Narrative:

The day began as day 6 of 6 on reserve. At xa:58 I received a call from crew scheduling that they neglected to cover aircraft X whose original first officer (first officer) was a no show at check in time. Scheduled push back was xb:27. At the time of the call; I was located inside the kcm (known crew member) area. I proceeded to exit terminal X and head down to terminal Y where I caught the first available shuttle. Arrived at gate XXX at xb:24 as the last of the passengers were boarding. The captain helped out the situation by completing a big portion of normal first officer duties to help expedite the operation. Once complete with my duties and prepared for the flight; we conducted normal preflight briefings and cockpit set up. We started engine #2 at the gate prior to push back with a crossbleed start on [the taxiway]. Ca-PF (captain - pilot flying); first officer-pm (pilot monitoring). With deferred items of pack 1 and APU; an ecs (environmental control system) off takeoff was required and performed per the takeoff data we received via ACARS. Acceleration; takeoff roll; and rotation were all normal. Shortly after takeoff on climb out; we received the EICAS message for bleed 2 overpress. Since we were still in a critical phase of flight we elected to continue the climb out and departure till we could get the airplane cleaned up and at a safe altitude heading back towards ZZZ which the departure procedure would accomplish. We elected to level off at 10;000 ft. And requested delay vectors as we worked the malfunction. Ca maintain PF while I broke out the QRH (quick reference handbook) and ran (bleed 1(2) overpress) procedures. The message failed to go out after securing affected bleed button along with the APU and xbleed ones which required the associated throttle to be reduced to idle and completion of the single engine and approach and landing procedure. Completed the procedure to set up for return to ZZZ on runway xxr for landing as we were above max gross weight for landing with one reverser available. Of note with both packs now inoperative; the cabin temperature quickly rose to above 90F for the duration of the flight. [Requested priority handling] with ATC; landing and taxi in were uneventful; crash fire rescue equipment (crash fire rescue) were on the scene; passengers were deplaned to waiting shuttle buses to return them to the [remote terminal] from our parking spot. Maintenance arrived and took over the aircraft for trouble shooting. Captain called and briefed the on-call chief pilot who gave everyone the option to continue on or be done for the day. The original pairing had us landing back in ZZZ at xi:25 (if on schedule) and only gave me 35 minutes 'till I timed out per far 117 rules. The rest of the crew had fdp (flight duty period) time available and completed the turn to ZZZ1 with another airplane. I was replaced as I was no longer going to have the duty day required with the delay. While the experience was similar to what we receive in training; we did all procedures called for with the QRH; and had effective CRM (cockpit resource management) with the flight crew; dispatch; and ATC; and safely landed the aircraft. There were some lessons to be learned. First; would be some limitations with the QRH. With deferred items and mels; individual malfunctions can quickly become complex and with switches in non-standard positions it will limit some messages on EICAS. The QRH in this case assumes that the other bleed/pack system is working normally. Per the QRH if we were able to get the message to clear after securing the affected bleed; APU; and cross bleed buttons; it would direct us to check fuel requirements and continue with normal operations. In our case we would still have both packs secured with one per MEL and one per procedure. Which made the cabin extremely hot but more importantly we lost our cabin pressurization. But by securing the switches we did not have any pressurization messages since we did not exceed 9;700 ft. Cabin altitude by leveling off at 10;000 ft. With initial pressurization prior to securing the second pack (of note; climb check done at initial level off at 10;000 ft. Showed normal). Going back to the MEL for 21-xx-xx gives guidance for both packs inoperative which was our current situation after completing the QRH procedure. It talks about limiting flights with passengers to 10;000 ft. Among other requirements for operation. Nowhere in this QRH procedure is this limitation documented. The QRH also directs the crew to reference single engine approach and landing procedure. During most if not all our training scenarios we would execute this procedure after securing the engine due to fire or failure and not have it available. In our case the affected engine was at idle and available to us if needed in extremis. We launched to the west and turned south of ZZZ where we don't have much terrain or high elevation airports to be concerned about performance. If this had occurred in a number of other high elevation or terrain threat airports the situation would be much different. It would have behooved us to brief the times when we would use the affected engine if aircraft performance was in question (GPWS warning; terrain clearance on missed approach; etc.). At the end of the day as a crew we discussed most of these issues/possibilities and completed all procedures as published with a positive outcome it is a good reminder that the QRH is not all encompassing and as pilots we need to take into considerations all conditions our airplane is in with both EICAS messages as well as mels.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 First Officer reported a pneumatic bleed valve anomaly after takeoff; which resulted in a return to the departure airport.

Narrative: The day began as day 6 of 6 on reserve. At XA:58 I received a call from Crew Scheduling that they neglected to cover Aircraft X whose original FO (First Officer) was a no show at check in time. Scheduled push back was XB:27. At the time of the call; I was located inside the KCM (Known Crew Member) area. I proceeded to exit Terminal X and head down to Terminal Y where I caught the first available shuttle. Arrived at Gate XXX at XB:24 as the last of the passengers were boarding. The Captain helped out the situation by completing a big portion of normal FO duties to help expedite the operation. Once complete with my duties and prepared for the flight; we conducted normal preflight briefings and cockpit set up. We started engine #2 at the gate prior to push back with a crossbleed start on [the taxiway]. CA-PF (Captain - Pilot Flying); FO-PM (Pilot Monitoring). With deferred items of Pack 1 and APU; an ECS (Environmental Control System) off takeoff was required and performed per the takeoff data we received via ACARS. Acceleration; takeoff roll; and rotation were all normal. Shortly after takeoff on climb out; we received the EICAS message for BLEED 2 OVERPRESS. Since we were still in a critical phase of flight we elected to continue the climb out and departure till we could get the airplane cleaned up and at a safe altitude heading back towards ZZZ which the departure procedure would accomplish. We elected to level off at 10;000 ft. and requested delay vectors as we worked the malfunction. CA maintain PF while I broke out the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and ran (BLEED 1(2) OVERPRESS) procedures. The message failed to go out after securing affected bleed button along with the APU and XBleed ones which required the associated throttle to be reduced to idle and completion of the Single Engine and Approach and Landing Procedure. Completed the procedure to set up for return to ZZZ on Runway XXR for landing as we were above max gross weight for landing with one reverser available. Of note with both packs now inoperative; the cabin temperature quickly rose to above 90F for the duration of the flight. [Requested priority handling] with ATC; landing and taxi in were uneventful; CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) were on the scene; passengers were deplaned to waiting shuttle buses to return them to the [Remote Terminal] from our parking spot. Maintenance arrived and took over the aircraft for trouble shooting. Captain called and briefed the on-call Chief Pilot who gave everyone the option to continue on or be done for the day. The original pairing had us landing back in ZZZ at XI:25 (if on schedule) and only gave me 35 minutes 'till I timed out per FAR 117 rules. The rest of the crew had FDP (Flight Duty Period) time available and completed the turn to ZZZ1 with another airplane. I was replaced as I was no longer going to have the duty day required with the delay. While the experience was similar to what we receive in training; we did all procedures called for with the QRH; and had effective CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) with the flight crew; Dispatch; and ATC; and safely landed the aircraft. There were some lessons to be learned. First; would be some limitations with the QRH. With deferred items and MELs; individual malfunctions can quickly become complex and with switches in non-standard positions it will limit some messages on EICAS. The QRH in this case assumes that the other bleed/pack system is working normally. Per the QRH if we were able to get the message to clear after securing the affected bleed; APU; and cross bleed buttons; it would direct us to check fuel requirements and continue with normal operations. In our case we would still have both packs secured with one per MEL and one per procedure. Which made the cabin extremely hot but more importantly we lost our cabin pressurization. But by securing the switches we did not have any pressurization messages since we did not exceed 9;700 ft. cabin altitude by leveling off at 10;000 ft. with initial pressurization prior to securing the second pack (of note; climb check done at initial level off at 10;000 ft. showed normal). Going back to the MEL for 21-XX-XX gives guidance for both packs inoperative which was our current situation after completing the QRH procedure. It talks about limiting flights with passengers to 10;000 ft. among other requirements for operation. Nowhere in this QRH procedure is this limitation documented. The QRH also directs the crew to reference single engine approach and landing procedure. During most if not all our training scenarios we would execute this procedure after securing the engine due to fire or failure and not have it available. In our case the affected engine was at idle and available to us if needed in extremis. We launched to the west and turned south of ZZZ where we don't have much terrain or high elevation airports to be concerned about performance. If this had occurred in a number of other high elevation or terrain threat airports the situation would be much different. It would have behooved us to brief the times when we would use the affected engine if aircraft performance was in question (GPWS warning; terrain clearance on missed approach; etc.). At the end of the day as a crew we discussed most of these issues/possibilities and completed all procedures as published with a positive outcome it is a good reminder that the QRH is not all encompassing and as pilots we need to take into considerations all conditions our airplane is in with both EICAS messages as well as MELs.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.