Narrative:

My father purchased a single engine trainer for me to build hours in and for him to regain his flying status after a long period of inactivity and transition from the glider category. It needed paint; had a high time engine; but was in annual; and was reported to have had sat for several years. [It] was placed into ferry-able condition 2 years ago flown there and then repaired to airworthy condition and then lots of work done for an annual sign off xx months ago. The seller said he would have no problem flying it anywhere but that it sat long enough to need the fuel drained and new fuel put in and that he would be out of the country. The carb was rebuilt; and all the rubber lines replaced etc; but the fuel has since sat in the tanks. So he would not fly it anywhere with the fuel currently in the tanks. When we went to possibly pick it up to fly it home an airport employee who was cutting the grass said something to the effect of: be careful; the guy working on that plane seemed like he was cutting corners. When asked what he meant; he said heard that the guy had put new cylinders on it then refused to fly in his own work after he signed it off. When my father said there was no mention of that by the seller or in the engine log and the cylinders look age appropriate with some rust on the outside fins; are you sure? He said 'look I'm not the type of guy to say bad stuff about someone else's work. I am really worried about the airworthiness of that airplane; some of it is things I saw; some rumors; and some of it gut feeling about the behavior of the previous owner and mechanic. And yes I think I saw him working on that with the cylinders off; I am not 100 percent certain; but are you sure it isn't in the logs double check them. If it is; that is definitely the plane I was worried about. If it isn't it still could be the plane and the non-logged cylinder work would be even scarier. I really think that is the plane. It was a while ago. No one will fly it. It's been sitting ever since. He won't fly in his own work. Look I just don't want you to hop in and just take off. Really run it up on the ground. Go over it with a fine tooth comb.' we said thank you and went about checking over the plane. The plane appeared dirty and in need of paint and avionics updates and sitting with bone dry tanks; it seemed to be in the condition we were advised by the seller. We saw new hoses; clean oil. Water-free golden colored gasoline smelling fuel was in all 3 stopcocks. A few gallons of 100LL blue fuel was carried over and put in and drained from each drain until color was as blue as it was in the 100LL. 22 psi was put in the front tire. Windscreen was washed. The engine fired right up and passed all normal checks from the poh. We taxied over to the fuel pump and took on 48 gallons of 100LL and planned to burn through 8 gallons of it doing ground run ups and high speed taxi tests prior to any possible takeoffs; but weight and balanced with 48 gallons regardless. After many ground run ups and high speed taxis; and rereading the logs; we determined that there were no apparent problems. We stopped over again near the fuel pumps and filed a flight plan a few minutes in the future planning to do a few touch and goes and then depart on our flight plan and phoned ahead and received permission to [fly our route] an inoperable transponder with intentions to get the craft to our ultimate destination for annual; paint; and avionics repairs. We stopped off to make sure the outside of the craft didn't have any oil or anything on the outside after running it and to use the restrooms and talked again with that employee at which point figured out through conversation that he was not a grass cutter but an a&P who has other property maintenance tasks also. But the tune was different now; he said he was watching us and that the engine sounded good. The new information that he thought it sounded good made us feel less uneasy; not because his assessment matched ours; but because he now identified himself as an a&P mechanic. It was easier to dismiss a guy mowing the grass when all verbal and documentary evidence and even the starting and run ups was contrary; but less so when it is an independent third party trained and active mechanic. And he kept saying things that were scary and then following up with qualifiers that he wasn't sure. So we decided that we would not take off on our trip just yet but would do pattern work until we were satisfied and regroup on the ground afterward and really decide whether leaving the pattern is the decision. We had a vehicle and driver on the ground who was our alternative route home. Once we take off and depart the pattern; that option largely goes away.up until then all ground and taxi run ups were good. All checks went good and takeoff roll was uneventful. Rotation at about 5 knots faster than expected; stayed in ground effect for a moment and entered best climb and the engine lost what felt like all its ability to produce power; shuddered. I declared in the cockpit that we lost our engine [and] pitched down to maintain controllable airspeed and manipulated the throttle down some and back to full and it didn't help. [I] picked a spot straight ahead to put down that looked like was sure to be survivable but would damage the craft. Before I could grab the flaps handle the engine roared to life again and gained speed; wanting to get back with no injuries or damage and not ditch a plane that hiccupped; another attempt at gaining altitude was made while turning into the wind but when pitched up the engine stopped producing power again; and we nearly stalled and pitched back down and shallowed the bank angle and leveled off our rate of climb. Fuel pressure was ok; the rpms at full throttle were now a little under 2500 but it was producing some power and maintaining altitude but could not climb. Rpms went lower again and shuddered again and by this time we were in a shallow turn back to the field which attempts to scan instruments or figure out how to make the engine stop doing what it was were aborted and eyes were outside assessing options. We were gaining altitude slowly at this point and a farmhouse not lined up with direction of flight fairly short and surrounded by trees was an improbable option; both on board agreed we'd be in the trees for sure that it we weren't in a STOL aircraft. We were running with the wind at our back no flaps increasingly intermittent barely altitude holding amounts of power interspersed with increasingly longer amounts of reduced power and began pitching on feel and anticipation of power changes. We could not see the runway or airport despite being sure it was over the line of trees; I aimed for the lowest height trees in the treeline and had to trade our preferred speed for altitude to clear them comfortably and needed to pitch down to gain solid controls back. When we broke over the treeline we were near the airport building having flown a teardrop shape; and being so low and such erratic power; the choice to now turn through more than 90 degrees at 50 feet to land on the runway was determined to be too unsafe and throttle was idled at which point the prop stopped; we settled into ground effect and a smooth touchdown made on the grass near the runway but off axis. We were unable to bring the aircraft to rest with toe breaking; and hit the airport fence shattering our windscreen and removing our nose gear and went over the road to the other side and came to rest with no injuries. I stayed calm but did not think of radio calls to declare emergency to prevent a potential collision had there been another craft; and failed to deploy flaps when assessing options in the last 75 feet of altitude which may have offered more aerodynamic braking. Overall I think this could have been prevented if me or my father had recognized that we very much wanted to believe that the plane was safe; despite being told by atrained person that it may not be. That should have been treated by us with more than a pause and rereading the aircraft and engine logs and more ground run ups of the engine. It would have been wiser to stop and have a third a&P/ia hired by us go over the craft and do an annual where it sat instead of planning to do it at the destination airport. I feel that once airborne and the engine failed; that we did as good as we could have but that some of it was due to luck. System-wide; a reporting system like this one (maybe even just adding another category for maintenance worker reporting) could be implemented for the mechanics to anonymously flag aircraft under similar circumstance. Clearly there was someone out there performing work that scared so some else enough to say something. But he appeared at first to be a landscaper and we put less weight on his assessment. But even if he was; shouldn't a landscaper or pilot or mechanic overhearing unsafe things about a craft be able to report it; maybe an anonymous report attached to the n number that can be looked into before an accident. I have been trained and practiced simulated and planned for full engine loss; but never partial power or intermittent. It changed my options to ones I hadn't thought of before as well as how far I could go. Also a burst of power made me abandon my first course of action long enough to make it no longer viable. But also I think that any pilot would have done either a straight ahead on first loss or tried to do what I did if in the same situation; both would have had similar result. It was a balancing act not to turn too sharply as attempts to do so lost too much altitude not as noticeable on the vsi but the tree heights. Each attempt to turn sharper (when we had more power and reduced sink rate due to it) was quickly aborted and shallowed because we were having trouble making up any lost altitude. Care was taken not to over utilize the rudder to force the craft to turn faster than we could bank and to carefully maintain our airspeed with pitch. Looking back across many videos and case studies I've watched and read... And living it... That's the message to teach. Low or no power and attempting to go the opposite way in under 800 feet (400 feet in my case) can cause you to lose altitude and stall horns cause you to pitch down and level out wings and the brain still wants to step on the rudder to steer back. It takes solid effort to keep coordinated and fly where you can with the performance you find yourself presented with rather than where you wish you can. I think that is what causes the loss of control low altitude spin deaths. Feet wanting to go back home while hands are reacting to a stall warning.at no point did I feel that we were out of control (til the fence took out nose gear); that we were in mortal danger or in danger of hurting anyone else; but in hindsight I think we had some lucky gusts; lucky periods where the engine developed some power; and I was lucky to have an (though not current for [many] years and even though he wouldn't take the controls; he said you got this; you're doing fine; you are current and you have the feel for it) ex glider instructor with tons of 'engine out' landings to calmly run down options with back and forth dialog and helped focus my mind on flying the aircraft with my head outside while he scanned instruments and called out things before they became problems. But when we landed smoothly on the grass by the runway (before the fence impact) we both jammed the toe brakes and covered each other and braced for whatever happened next. And luckily nothing really bad did.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Beech 19 pilot reported engine failure after takeoff.

Narrative: My father purchased a single engine trainer for me to build hours in and for him to regain his flying status after a long period of inactivity and transition from the glider category. It needed paint; had a high time engine; but was in annual; and was reported to have had sat for several years. [It] was placed into ferry-able condition 2 years ago flown there and then repaired to airworthy condition and then lots of work done for an annual sign off XX months ago. The seller said he would have no problem flying it anywhere but that it sat long enough to need the fuel drained and new fuel put in and that he would be out of the country. The carb was rebuilt; and all the rubber lines replaced etc; but the fuel has since sat in the tanks. So he would not fly it anywhere with the fuel currently in the tanks. When we went to possibly pick it up to fly it home an airport employee who was cutting the grass said something to the effect of: be careful; the guy working on that plane seemed like he was cutting corners. When asked what he meant; he said heard that the guy had put new cylinders on it then refused to fly in his own work after he signed it off. When my father said there was no mention of that by the seller or in the engine log and the cylinders look age appropriate with some rust on the outside fins; are you sure? He said 'Look I'm not the type of guy to say bad stuff about someone else's work. I am really worried about the airworthiness of that airplane; some of it is things I saw; some rumors; and some of it gut feeling about the behavior of the previous owner and mechanic. And yes I think I saw him working on that with the cylinders off; I am not 100 percent certain; but are you sure it isn't in the logs double check them. If it is; that is definitely the plane I was worried about. If it isn't it still could be the plane and the non-logged cylinder work would be even scarier. I really think that is the plane. It was a while ago. No one will fly it. It's been sitting ever since. He won't fly in his own work. Look I just don't want you to hop in and just take off. Really run it up on the ground. Go over it with a fine tooth comb.' We said thank you and went about checking over the plane. The plane appeared dirty and in need of paint and avionics updates and sitting with bone dry tanks; it seemed to be in the condition we were advised by the seller. We saw new hoses; clean oil. Water-free golden colored gasoline smelling fuel was in all 3 stopcocks. A few gallons of 100LL blue fuel was carried over and put in and drained from each drain until color was as blue as it was in the 100LL. 22 psi was put in the front tire. Windscreen was washed. The engine fired right up and passed all normal checks from the POH. We taxied over to the fuel pump and took on 48 gallons of 100LL and planned to burn through 8 gallons of it doing ground run ups and high speed taxi tests prior to any possible takeoffs; but weight and balanced with 48 gallons regardless. After many ground run ups and high speed taxis; and rereading the logs; we determined that there were no apparent problems. We stopped over again near the fuel pumps and filed a flight plan a few minutes in the future planning to do a few touch and goes and then depart on our flight plan and phoned ahead and received permission to [fly our route] an inoperable transponder with intentions to get the craft to our ultimate destination for annual; paint; and avionics repairs. We stopped off to make sure the outside of the craft didn't have any oil or anything on the outside after running it and to use the restrooms and talked again with that employee at which point figured out through conversation that he was not a grass cutter but an A&P who has other property maintenance tasks also. But the tune was different now; he said he was watching us and that the engine sounded good. The new information that he thought it sounded good made us feel less uneasy; not because his assessment matched ours; but because he now identified himself as an A&P mechanic. It was easier to dismiss a guy mowing the grass when all verbal and documentary evidence and even the starting and run ups was contrary; but less so when it is an independent third party trained and active mechanic. And he kept saying things that were scary and then following up with qualifiers that he wasn't sure. So we decided that we would not take off on our trip just yet but would do pattern work until we were satisfied and regroup on the ground afterward and really decide whether leaving the pattern is the decision. We had a vehicle and driver on the ground who was our alternative route home. Once we take off and depart the pattern; that option largely goes away.Up until then all ground and taxi run ups were good. All checks went good and takeoff roll was uneventful. Rotation at about 5 knots faster than expected; stayed in ground effect for a moment and entered best climb and the engine lost what felt like all its ability to produce power; shuddered. I declared in the cockpit that we lost our engine [and] pitched down to maintain controllable airspeed and manipulated the throttle down some and back to full and it didn't help. [I] picked a spot straight ahead to put down that looked like was sure to be survivable but would damage the craft. Before I could grab the flaps handle the engine roared to life again and gained speed; wanting to get back with no injuries or damage and not ditch a plane that hiccupped; another attempt at gaining altitude was made while turning into the wind but when pitched up the engine stopped producing power again; and we nearly stalled and pitched back down and shallowed the bank angle and leveled off our rate of climb. Fuel pressure was ok; the RPMs at full throttle were now a little under 2500 but it was producing some power and maintaining altitude but could not climb. RPMs went lower again and shuddered again and by this time we were in a shallow turn back to the field which attempts to scan instruments or figure out how to make the engine stop doing what it was were aborted and eyes were outside assessing options. We were gaining altitude slowly at this point and a farmhouse not lined up with direction of flight fairly short and surrounded by trees was an improbable option; both on board agreed we'd be in the trees for sure that it we weren't in a STOL aircraft. We were running with the wind at our back no flaps increasingly intermittent barely altitude holding amounts of power interspersed with increasingly longer amounts of reduced power and began pitching on feel and anticipation of power changes. We could not see the runway or airport despite being sure it was over the line of trees; I aimed for the lowest height trees in the treeline and had to trade our preferred speed for altitude to clear them comfortably and needed to pitch down to gain solid controls back. When we broke over the treeline we were near the airport building having flown a teardrop shape; and being so low and such erratic power; the choice to now turn through more than 90 degrees at 50 feet to land on the runway was determined to be too unsafe and throttle was idled at which point the prop stopped; we settled into ground effect and a smooth touchdown made on the grass near the runway but off axis. We were unable to bring the aircraft to rest with toe breaking; and hit the airport fence shattering our windscreen and removing our nose gear and went over the road to the other side and came to rest with no injuries. I stayed calm but did not think of radio calls to declare emergency to prevent a potential collision had there been another craft; and failed to deploy flaps when assessing options in the last 75 feet of altitude which may have offered more aerodynamic braking. Overall I think this could have been prevented if me or my father had recognized that we very much wanted to believe that the plane was safe; despite being told by atrained person that it may not be. That should have been treated by us with more than a pause and rereading the aircraft and engine logs and more ground run ups of the engine. It would have been wiser to stop and have a third A&P/IA hired by us go over the craft and do an annual where it sat instead of planning to do it at the destination airport. I feel that once airborne and the engine failed; that we did as good as we could have but that some of it was due to luck. System-wide; a reporting system like this one (maybe even just adding another category for maintenance worker reporting) could be implemented for the mechanics to anonymously flag aircraft under similar circumstance. Clearly there was someone out there performing work that scared so some else enough to say something. But he appeared at first to be a landscaper and we put less weight on his assessment. But even if he was; shouldn't a landscaper or pilot or mechanic overhearing unsafe things about a craft be able to report it; maybe an anonymous report attached to the n number that can be looked into before an accident. I have been trained and practiced simulated and planned for full engine loss; but never partial power or intermittent. It changed my options to ones I hadn't thought of before as well as how far I could go. Also a burst of power made me abandon my first course of action long enough to make it no longer viable. But also I think that any pilot would have done either a straight ahead on first loss or tried to do what I did if in the same situation; both would have had similar result. It was a balancing act not to turn too sharply as attempts to do so lost too much altitude not as noticeable on the VSI but the tree heights. Each attempt to turn sharper (when we had more power and reduced sink rate due to it) was quickly aborted and shallowed because we were having trouble making up any lost altitude. Care was taken not to over utilize the rudder to force the craft to turn faster than we could bank and to carefully maintain our airspeed with pitch. Looking back across many videos and case studies I've watched and read... and living it... that's the message to teach. Low or no power and attempting to go the opposite way in under 800 feet (400 feet in my case) can cause you to lose altitude and stall horns cause you to pitch down and level out wings and the brain still wants to step on the rudder to steer back. It takes solid effort to keep coordinated and fly where you can with the performance you find yourself presented with rather than where you wish you can. I think that is what causes the loss of control low altitude spin deaths. Feet wanting to go back home while hands are reacting to a stall warning.At no point did I feel that we were out of control (til the fence took out nose gear); that we were in mortal danger or in danger of hurting anyone else; but in hindsight I think we had some lucky gusts; lucky periods where the engine developed some power; and I was lucky to have an (though not current for [many] years and even though he wouldn't take the controls; he said you got this; you're doing fine; you are current and you have the feel for it) ex glider instructor with tons of 'engine out' landings to calmly run down options with back and forth dialog and helped focus my mind on flying the aircraft with my head outside while he scanned instruments and called out things before they became problems. But when we landed smoothly on the grass by the runway (before the fence impact) we both jammed the toe brakes and covered each other and braced for whatever happened next. And luckily nothing really bad did.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.