Narrative:

Working departure east (a); north flow; moderate departure volume; high complexity. Prior to the MVA incident; the session was already complex and outside of normal operations due to sea departures stopping at 6000 to accommodate aircraft a maneuvering north northeast of mercer island at 7500. This was workload intensive as it involved verifying the abnormal initial altitude on initial contact; communicating to the departures when they could expect higher; responding to an increased amount of aircraft requests for higher; issuing traffic advisories as necessary; all while avoiding first aircraft a at 7500; then the arrival leg descending to 10000; then getting the aircraft climbed and on course.aircraft B photo mission approved inside seattle class bravo airspace. North/south lines at 4200; north of sea to approximately 8NM south. Initially responded to automated point out from final. Subsequently told by supervisor that sea departures would be stopped at 3000 to accommodate the photo mission. Asked if I was okay with the arrangement; responded that I do what I'm told. Was not comfortable with the arrangement and complexity of the sector; however; it was clear that my assessment of the situation did not matter.aircraft X on a 020 heading (per LOA) at 3000 turned east to avoid aircraft Y on summa departure turning towards aircraft X at 3000. Also turned aircraft Y to the north to increase likelihood of maintaining separation. Busy scanning all my other traffic; overloaded; noticed aircraft X now headed towards 3200 MVA. Issued climb and turn to the south to parallel the increasing terrain. Not sure if aircraft X cleared the MVA or not; but pretty sure they entered at 3000. Subsequently; got aircraft X above the mvas; climbed as traffic permitted. Aircraft X requested deviations for weather; so I coordinated that and gave control to ZSE. This was good; because as I was attempting to recover from the events; I inadvertently transferred communication to ZSE with the aircraft at an uncoordinated altitude of 11000.aircraft Y subsequently climbed to 7000 to avoid aircraft a and turned on course; which put in conflict with aircraft Z on a vector to pae descending through 7000. Controller on P sector brought conflict to my attention; turned aircraft Z to the north to avoid/turned aircraft Y to the east southeast and climbed further to avoid. Handed aircraft Z to the P sector and switched him on an uncoordinated heading/altitude. Aircraft Y subsequently climbed and on course.told the supervisor I wanted off position; not sure how long it took; maybe 5 minutes +/- a couple. Subsequently hit the stop departure light for sea departures for my sector due to overload and not wanting to introduce any more traffic into my airspace. Forgot to brief relieving controller that the stop departure light was still activated.I feel like I was set up for failure on this session. My scan was exaggerated. Airplanes were at altitudes vastly outside of normal. It was during at least a moderate departure volume. I had already been working a complex situation with just aircraft a. Between the photo mission and the [law enforcement] mission there was an unnecessary amount of complexity in the sector. At some point after the sea departures were stopped at 3000; I remember a controller coming over and indicating to me that they were going to be my departure coordinator. I can only assume this was the supervisor's attempt at mitigating the additional complexity that was being introduced by the photo mission and the additional restriction on sea departures. I have no idea where that controller was during the subsequent events; but he did not speak to or help me in any way. To my knowledge he was not plugged in or physically near the departure sectors.seattle TRACON seems willing to go to any length to accommodate photo missions in the airspace; regardless of the impact and/or complexity that accompanies the situations. Obviously; the [lawenforcement] mission will be (and should be) accommodated; but that should subsequently factor in when determining whether to allow additional special operations in the airspace. I believe the photo mission operators are promised things by managers and/or supervisors who are not completely in tune with the operation. Seattle TRACON should execute a [safety review] pertaining to this session and these events. I believe this [safety review] should include interviews with the controllers in the room at the time of the event; because not everything pertaining to it was recorded on a frequency or briefing. The facility should determine a better system for evaluating and approving; or denying; aircraft with photo missions into the class bravo airspace. Supervisors should be more cognizant of what their controllers are communicating to them with regard to actually allowing these operations in real-time. At the very minimum; it should become SOP for all departures to be assigned straight-out; or the seattle departure; if they are going to be stopped at-or-below 3000 for any reason.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: S46 Controller reported departures were stopped at an interim altitude for a photo mission and they were unable to climb one aircraft; due to workload; which flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

Narrative: Working Departure East (A); north flow; moderate departure volume; high complexity. Prior to the MVA incident; the session was already complex and outside of normal operations due to SEA departures stopping at 6000 to accommodate Aircraft A maneuvering north northeast of Mercer Island at 7500. This was workload intensive as it involved verifying the abnormal initial altitude on initial contact; communicating to the departures when they could expect higher; responding to an increased amount of aircraft requests for higher; issuing traffic advisories as necessary; all while avoiding first Aircraft A at 7500; then the arrival leg descending to 10000; then getting the aircraft climbed and on course.Aircraft B photo mission approved inside Seattle Class Bravo airspace. North/south lines at 4200; north of SEA to approximately 8NM south. Initially responded to automated point out from Final. Subsequently told by Supervisor that SEA departures would be stopped at 3000 to accommodate the photo mission. Asked if I was okay with the arrangement; responded that I do what I'm told. Was not comfortable with the arrangement and complexity of the sector; however; it was clear that my assessment of the situation did not matter.Aircraft X on a 020 heading (per LOA) at 3000 turned east to avoid Aircraft Y on SUMMA Departure turning towards Aircraft X at 3000. Also turned Aircraft Y to the north to increase likelihood of maintaining separation. Busy scanning all my other traffic; overloaded; noticed Aircraft X now headed towards 3200 MVA. Issued climb and turn to the south to parallel the increasing terrain. Not sure if Aircraft X cleared the MVA or not; but pretty sure they entered at 3000. Subsequently; got Aircraft X above the MVAs; climbed as traffic permitted. Aircraft X requested deviations for weather; so I coordinated that and gave control to ZSE. This was good; because as I was attempting to recover from the events; I inadvertently transferred communication to ZSE with the aircraft at an uncoordinated altitude of 11000.Aircraft Y subsequently climbed to 7000 to avoid Aircraft A and turned on course; which put in conflict with Aircraft Z on a vector to PAE descending through 7000. Controller on P Sector brought conflict to my attention; turned Aircraft Z to the north to avoid/turned Aircraft Y to the east southeast and climbed further to avoid. Handed Aircraft Z to the P Sector and switched him on an uncoordinated heading/altitude. Aircraft Y subsequently climbed and on course.Told the Supervisor I wanted off position; not sure how long it took; maybe 5 minutes +/- a couple. Subsequently hit the stop departure light for SEA departures for my sector due to overload and not wanting to introduce any more traffic into my airspace. Forgot to brief relieving controller that the stop departure light was still activated.I feel like I was set up for failure on this session. My scan was exaggerated. Airplanes were at altitudes vastly outside of normal. It was during at least a moderate departure volume. I had already been working a complex situation with just Aircraft A. Between the photo mission and the [law enforcement] mission there was an unnecessary amount of complexity in the sector. At some point after the SEA departures were stopped at 3000; I remember a controller coming over and indicating to me that they were going to be my departure coordinator. I can only assume this was the Supervisor's attempt at mitigating the additional complexity that was being introduced by the photo mission and the additional restriction on SEA departures. I have no idea where that controller was during the subsequent events; but he did not speak to or help me in any way. To my knowledge he was not plugged in or physically near the departure sectors.Seattle TRACON seems willing to go to any length to accommodate photo missions in the airspace; regardless of the impact and/or complexity that accompanies the situations. Obviously; the [lawenforcement] mission will be (and should be) accommodated; but that should subsequently factor in when determining whether to allow additional special operations in the airspace. I believe the photo mission operators are promised things by Managers and/or Supervisors who are not completely in tune with the operation. Seattle TRACON should execute a [safety review] pertaining to this session and these events. I believe this [safety review] should include interviews with the controllers in the room at the time of the event; because not everything pertaining to it was recorded on a frequency or briefing. The facility should determine a better system for evaluating and approving; OR DENYING; aircraft with photo missions into the Class Bravo airspace. Supervisors should be more cognizant of what their controllers are communicating to them with regard to actually allowing these operations in real-time. At the very minimum; it should become SOP for all departures to be assigned straight-out; or the Seattle Departure; if they are going to be stopped at-or-below 3000 for any reason.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.