37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1655975 |
Time | |
Date | 201906 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Dispatch unable to calculate airplane take-off performance with toga power and APU bleed air. Due to MEL 'air traffic service unit system (atsu) ETOPS aircraft' we were not able to receive takeoff performance data through the ACARS system; we needed to speak with dispatch. Dispatch ran the takeoff performance with flaps 3 and flex power setting (photo with 1 in lower right corner). We noticed the available stop distance remaining (asdr) was 378 feet so asked dispatch to recalculate the takeoff performance using toga power. This time the asdr was even less; at 324 feet. Finally; we asked for performance data using flaps 3; toga thrust and APU air bleed. The dispatcher told us there was no option available to him to input toga power and APU bleed air that he would have to do those calculations manually. Note that the last photo provides data for flex power with APU bleed air. We ended up departing without APU bleed air performance data; which could have expanded our very small margin for a safe departure. How it possible is this company is unable to adapt to changing weather and takeoff parameters by not having the ability for its dispatchers to calculate takeoff performance in all non-standard configurations? There are multiple variations in flap configuration; power settings and bleed configuration that increase the capability of the airbus quite effectively; as every other operator of the airbus is likely aware. A company that relies on its longevity as a term of legitimacy should be aware of these capabilities and understand this critical concept of calculating takeoff performance from relatively short fields in warmer weather conditions. As a crew member who is reliant on corporate staff to accurately calculate my takeoff performance data on a consistent basis I feel not only extremely let down but also that this operation is not as safe as it should be. I do not appreciate my life being exposed to any more danger than already is inherent in the job and I demand this company do better!additionally; when the dispatcher told us he would have to manually calculate the takeoff data using APU bleed air; at first I was waiting for him to tell us to stand by; but my first officer; who was on the phone; appeared to sound dejected as if he realized the dispatcher maybe was not interested in calculating the numbers manually?? I cannot say for certain as I was not on the phone with the dispatcher; however; at no time did I discern the dispatcher taking any kind of initiative to calculate our performance data manually. Ultimately we pushed back with the toga power; flaps 3; engine bleed air data. Had the dispatcher taken the time to calculate the APU bleed air; toga; flaps 3 data manually we might have experiences a slightly higher margin of safety than we did. As evidenced by the photo of the tlr printout; 'APU bleed on' is possible. So why is it that the dispatch was not able to input this configuration into his computer? If the answer has anything to do with the 737 not having this same capability (I have never operated the 737 so do not know) then (airline) is doing a great disservice to itself; its passengers and ground employees as well as the crews who operate the airbus. Perhaps 'do better' should be part of the corporate mantra. The airbus is a very capable aircraft when managed properly. The fact that (airline) does not have the capability to compute takeoff performance using bleed air taken from the APU instead of the engines is both disheartening and counterproductive to operating as safely as possible. Recommend learning how to compute takeoff data using APU bleed air.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Captain reported difficulty in obtaining takeoff performance data.
Narrative: Dispatch unable to calculate airplane take-off performance with TOGA power and APU Bleed Air. Due to MEL 'AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE UNIT SYSTEM (ATSU) ETOPS Aircraft' we were not able to receive takeoff performance data through the ACARS system; we needed to speak with Dispatch. Dispatch ran the takeoff performance with flaps 3 and flex power setting (photo with 1 in lower right corner). We noticed the available stop distance remaining (ASDR) was 378 feet so asked Dispatch to recalculate the takeoff performance using TOGA power. This time the ASDR was even less; at 324 feet. Finally; we asked for performance data using flaps 3; TOGA thrust and APU air bleed. The Dispatcher told us there was no option available to him to input TOGA power and APU bleed air that he would have to do those calculations manually. Note that the last photo provides data for flex power with APU Bleed Air. We ended up departing without APU Bleed Air performance data; which could have expanded our very small margin for a safe departure. How it possible is this company is unable to adapt to changing weather and takeoff parameters by not having the ability for its dispatchers to calculate takeoff performance in all non-standard configurations? There are multiple variations in flap configuration; power settings and bleed configuration that increase the capability of the Airbus quite effectively; as every other operator of the Airbus is likely aware. A company that relies on its longevity as a term of legitimacy should be aware of these capabilities and understand this critical concept of calculating takeoff performance from relatively short fields in warmer weather conditions. As a crew member who is reliant on corporate staff to accurately calculate my takeoff performance data on a consistent basis I feel not only extremely let down but also that this operation is not as safe as it should be. I do not appreciate my life being exposed to any more danger than already is inherent in the job and I demand this company do better!Additionally; when the Dispatcher told us he would have to manually calculate the takeoff data using APU bleed air; at first I was waiting for him to tell us to stand by; but my First Officer; who was on the phone; appeared to sound dejected as if he realized the Dispatcher maybe was not interested in calculating the numbers manually?? I cannot say for certain as I was not on the phone with the Dispatcher; however; at no time did I discern the Dispatcher taking any kind of initiative to calculate our performance data manually. Ultimately we pushed back with the TOGA power; flaps 3; engine bleed air data. Had the Dispatcher taken the time to calculate the APU bleed air; TOGA; flaps 3 data manually we might have experiences a slightly higher margin of safety than we did. As evidenced by the photo of the TLR printout; 'APU BLEED ON' is possible. So why is it that the Dispatch was not able to input this configuration into his computer? If the answer has anything to do with the 737 not having this same capability (I have never operated the 737 so do not know) then (airline) is doing a great disservice to itself; its passengers and ground employees as well as the crews who operate the Airbus. Perhaps 'Do Better' should be part of the corporate mantra. The Airbus is a very capable aircraft when managed properly. The fact that (airline) does not have the capability to compute takeoff performance using bleed air taken from the APU instead of the engines is both disheartening and counterproductive to operating as safely as possible. Recommend learning how to compute takeoff data using APU BLEED AIR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.