Narrative:

Landed and rolled to far end of runway toward FBO. Missed last turnoff for taxiway. Retarded throttle on left engine and simultaneously advanced right throttle to aid in a 180 degree turn. Left engine started to die. Hit boost pump--no help. Advanced throttle, hit boost pump, then started. Got it restarted, but sputtering. Looked outside and had fire inside and under left nacelle. Called tower to roll the equipment. Passenger in right seat grabbed onboard fire extinguisher, but had to struggle to free it from a cobbled up bracket under PIC seat. I shut everything down, including fuel shutoffs on both engines. By the time passenger outside at nacelle, remaining flame the size of a cigarette lighter flame. Got it out by blowing on it. This airport has scheduled part 121 air carrier service and a constant series of violations with new england region FAA meeting part 139 certification. Bdr based pilots know that cft crew are airport maintenance staff with minimum training. Response time is inadequate and bdr employees are asked to perform services for which they have minimal training. Airport continues under waiver with cft truck older than dirt. Employee who responded in this incident is super guy, but should not be asked to respond to fires. By the time he got there, aircraft would have been engulfed in flames had fire not been so inconsequential. Local municipal equipment is 6-8 mi away and response time slow. By the time they arrived, FBO had arrived to tow aircraft off runway. We understand that F an in-flight emergency arises, there may be adequate time to 'roll the equipment.' there is not proper response for fuel spills or any on-ground fires. Aircraft was inspected by dir of maintenance the next day. No damage at all. What concerns us is the lack of proper services for the passenger carrying flts which could result in real problems. Human factors: taxiway lighting system inoperative in that area due to installation of proper system. I should have been sharper in looking for turnoff and not rushed a restart. Passenger is commercial ticket CFI-mei. Good thing he was there to get fire out. FAA should enforce regulations and not permit continual waivers. Ner-FAA airports staff work hard in an uphill situation. Please do not criticize them! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter states that airport has been cited in past for violations and non compliance re: crash fire rescue equipment, security and other safety aspects. Since report, the airport has lost its part 139 certification. It can no longer have part 121 operations at the airport. Reporter is still concerned, however, because flts with less than 30 seats can continue to operate and it is still an unsafe environment due to equipment and response time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWIN ENGINE ACFT HAS LEFT ENGINE FIRE ON AFTER LNDG ROLLOUT.

Narrative: LANDED AND ROLLED TO FAR END OF RWY TOWARD FBO. MISSED LAST TURNOFF FOR TXWY. RETARDED THROTTLE ON LEFT ENG AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ADVANCED RIGHT THROTTLE TO AID IN A 180 DEG TURN. LEFT ENG STARTED TO DIE. HIT BOOST PUMP--NO HELP. ADVANCED THROTTLE, HIT BOOST PUMP, THEN STARTED. GOT IT RESTARTED, BUT SPUTTERING. LOOKED OUTSIDE AND HAD FIRE INSIDE AND UNDER LEFT NACELLE. CALLED TWR TO ROLL THE EQUIP. PAX IN RIGHT SEAT GRABBED ONBOARD FIRE EXTINGUISHER, BUT HAD TO STRUGGLE TO FREE IT FROM A COBBLED UP BRACKET UNDER PIC SEAT. I SHUT EVERYTHING DOWN, INCLUDING FUEL SHUTOFFS ON BOTH ENGS. BY THE TIME PAX OUTSIDE AT NACELLE, REMAINING FLAME THE SIZE OF A CIGARETTE LIGHTER FLAME. GOT IT OUT BY BLOWING ON IT. THIS ARPT HAS SCHEDULED PART 121 ACR SVC AND A CONSTANT SERIES OF VIOLATIONS WITH NEW ENGLAND REGION FAA MEETING PART 139 CERTIFICATION. BDR BASED PLTS KNOW THAT CFT CREW ARE ARPT MAINT STAFF WITH MINIMUM TRNING. RESPONSE TIME IS INADEQUATE AND BDR EMPLOYEES ARE ASKED TO PERFORM SVCS FOR WHICH THEY HAVE MINIMAL TRNING. ARPT CONTINUES UNDER WAIVER WITH CFT TRUCK OLDER THAN DIRT. EMPLOYEE WHO RESPONDED IN THIS INCIDENT IS SUPER GUY, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO RESPOND TO FIRES. BY THE TIME HE GOT THERE, ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENGULFED IN FLAMES HAD FIRE NOT BEEN SO INCONSEQUENTIAL. LCL MUNI EQUIP IS 6-8 MI AWAY AND RESPONSE TIME SLOW. BY THE TIME THEY ARRIVED, FBO HAD ARRIVED TO TOW ACFT OFF RWY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT F AN INFLT EMER ARISES, THERE MAY BE ADEQUATE TIME TO 'ROLL THE EQUIP.' THERE IS NOT PROPER RESPONSE FOR FUEL SPILLS OR ANY ON-GND FIRES. ACFT WAS INSPECTED BY DIR OF MAINT THE NEXT DAY. NO DAMAGE AT ALL. WHAT CONCERNS US IS THE LACK OF PROPER SVCS FOR THE PAX CARRYING FLTS WHICH COULD RESULT IN REAL PROBS. HUMAN FACTORS: TXWY LIGHTING SYS INOP IN THAT AREA DUE TO INSTALLATION OF PROPER SYS. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN SHARPER IN LOOKING FOR TURNOFF AND NOT RUSHED A RESTART. PAX IS COMMERCIAL TICKET CFI-MEI. GOOD THING HE WAS THERE TO GET FIRE OUT. FAA SHOULD ENFORCE REGS AND NOT PERMIT CONTINUAL WAIVERS. NER-FAA ARPTS STAFF WORK HARD IN AN UPHILL SITUATION. PLEASE DO NOT CRITICIZE THEM! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATES THAT ARPT HAS BEEN CITED IN PAST FOR VIOLATIONS AND NON COMPLIANCE RE: CFR, SECURITY AND OTHER SAFETY ASPECTS. SINCE RPT, THE ARPT HAS LOST ITS PART 139 CERTIFICATION. IT CAN NO LONGER HAVE PART 121 OPS AT THE ARPT. RPTR IS STILL CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE FLTS WITH LESS THAN 30 SEATS CAN CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND IT IS STILL AN UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO EQUIP AND RESPONSE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.