Narrative:

Cleared stadium visibility (approach runway 24R lax). Captain flying, first officer handling communications. As captain I had lax airport in sight out coplts window overhead santa monica. I lost visibility with airport as we approached downtown. Turned base leg over expressway as prescribed in approach procedure. Overshot final resulting in being lined up closer to runway 25R final than runway 24R. Recognized error and began to turn back to runway 24R final just as tower controller advised we were encroaching on south complex approach space. He also advised we were close to an air carrier Y flight on final for the south complex. Tower controller asked us if we had air carrier Y in sight. We did not and we did not have air carrier Y in sight until lined up on runway 24R final. Air carrier Y appeared to be approximately 1000' below our altitude when I finally spotted the other aircraft. I purposely remained high on the runway 24R G/south until acquiring visibility with the air carrier Y in order to maintain vertical sep from the unseen aircraft. Despite good visibility the air carrier Y was difficult to see in the backgnd clutter of buildings. In a post-flight review, neither the flight engineer nor I recalled approach controllers telling us about the air carrier Y on final. However the first officer recalled being told about a commuter to follow us to the north complex and about the air carrier Y bound for the south complex. There was some difficulty in the transmission of this traffic information by the controller. The first officer had to ask the controller to repeat the transmission about the commuter aircraft. All 3 of us comprehended the information about the commuter aircraft, but 2 of us missed the advisory on the air carrier Y traffic! Human factors: I was able to get only about 3 hours sleep at the layover hotel prior to departure from sfo due to noise in the hotel by convention of college students. Was this a factor? I don't really know if normal sleep would have aided in quicker recognition of an overshoot. Since I had not operated into lax at that time of day in a long time it is possible that the change of visibility perception of lax in the light of dawn was a factor. I don't know. Sep of the pilot from the 'big picture' might well have been a factor. While 2 of the 3 crew members may have missed the transmission about conflicting traffic, I doubt such would have been the case if all traffic landing at lax had been on a single tower frequency rather than the north complex on one and the south on another. Aircraft in unintentional conflict during parallel approachs had become an all too common experience for aircraft at major airports such as lax, sfo, and mia. Eventually there will be a disaster. If the FAA continues to allow this hazardous procedure of parallel approachs the least that should be done is to stagger aircraft on final so that there is some following distance between aircraft on parallel approachs. Best of all lets stop this madness before people die.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB OVERSHOT TURN ON FOR FINAL APCH TO RWY 24L AT LAX. MINOR CONFLICT WITH TRAFFIC FOR RWY 25R.

Narrative: CLRED STADIUM VIS (APCH RWY 24R LAX). CAPT FLYING, F/O HANDLING COMS. AS CAPT I HAD LAX ARPT IN SIGHT OUT COPLTS WINDOW OVERHEAD SANTA MONICA. I LOST VIS WITH ARPT AS WE APCHED DOWNTOWN. TURNED BASE LEG OVER EXPRESSWAY AS PRESCRIBED IN APCH PROC. OVERSHOT FINAL RESULTING IN BEING LINED UP CLOSER TO RWY 25R FINAL THAN RWY 24R. RECOGNIZED ERROR AND BEGAN TO TURN BACK TO RWY 24R FINAL JUST AS TWR CTLR ADVISED WE WERE ENCROACHING ON S COMPLEX APCH SPACE. HE ALSO ADVISED WE WERE CLOSE TO AN ACR Y FLT ON FINAL FOR THE S COMPLEX. TWR CTLR ASKED US IF WE HAD ACR Y IN SIGHT. WE DID NOT AND WE DID NOT HAVE ACR Y IN SIGHT UNTIL LINED UP ON RWY 24R FINAL. ACR Y APPEARED TO BE APPROX 1000' BELOW OUR ALT WHEN I FINALLY SPOTTED THE OTHER ACFT. I PURPOSELY REMAINED HIGH ON THE RWY 24R G/S UNTIL ACQUIRING VIS WITH THE ACR Y IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN VERT SEP FROM THE UNSEEN ACFT. DESPITE GOOD VISIBILITY THE ACR Y WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE IN THE BACKGND CLUTTER OF BUILDINGS. IN A POST-FLT REVIEW, NEITHER THE FLT ENGINEER NOR I RECALLED APCH CTLRS TELLING US ABOUT THE ACR Y ON FINAL. HOWEVER THE F/O RECALLED BEING TOLD ABOUT A COMMUTER TO FOLLOW US TO THE N COMPLEX AND ABOUT THE ACR Y BOUND FOR THE S COMPLEX. THERE WAS SOME DIFFICULTY IN THE XMISSION OF THIS TFC INFO BY THE CTLR. THE F/O HAD TO ASK THE CTLR TO REPEAT THE XMISSION ABOUT THE COMMUTER ACFT. ALL 3 OF US COMPREHENDED THE INFO ABOUT THE COMMUTER ACFT, BUT 2 OF US MISSED THE ADVISORY ON THE ACR Y TFC! HUMAN FACTORS: I WAS ABLE TO GET ONLY ABOUT 3 HRS SLEEP AT THE LAYOVER HOTEL PRIOR TO DEP FROM SFO DUE TO NOISE IN THE HOTEL BY CONVENTION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS. WAS THIS A FACTOR? I DON'T REALLY KNOW IF NORMAL SLEEP WOULD HAVE AIDED IN QUICKER RECOGNITION OF AN OVERSHOOT. SINCE I HAD NOT OPERATED INTO LAX AT THAT TIME OF DAY IN A LONG TIME IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE CHANGE OF VIS PERCEPTION OF LAX IN THE LIGHT OF DAWN WAS A FACTOR. I DON'T KNOW. SEP OF THE PLT FROM THE 'BIG PICTURE' MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN A FACTOR. WHILE 2 OF THE 3 CREW MEMBERS MAY HAVE MISSED THE XMISSION ABOUT CONFLICTING TFC, I DOUBT SUCH WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE IF ALL TFC LNDG AT LAX HAD BEEN ON A SINGLE TWR FREQ RATHER THAN THE N COMPLEX ON ONE AND THE S ON ANOTHER. ACFT IN UNINTENTIONAL CONFLICT DURING PARALLEL APCHS HAD BECOME AN ALL TOO COMMON EXPERIENCE FOR ACFT AT MAJOR ARPTS SUCH AS LAX, SFO, AND MIA. EVENTUALLY THERE WILL BE A DISASTER. IF THE FAA CONTINUES TO ALLOW THIS HAZARDOUS PROC OF PARALLEL APCHS THE LEAST THAT SHOULD BE DONE IS TO STAGGER ACFT ON FINAL SO THAT THERE IS SOME FOLLOWING DISTANCE BTWN ACFT ON PARALLEL APCHS. BEST OF ALL LETS STOP THIS MADNESS BEFORE PEOPLE DIE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.