Narrative:

Descending into dfw on the blue ridge arrival, we received clearance to 13000'. Then approaching baton, we were cleared to turn left to 220 degrees at alkid, which the copilot read back. Both of these xmissions were partly blocked by other aircraft, so the copilot read back again, 'medium large transport, turn to 220 degrees at alkid.' no further instructions were given to medium large transport! However, I knew that this was a very unusual clearance in 3 ways--altitude, heading and point at which to turn--so I told the copilot to confirm the instructions with approach control; but, he could not get through on approach control frequency because the controller was issuing instructions to other aircraft non-stop for a full 2 mins in rapid fire manner. We made the turn to 220 degrees at alkid, and remained at 13000', and shortly the controller told us to turn back to 230 degrees and said, 'you were supposed to turn to 170 degrees at hamak.' we complied and stated that we previously had read back, 'turn to 220 degrees at alkid.' no further difficulties were encountered. We still don't know if correct instructions were given to us, although I suspect the controller gave us instructions he did not mean to--or we acknowledged another aircraft's clearance. But the point is that we were simply and totally unable to get through on the radio to verify what we heard as our clearance due to the controller's non-stop issuance of instructions to other aircraft--a potentially dangerous situation. I realize what a fine job these controllers do, and fully appreciate that they frequently are overworked by a crush of arrival traffic. But an adjustment is necessary to prevent situations like this from developing. It sometimes appears that some controllers think that the controllers are the only ones who have something important to say.. What if an aircraft had needed to declare an emergency during those 2 mins?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW WAS UNABLE TO VERIFY ATC INSTRUCTIONS DUE TO CONTINUOUS TRANSMISSIONS BY THE CTLR.

Narrative: DSNDING INTO DFW ON THE BLUE RIDGE ARR, WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO 13000'. THEN APCHING BATON, WE WERE CLRED TO TURN LEFT TO 220 DEGS AT ALKID, WHICH THE COPLT READ BACK. BOTH OF THESE XMISSIONS WERE PARTLY BLOCKED BY OTHER ACFT, SO THE COPLT READ BACK AGAIN, 'MLG, TURN TO 220 DEGS AT ALKID.' NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO MLG! HOWEVER, I KNEW THAT THIS WAS A VERY UNUSUAL CLRNC IN 3 WAYS--ALT, HDG AND POINT AT WHICH TO TURN--SO I TOLD THE COPLT TO CONFIRM THE INSTRUCTIONS WITH APCH CTL; BUT, HE COULD NOT GET THROUGH ON APCH CTL FREQ BECAUSE THE CTLR WAS ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER ACFT NON-STOP FOR A FULL 2 MINS IN RAPID FIRE MANNER. WE MADE THE TURN TO 220 DEGS AT ALKID, AND REMAINED AT 13000', AND SHORTLY THE CTLR TOLD US TO TURN BACK TO 230 DEGS AND SAID, 'YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO TURN TO 170 DEGS AT HAMAK.' WE COMPLIED AND STATED THAT WE PREVIOUSLY HAD READ BACK, 'TURN TO 220 DEGS AT ALKID.' NO FURTHER DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED. WE STILL DON'T KNOW IF CORRECT INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO US, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT THE CTLR GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS HE DID NOT MEAN TO--OR WE ACKNOWLEDGED ANOTHER ACFT'S CLRNC. BUT THE POINT IS THAT WE WERE SIMPLY AND TOTALLY UNABLE TO GET THROUGH ON THE RADIO TO VERIFY WHAT WE HEARD AS OUR CLRNC DUE TO THE CTLR'S NON-STOP ISSUANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER ACFT--A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. I REALIZE WHAT A FINE JOB THESE CTLRS DO, AND FULLY APPRECIATE THAT THEY FREQUENTLY ARE OVERWORKED BY A CRUSH OF ARR TFC. BUT AN ADJUSTMENT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT SITUATIONS LIKE THIS FROM DEVELOPING. IT SOMETIMES APPEARS THAT SOME CTLRS THINK THAT THE CTLRS ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO HAVE SOMETHING IMPORTANT TO SAY.. WHAT IF AN ACFT HAD NEEDED TO DECLARE AN EMER DURING THOSE 2 MINS?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.