join behind a heavy is a setup for wake and unstable approaches.SFO Approach used to often turn aircraft on base high and fast for visual approaches. I have not seen it happen since the 777 accident. Just because an ATC procedure is legal does not mean it's in the best interest of safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.