Narrative:

Immediately after takeoff we received two ECAM warnings indicating 'engine egt over limit' for both engines 1 and 2. I was the pilot flying and continued the climb while my first officer checked the qrc and found that our issue was not referenced. As the captain; I chose to continue as the pilot flying at that time because we were still in the takeoff phase with flaps extended and the auto pilot would not remain engaged for more than 2 or 3 seconds before disconnecting. I was not comfortable transferring control at that point. After flap retraction and the after takeoff checklist completion we then turned our attention to the ECAM actions. The procedure leads you to shut down the engine. Obviously that procedure is intended when only one engine is affected; not both. My first officer along with another A320 captain and first officer occupying our flight deck jumpseats scoured their QRH's for any information that might be helpful but found nothing. With no guidance other than to shut down the engine(s) it was quite obvious to me that my only rational choice was to return to [departure airport] and perform an overweight landing. All appropriate communications were accomplished with company; crew and passengers. Landing distance assessment for the overweight landing was accomplished; I briefed the approach; flew the approach; landed softly and taxied to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain reported returning to departure airport after experiencing high EGT in both engines shortly after takeoff.

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff we received two ECAM warnings indicating 'Engine EGT Over limit' for both engines 1 and 2. I was the pilot flying and continued the climb while my FO checked the QRC and found that our issue was not referenced. As the Captain; I chose to continue as the pilot flying at that time because we were still in the takeoff phase with flaps extended and the auto pilot would not remain engaged for more than 2 or 3 seconds before disconnecting. I was not comfortable transferring control at that point. After flap retraction and the after takeoff checklist completion we then turned our attention to the ECAM actions. The procedure leads you to shut down the engine. Obviously that procedure is intended when only one engine is affected; not both. My FO along with another A320 Captain and FO occupying our flight deck jumpseats scoured their QRH's for any information that might be helpful but found nothing. With no guidance other than to shut down the engine(s) it was quite obvious to me that my only rational choice was to return to [departure airport] and perform an overweight landing. All appropriate communications were accomplished with company; crew and passengers. Landing distance assessment for the overweight landing was accomplished; I briefed the approach; flew the approach; landed softly and taxied to the gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.