Narrative:

Upon arrival at [aircraft] for the flight prior to the abort; the aircraft had multiple engine control problems. The auto throttle servos; thrust management system (tms); left engine thrust reverser; and lower engine indications and crew alerting system (EICAS) display were all inoperative and summarily deferred. I refused the aircraft with all these interrelated deferrals because I was concerned about being required by the MEL (minimum equipment list) for the tms deferral to set maximum thrust manually without 'full-up' EICAS engine instruments. Maintenance took their now standard position: defer and argue with the captain rather than fix anything; regardless of the dangers involved. I called the director to flight operations; and he agreed with me: something had to be fixed. I requested that it be the tms but instead maintenance magically found a lower EICAS screen and replaced it within 15 minutes; taking the path of least work once again. On the next attempted flight; these actions or lack thereof and the now standard deferrals rather than repairs were the direct cause of a high speed; high power; high altitude rejected takeoff.reverse this extremely dangerous trend in our maintenance culture which is being dictated and driven directly from the very top of [the company] of defer before repair; deceive before admission and argue before submission; before we have an accident; loss of aircraft or loss of life!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported encountering resistance from Maintenance to properly repair airplane.

Narrative: Upon arrival at [aircraft] for the flight prior to the abort; the aircraft had multiple engine control problems. The Auto Throttle Servos; Thrust Management System (TMS); Left Engine Thrust Reverser; and lower Engine Indications and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) display were all inoperative and summarily deferred. I refused the aircraft with all these interrelated deferrals because I was concerned about being required by the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) for the TMS deferral to set MAX thrust manually without 'full-up' EICAS engine instruments. Maintenance took their now standard position: defer and argue with the Captain rather than fix anything; regardless of the dangers involved. I called the Director to Flight Operations; and he agreed with me: something had to be fixed. I requested that it be the TMS but instead Maintenance magically found a lower EICAS screen and replaced it within 15 minutes; taking the path of least work once again. On the next attempted flight; these actions or lack thereof and the now standard deferrals rather than repairs were the direct cause of a high speed; high power; high altitude rejected takeoff.Reverse this extremely dangerous trend in our Maintenance culture which is being dictated and driven directly from the very top of [the company] of defer before repair; deceive before admission and argue before submission; before we have an accident; loss of aircraft or loss of life!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.