Narrative:

This event happened because I made a mistake and chose the incorrect altitude and descent method. I should have denied the visual approach clearance and remained on vectors for the lda approach. I was familiar with this approach; even at night and had briefed it; but on this occasion I made a mistake and was not where I thought I was. I was pilot flying to ZZZ at night in VMC conditions. I was flying with a first officer (first officer) I had never flown with and we were being vectored to the lda DME 29 at ZZZ. I'm not sure the last altitude we were given; maybe 13;000ft. Approach advised of the field location; and my first officer called it in sight before I had actually seen it. Then they cleared us for the visual approach. I told him I did not see it and I was frustrated inside myself that he had called it without asking me but I continued towards zzzzz fix 12.1 DME from the airport. He then extended the final approach course line off of zzzzz which prompted me to verify my chart for the next altitude and asked him to set 7;700 for the altitude I needed to be at crossing the fix. I lost my awareness of my current distance to the fix and in reality 7;700 is the altitude after crossing zzzzz. I saw that I was high needed to get down quickly; so I looked at my terrain map and did not see any issues below me and looked outside below the nose of the aircraft and double checked. I began a quick descent probably 2;000 feet per minute or more and a little while later we heard the 'caution terrain' and I added power and climbed back up to about 13;000. Once over the valley and near the lda we were given over to tower and I began a descent with s-turn and then visually aligned with the runway and vasis to a landing on runway 29. Never allow other distractions; whether it be external (like ATC; terrain; weather); or internal (like crew; automation; or expectation bias) to keep you from doing things the way you are trained to do them. Look more carefully at altitudes on charts and verify them with each other before setting and executing them. Follow through with items as briefed even when other unexpected changes/circumstances arise.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB 145 Captain reported descending to an altitude restriction too early on a LDA DME approach.

Narrative: This event happened because I made a mistake and chose the incorrect altitude and descent method. I should have denied the visual approach clearance and remained on vectors for the LDA approach. I was familiar with this approach; even at night and had briefed it; but on this occasion I made a mistake and was not where I thought I was. I was pilot flying to ZZZ at night in VMC conditions. I was flying with a First Officer (FO) I had never flown with and we were being vectored to the LDA DME 29 at ZZZ. I'm not sure the last altitude we were given; maybe 13;000ft. Approach advised of the field location; and my FO called it in sight before I had actually seen it. Then they cleared us for the visual approach. I told him I did not see it and I was frustrated inside myself that he had called it without asking me but I continued towards ZZZZZ fix 12.1 DME from the airport. He then extended the final approach course line off of ZZZZZ which prompted me to verify my chart for the next altitude and asked him to set 7;700 for the altitude I needed to be at crossing the fix. I lost my awareness of my current distance to the fix and in reality 7;700 is the altitude after crossing ZZZZZ. I saw that I was high needed to get down quickly; so I looked at my terrain map and did not see any issues below me and looked outside below the nose of the aircraft and double checked. I began a quick descent probably 2;000 feet per minute or more and a little while later we heard the 'caution terrain' and I added power and climbed back up to about 13;000. Once over the valley and near the LDA we were given over to tower and I began a descent with s-turn and then visually aligned with the runway and VASIs to a landing on runway 29. Never allow other distractions; whether it be external (like ATC; terrain; weather); or internal (like crew; automation; or expectation bias) to keep you from doing things the way you are trained to do them. Look more carefully at altitudes on charts and verify them with each other before setting and executing them. Follow through with items as briefed even when other unexpected changes/circumstances arise.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.