Narrative:

Prior to push back we experienced a cas miscomp status message and a spoileron fault status message. We called maintenance and they had us perform an fim reset. When the reset was complete we had inbd ground splr fault status message. Maintenance had us perform the fim reset a second time and the message cleared. This may be related to what happened later in the flight. Approximately 5 minutes after takeoff at 200 knots we experienced complete loss of the airspeed indicator 1 (captain side). The captain's airspeed indicator read 40 knots (bottom of the raster) with full airspeed trend decrease. We also received stall fail; stabilizer trim; and mach trim caution messages. The first officer's pfd displayed an amber boxed IAS. I was pilot flying at the time and I immediately turned off the autopilot and rotated back to our previous pitch attitude. I noted that the first officer's airspeed appeared to be normal so we transferred controls and he acted as pilot flying for the remainder of the flight (except for during the approach briefing). We ran the unreliable airspeed iac and QRH. Partway through the QRH ATC called and said that they indicated that we were off of our cleared course. At this time we realized that our FMS navigation had failed and was no longer giving us accurate information. At this time we relayed the nature of our situation and equipment failures; and requested vectors while we finished the QRH. The QRH instructed us to leave the air data selector in the normal position and to continue using the number 2 airspeed indicator while monitoring the standby. We had our ACARS on MEL so we were unable to contact dispatch in that manner and instead we contacted them through arinc. As we contacted dispatch we attempted to find what our options were for nearest airport. Our FMS was not working so we attempted using the enroute charts. We found that the charts were extremely difficult to utilize for this purpose. The enroute charts are insufficient. A complete overhaul should be accomplished of the enroute charts; in particular the ability to plug in your flight plan to follow along would be abundantly useful. GPS signal so that the aircraft position can be displayed would also be very helpful. The QRH stated to land at the nearest suitable airport. At the time; this was ZZZ1 but dispatch informed us that the weather there was approaching minimums. Due to the weather; the mountainous terrain of ZZZ1; and their short runway; dispatch and the flight crew agreed that that would not constitute a suitable airport. The next nearest suitable airport was ZZZ so we continued to ZZZ. Our FMS navigation remained inoperative so we requested ATC vectors until intercepting the ILS. We also requested a longer final to get the aircraft configured; as per the QRH. We notified the flight attendant but chose not to notify the passengers as we expected a normal landing at our regularly scheduled airport. We had a normal landing; taxied to the gate; wrote up the malfunctions; and participated in a safety conference call with various members of the company. After the safety briefing the ops instructed us that we would be operating a ferry flight to ZZZ2 and then operating a different aircraft back to ZZZ that same night. While this may be legal; ops should use some common sense and understand that it is not reasonable to expect a crew that has just experienced a significant condition and is now approaching the wocl period to fly a broken airplane and to continue operating flights for 3-4 more hours. I believe that; considering the extenuating circumstances; this should have been made as a request instead of a command. Due to the events of the flight and the fact that it was very late; I had to call in fatigued.the enroute charts should be overhauled and the new version should include the ability to program the assigned flight plan on the map and GPS should be enabled on the ipads to allow display of the aircraft's position on the map. Also; ops and management should exercise common sense when considering flight assignments for a crew that has just had a situation; especially in poor weather conditions and late at night. This will help prevent pressure to accept the flight assignment when it may not be safe to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 pilot reported numerous equipment failures they had to work through and a safe landing at original destination.

Narrative: Prior to push back we experienced a CAS MISCOMP status message and a SPOILERON FAULT status message. We called maintenance and they had us perform an FIM reset. When the reset was complete we had INBD GND SPLR FAULT status message. Maintenance had us perform the FIM reset a second time and the message cleared. This may be related to what happened later in the flight. Approximately 5 minutes after takeoff at 200 knots we experienced complete loss of the airspeed indicator 1 (Captain side). The captain's airspeed indicator read 40 knots (bottom of the raster) with full airspeed trend decrease. We also received STALL FAIL; STAB TRIM; and MACH TRIM caution messages. The FO's PFD displayed an amber boxed IAS. I was pilot flying at the time and I immediately turned off the autopilot and rotated back to our previous pitch attitude. I noted that the FO's airspeed appeared to be normal so we transferred controls and he acted as Pilot Flying for the remainder of the flight (except for during the approach briefing). We ran the Unreliable Airspeed IAC and QRH. Partway through the QRH ATC called and said that they indicated that we were off of our cleared course. At this time we realized that our FMS navigation had failed and was no longer giving us accurate information. At this time we relayed the nature of our situation and equipment failures; and requested vectors while we finished the QRH. The QRH instructed us to leave the Air Data selector in the normal position and to continue using the number 2 airspeed indicator while monitoring the standby. We had our ACARS on MEL so we were unable to contact dispatch in that manner and instead we contacted them through ARINC. As we contacted dispatch we attempted to find what our options were for nearest airport. Our FMS was not working so we attempted using the enroute charts. We found that the charts were extremely difficult to utilize for this purpose. The enroute charts are insufficient. A complete overhaul should be accomplished of the enroute charts; in particular the ability to plug in your flight plan to follow along would be abundantly useful. GPS signal so that the aircraft position can be displayed would also be very helpful. The QRH stated to land at the nearest suitable airport. At the time; this was ZZZ1 but dispatch informed us that the weather there was approaching minimums. Due to the weather; the mountainous terrain of ZZZ1; and their short runway; dispatch and the flight crew agreed that that would not constitute a suitable airport. The next nearest suitable airport was ZZZ so we continued to ZZZ. Our FMS navigation remained inoperative so we requested ATC vectors until intercepting the ILS. We also requested a longer final to get the aircraft configured; as per the QRH. We notified the flight attendant but chose not to notify the passengers as we expected a normal landing at our regularly scheduled airport. We had a normal landing; taxied to the gate; wrote up the malfunctions; and participated in a safety conference call with various members of the company. After the safety briefing the Ops instructed us that we would be operating a ferry flight to ZZZ2 and then operating a different aircraft back to ZZZ that same night. While this may be legal; Ops should use some common sense and understand that it is not reasonable to expect a crew that has just experienced a significant condition and is now approaching the WOCL period to fly a broken airplane and to continue operating flights for 3-4 more hours. I believe that; considering the extenuating circumstances; this should have been made as a REQUEST instead of a COMMAND. Due to the events of the flight and the fact that it was very late; I had to call in fatigued.The Enroute charts should be overhauled and the new version should include the ability to program the assigned flight plan on the map and GPS should be enabled on the IPads to allow display of the aircraft's position on the map. Also; Ops and management should exercise common sense when considering flight assignments for a crew that has just had a situation; especially in poor weather conditions and late at night. This will help prevent pressure to accept the flight assignment when it may not be safe to do so.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.