Narrative:

When I first took the sector volume was only moderate; but no traffic was deviating yet. I was briefed from the previous controller that the weather was starting to move quickly from the west to the east and eventually aircraft departing ZZZ would likely be deviating into my sector. The warning areas were active up to 50000 feet off to the east. Before the weather started to move into the sector; the controller told the supervisor and tmu (traffic management unit) that we wouldn't be able to be work departures much longer as well as the arrivals because they were going to be in direct conflict with each other. Approximately 20 minutes later just that started to happen. The controller asked tmu to be called and stop departures out of ZZZ because the higher sector could not take any more aircraft and they were deviating into arrivals. The departures continued to come and when approach was asked about it by the controller they said tmu told said that they just needed 20 miles in trail. The sector told approach they could not take any more hand offs and to stop departures. Approach immediately called the arrival sector and told them to hold arrivals apparently in retaliation for having to stop departures.I issued 2 holding clearances before approach called back and said we could keep them coming. I was already working a heavy volume of traffic and high complexity because the overlying sector was working on trying to climb aircraft between my descending aircraft. I had a d-side and tracker and the tracker for myself and the overlying sector were having to coordinate when planes could descend and climb between the two controllers. Data blocks become impossible to separate and it was difficult to ensure safety of aircraft even with 6 people working between the 2 sectors. Facilities should never shut off another facility without just operational necessity. Also if a sector gives plenty of warning that they will not be able to work aircraft and request from tmu that departures should be stopped; the request shouldn't be ignored. It should also be noted that the 7110.65 appendix B shouldn't be overlooked. Staffing was already horrible and everyone was working a position that was there and people were pulled off of busy sectors to go work d-sides and trackers and even busy sectors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Center Controller reported requesting an airport's departures be shut off due to sector workload with weather deviations but Traffic Management Unit did not comply with their request creating an unsafe workload for the controllers.

Narrative: When I first took the sector volume was only moderate; but no traffic was deviating yet. I was briefed from the previous Controller that the weather was starting to move quickly from the west to the east and eventually aircraft departing ZZZ would likely be deviating into my sector. The Warning Areas were active up to 50000 feet off to the east. Before the weather started to move into the sector; the Controller told the Supervisor and TMU (Traffic Management Unit) that we wouldn't be able to be work departures much longer as well as the arrivals because they were going to be in direct conflict with each other. Approximately 20 minutes later just that started to happen. The Controller asked TMU to be called and stop departures out of ZZZ because the higher sector could not take any more aircraft and they were deviating into arrivals. The departures continued to come and when Approach was asked about it by the Controller they said TMU told said that they just needed 20 miles in trail. The sector told Approach they could not take any more hand offs and to stop departures. Approach immediately called the arrival sector and told them to hold arrivals apparently in retaliation for having to stop departures.I issued 2 holding clearances before Approach called back and said we could keep them coming. I was already working a heavy volume of traffic and high complexity because the overlying sector was working on trying to climb aircraft between my descending aircraft. I had a D-side and tracker and the tracker for myself and the overlying sector were having to coordinate when planes could descend and climb between the two controllers. Data blocks become impossible to separate and it was difficult to ensure safety of aircraft even with 6 people working between the 2 sectors. Facilities should NEVER shut off another facility without just operational necessity. Also if a sector gives plenty of warning that they will not be able to work aircraft and request from TMU that departures should be stopped; the request shouldn't be ignored. It should also be noted that the 7110.65 Appendix B shouldn't be overlooked. Staffing was already horrible and everyone was working a position that was there and people were pulled off of busy sectors to go work d-sides and trackers and even busy sectors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.