Narrative:

About halfway through cruise at 38;000 feet; the captain and I noticed some very subtle; but different feeling vibration in the flight deck. We reviewed the N1/N2 vibration indicators and they were well within the normal range. I suggested to the captain that the vibration may be happening from something other than the engines. The captain suggested that we review the vibration advisory in the QRH. We reviewed the QRH regarding engine vibration and noted what to do; in the event we had excessive engine vibration. The procedure was not needed under these specific conditions.the vibration was intermittent and hard to concretely sense it was really any concern. However; we did; for our own interest; review nearest airport options in case the vibration became significant.the vibration ended; and we didn't discuss more about it. Then about 10-15 minutes later; I smelled a burning smell towards the rudder pedals. It had the smell of something similar to when you light a match. I also felt some heat from the fumes. I advised the captain that I believed we had smoke in the flight deck and we immediately donned our air masks. We then called the fas (flight attendants); and they reported that they did not smell any smoke. We advised the fas that we were keeping our masks on for now because we smelled smoke. The captain and I were slightly surprised that the fas did not smell anything; because we were still smelling smoke. So to troubleshoot; we decided to look at all of our peds (personal devices) to see if anything was burning. Peds were fine. While keeping the masks on; we did each take them off briefly to confirm we still had a burning smell; which we did.there were no indications from any of our instrumentation and advisory system screens that anything out of the ordinary was going on. But; I had no confidence that the burning smell was going to end. Rather; I was concerned that that situation was going to escalate from a burning smell to a fire. I shared my concerns with the captain and that I felt we needed to divert to ZZZ (we were about 10-15 minutes from top of descent to [original destination]) if the smell persisted for 2 more minutes; and he agreed. The smell persisted; we advised center that we needed to divert to ZZZ. They gave us vectors direct and to descend to 16;000 ft. We then advised the flight attendants we were diverting to ZZZ because we kept smelling a burning smell in the flight deck.shortly after we started our descent; the flight attendant's advised us that they also had a noticeable burning smell from the exit row up to the flight deck. Upon receiving this information; the captain and I concurred that we should [advise ATC]; for priority into ZZZ and to have fire/rescue at the field. (Later we would also learn that there was a first officer in row 17; who also noticed a burning smell while were descending and asked the flight attendants if we were descending because of the burning smell.) I advised the fas to grab their [emergency gear] at the ready; in case the situation got worse.we [advised ATC of the situation]; which triggered a plethora of ATC scripted questions to us; which workload permitting I answered. (East.g. The nature of the smoke?; where the smoke was?; were we wearing our oxygen masks?; souls on board?; fuel remaining?). Our priority at this point was to get the aircraft on the ground safely; but as quickly as possible. On the descent; I was very busy as pilot monitoring. First; we had our air masks on the whole time; which was cumbersome. Second; handling numerous comms with ATC; talking to the fas; discussing the divert with the captain; and loading a divert into the FMS for ZZZ. The captain was handling the emergency descent; which took most of his attention. Center offered us any runway at ZZZ; I asked which way they were landing; they said west; so I requested xxl. The captain was so busy with the descent that he did not change his instrument approach plates from [theoriginal destination] to ZZZ; nor did he have time to; so I asked for him to hand me his ipad and I loaded the appropriate plates for the divert to ZZZ.approach checklist was handled through 18;000 feet; as is standard. Flight attendants advised they were doing okay in the cabin. We discussed how to brief the passengers; fas asked if we were going to say something to the passengers. But; because we were wearing our air masks; I asked the fas to give the briefing; as I did not want to raise more panic by them hearing me sound like darth vader on the overhead speaker with my air mask on. The captain advised them to say we were going to ZZZ out of a safety precaution. While getting ready for landing; I did not have time to get ATIS; were too busy; so I asked ATC for the weather; to enter into the FMS for performance. The weather was good; it would be a night visual. We did not have time to ACARS dispatch of the divert; that would have been too much of a time sink and a distraction. I thought about it; but did not see having any time to do it; nor did I think about asking ATC to contact company; was just too busy.when we got lined up for a long final approach; we were still too high; so ATC vectored us out towards the east. They asked me when we wanted to turn back to the field. I advised them that it was too dark in the direction we were flying; that we could not see the airport; we were descending at 3;000 fpm; and if they would help us by calling our turn back to the final approach course. I was also getting task saturated.ATC turned us a couple more times; then switched us to approach control. At this point they advised us that rwy xxl was closed (I wish center would have told us; since we requested xxl with them; that would have saved me time close in to the field). So; I was busy again loading the FMS for xxr. When handed off to tower; we advised that we anticipated a normal landing; and that we planned to taxi off the runway. Landing checklist was completed. Fire and rescue was all lined up; adjacent to the field. Landing was uneventful.upon landing; we taxied off. At this point there began to be confusion. First; we called ops and they said they didn't have a gate for us; second; ground control advised that the fire department was on a different frequency and wanted to talk about how to scan the plane for hot spots; third; we had a bunch of caution/fault lights just come on after we taxied off the runway regarding faults with the avionics blower and extract fan; requiring an ECAM procedure to override; and then the fault warnings repeated even after we pressed the overrides. While talking with the fire department; they advised we needed to pull to a gate to scan the plane. At that moment; the flight attendant's in the back called us and advised that they now; for the first time; were smelling smoke. We told them to update us if it got worse and that we were sorting out getting a gate.we quickly advised ops that we needed a gate immediately; or we were going to request any gate at the airport. And if we didn't get any gate and if the smoke smell escalated; then the next consideration was to potentially have the air slides deploy to get the passengers off the plane. Ops responded to go to gate Z. Upon getting to the gate; the ground crew scrambled to get us in; after parking we opened up our emergency windows in the flight deck; to get fresh air in the plane.fire department came on the plane first in full gear (while the passengers remained seated); followed by maintenance in the flight deck where they reviewed the fault lights we had for the avionics. The captain got real busy with dispatch; maintenance; and observing the deplaning process.while we were super busy in the flight deck; a [company] gate lead popped in and interrupted us in front of maintenance to tell us that crew scheduling had us taking another airbus; that was a ron (routine overnight); to take the passengers on to [the original destination]. The captain politely told the gate lead that we did not know that and we weren't sure we were going to do that; and that we had to talk to several people before we consider that.the captain called the [chief pilot]; and apparently the [chief pilot] said that we could take the passengers on to [the original destination]; but he had our back either way if we decided not to. At this point; that would have been an fdp (flight duty period) extension. I told the captain that I was shocked that the [chief pilot] would even suggest such a thing; us flying another leg and take an extension; after we had just had an emergency; performed an emergency descent; a divert to ZZZ; and had our air masks on for over 30 minutes. I found it to be incredibly insensitive; and inappropriate. The inconvenience to the passengers should be handled by another flight crew; it appeared to me that management's view of safety was getting blurred with operational needs to accommodate the stranded passengers.after the flight had deplaned the captain; walked up the jetway to greet passengers to see if everyone was okay. There were no health problems. Meanwhile; the flight attendants and I discussed that we did not want to do another leg. One flight attendant in particular had already told the gate lead that he did not want to work another leg.while in the jetway; discussing the situation with the flight crew; the gate lead came down to talk to us; but she was still on the phone; talking to someone in dispatch/ops and telling them that she wasn't sure if the crew was going to continue to [the original destination]; because one of the flight attendants was having issues. The flight attendant told the gate lead that it was very insensitive of her to be calling him out in front of everybody as the problem for not continuing the flight to [the original destination]. The gate lead did not get what the flight attendant was saying; rather she started to bark at all of us; that all her managers had gone for the day; they had no real help from the company to accommodate the stranded passengers and that it was going to be a real inconvenience for them; if we didn't continue on with another flight.the gate lead left for a moment; and the crew discussed how we felt about flying another leg. All three flight attendant's said they were tired and could do the flight; only because it was short. The captain said he was fine to continue to [the original destination]; but if other's didn't want to go; he would support that decision. One flight attendant said because it was a short flight he could do it; but really didn't want to because earlier this year he had a fume event and got sick from it; and had to get medical attention. The captain said; whatever you guys want to do; I'll support your decision. The gate lead came back again; she looked stressed and then got really pushy and was saying 'I don't know what's the hold-up; are you going to do the flight?' at this point I said that the gate lead was too overbearing; that she was smothering us and becoming the problem; pushing us after we had just handled an emergency; and we still needed time to decompress. The gate lead would not leave; and I told her that we were not going to make a decision until she gave us some space.after the gate lead left; I reflected on the day (three legs; and not wanting to do an fdp extension for a 4th leg; after an emergency). While I knew I could go to [the original destination]; I was now irritated by the gate lead singling out the flight attendant that didn't want to go; and then being way too pushy to us to work the next flight. So; I told the captain; there's no way I'm doing another leg; and we need hotel rooms in ZZZ. The captain told the gate lead.while waiting for crew scheduling to figure out hotels; the gate lead approached me and said she was sorry; that she realized we have a very busy night; and she was wrong to push us.[company] pushes crews after an emergency to wo

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer reported mild airframe vibrations followed by a burning odor and fumes; which resulted in a diversion.

Narrative: About halfway through cruise at 38;000 feet; the Captain and I noticed some very subtle; but different feeling vibration in the flight deck. We reviewed the N1/N2 vibration indicators and they were well within the normal range. I suggested to the Captain that the vibration may be happening from something other than the engines. The Captain suggested that we review the vibration advisory in the QRH. We reviewed the QRH regarding engine vibration and noted what to do; in the event we had excessive engine vibration. The procedure was not needed under these specific conditions.The vibration was intermittent and hard to concretely sense it was really any concern. However; we did; for our own interest; review nearest airport options in case the vibration became significant.The vibration ended; and we didn't discuss more about it. Then about 10-15 minutes later; I smelled a burning smell towards the rudder pedals. It had the smell of something similar to when you light a match. I also felt some heat from the fumes. I advised the Captain that I believed we had smoke in the flight deck and we immediately donned our air masks. We then called the FAs (Flight Attendants); and they reported that they did not smell any smoke. We advised the FAs that we were keeping our masks on for now because we smelled smoke. The Captain and I were slightly surprised that the FAs did not smell anything; because we were still smelling smoke. So to troubleshoot; we decided to look at all of our PEDs (personal devices) to see if anything was burning. PEDs were fine. While keeping the masks on; we did each take them off briefly to confirm we still had a burning smell; which we did.There were no indications from any of our instrumentation and advisory system screens that anything out of the ordinary was going on. But; I had no confidence that the burning smell was going to end. Rather; I was concerned that that situation was going to escalate from a burning smell to a fire. I shared my concerns with the Captain and that I felt we needed to divert to ZZZ (we were about 10-15 minutes from Top of Descent to [original destination]) if the smell persisted for 2 more minutes; and he agreed. The smell persisted; we advised Center that we needed to divert to ZZZ. They gave us vectors direct and to descend to 16;000 ft. We then advised the flight attendants we were diverting to ZZZ because we kept smelling a burning smell in the flight deck.Shortly after we started our descent; the FA's advised us that they also had a noticeable burning smell from the Exit Row up to the Flight Deck. Upon receiving this information; the Captain and I concurred that we should [advise ATC]; for priority into ZZZ and to have Fire/Rescue at the field. (Later we would also learn that there was a First Officer in Row 17; who also noticed a burning smell while were descending and asked the Flight Attendants if we were descending because of the burning smell.) I advised the FAs to grab their [emergency gear] at the ready; in case the situation got worse.We [advised ATC of the situation]; which triggered a plethora of ATC scripted questions to us; which workload permitting I answered. (e.g. the nature of the smoke?; where the smoke was?; were we wearing our oxygen masks?; souls on board?; fuel remaining?). Our priority at this point was to get the aircraft on the ground safely; but as quickly as possible. On the descent; I was very busy as Pilot Monitoring. First; we had our air masks on the whole time; which was cumbersome. Second; handling numerous comms with ATC; talking to the FAs; discussing the divert with the Captain; and loading a divert into the FMS for ZZZ. The Captain was handling the emergency descent; which took most of his attention. Center offered us any runway at ZZZ; I asked which way they were landing; they said west; so I requested XXL. The Captain was so busy with the descent that he did not change his instrument approach plates from [theoriginal destination] to ZZZ; nor did he have time to; so I asked for him to hand me his iPad and I loaded the appropriate plates for the divert to ZZZ.Approach checklist was handled through 18;000 feet; as is standard. Flight Attendants advised they were doing okay in the cabin. We discussed how to brief the passengers; FAs asked if we were going to say something to the passengers. But; because we were wearing our air masks; I asked the FAs to give the briefing; as I did not want to raise more panic by them hearing me sound like Darth Vader on the overhead speaker with my air mask on. The Captain advised them to say we were going to ZZZ out of a safety precaution. While getting ready for landing; I did not have time to get ATIS; were too busy; so I asked ATC for the weather; to enter into the FMS for performance. The weather was good; it would be a night visual. We did not have time to ACARS dispatch of the divert; that would have been too much of a time sink and a distraction. I thought about it; but did not see having any time to do it; nor did I think about asking ATC to contact company; was just too busy.When we got lined up for a long final approach; we were still too high; so ATC vectored us out towards the East. They asked me when we wanted to turn back to the field. I advised them that it was too dark in the direction we were flying; that we could not see the airport; we were descending at 3;000 fpm; and if they would help us by calling our turn back to the final approach course. I was also getting task saturated.ATC turned us a couple more times; then switched us to Approach Control. At this point they advised us that Rwy XXL was closed (I wish Center would have told us; since we requested XXL with them; that would have saved me time close in to the field). So; I was busy again loading the FMS for XXR. When handed off to tower; we advised that we anticipated a normal landing; and that we planned to taxi off the runway. Landing Checklist was completed. Fire and Rescue was all lined up; adjacent to the field. Landing was uneventful.Upon landing; we taxied off. At this point there began to be confusion. First; we called Ops and they said they didn't have a gate for us; Second; Ground Control advised that the Fire Department was on a different frequency and wanted to talk about how to scan the plane for hot spots; third; we had a bunch of caution/fault lights just come on after we taxied off the runway regarding Faults with the Avionics Blower and Extract Fan; requiring an ECAM procedure to override; and then the Fault warnings repeated even after we pressed the overrides. While talking with the Fire Department; they advised we needed to pull to a gate to scan the plane. At that moment; the FA's in the back called us and advised that they now; for the first time; were smelling smoke. We told them to update us if it got worse and that we were sorting out getting a gate.We quickly advised Ops that we needed a gate immediately; or we were going to request any gate at the airport. And if we didn't get any gate and if the smoke smell escalated; then the next consideration was to potentially have the air slides deploy to get the passengers off the plane. Ops responded to go to Gate Z. Upon getting to the gate; the ground crew scrambled to get us in; after parking we opened up our emergency windows in the flight deck; to get fresh air in the plane.Fire Department came on the plane first in full gear (while the passengers remained seated); followed by Maintenance in the flight deck where they reviewed the fault lights we had for the avionics. The Captain got real busy with Dispatch; maintenance; and observing the deplaning process.While we were super busy in the flight deck; a [company] Gate Lead popped in and interrupted us in front of maintenance to tell us that Crew Scheduling had us taking another Airbus; that was a RON (Routine Overnight); to take the passengers on to [the original destination]. The Captain politely told the Gate Lead that we did not know that and we weren't sure we were going to do that; and that we had to talk to several people before we consider that.The Captain called the [Chief Pilot]; and apparently the [Chief Pilot] said that we could take the passengers on to [the original destination]; but he had our back either way if we decided not to. At this point; that would have been an FDP (Flight Duty Period) extension. I told the Captain that I was shocked that the [Chief Pilot] would even suggest such a thing; us flying another leg and take an extension; after we had just had an emergency; performed an emergency descent; a divert to ZZZ; and had our air masks on for over 30 minutes. I found it to be incredibly insensitive; and inappropriate. The inconvenience to the passengers should be handled by another flight crew; it appeared to me that Management's view of Safety was getting blurred with operational needs to accommodate the stranded passengers.After the flight had deplaned the Captain; walked up the jetway to greet passengers to see if everyone was okay. There were no health problems. Meanwhile; the flight attendants and I discussed that we did not want to do another leg. One flight attendant in particular had already told the Gate Lead that he did not want to work another leg.While in the jetway; discussing the situation with the flight crew; the Gate Lead came down to talk to us; but she was still on the phone; talking to someone in Dispatch/Ops and telling them that she wasn't sure if the crew was going to continue to [the original destination]; because one of the flight attendants was having issues. The flight attendant told the Gate Lead that it was very insensitive of her to be calling him out in front of everybody as the problem for not continuing the flight to [the original destination]. The Gate Lead did not get what the FA was saying; rather she started to bark at all of us; that all her Managers had gone for the day; they had no real help from the company to accommodate the stranded passengers and that it was going to be a real inconvenience for them; if we didn't continue on with another flight.The Gate Lead left for a moment; and the crew discussed how we felt about flying another leg. All three FA's said they were tired and could do the flight; only because it was short. The Captain said he was fine to continue to [the original destination]; but if other's didn't want to go; he would support that decision. One Flight Attendant said because it was a short flight he could do it; but really didn't want to because earlier this year he had a fume event and got sick from it; and had to get medical attention. The Captain said; whatever you guys want to do; I'll support your decision. The Gate Lead came back again; she looked stressed and then got really pushy and was saying 'I don't know what's the hold-up; are you going to do the flight?' At this point I said that the Gate Lead was too overbearing; that she was smothering us and becoming the problem; pushing us after we had just handled an emergency; and we still needed time to decompress. The Gate Lead would not leave; and I told her that we were not going to make a decision until she gave us some space.After the Gate Lead left; I reflected on the day (three legs; and not wanting to do an FDP extension for a 4th leg; after an emergency). While I knew I could go to [the original destination]; I was now irritated by the Gate Lead singling out the FA that didn't want to go; and then being way too pushy to us to work the next flight. So; I told the Captain; there's no way I'm doing another leg; and we need hotel rooms in ZZZ. The Captain told the Gate Lead.While waiting for Crew Scheduling to figure out hotels; the Gate Lead approached me and said she was sorry; that she realized we have a very busy night; and she was wrong to push us.[Company] pushes crews after an emergency to wo

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.