Narrative:

First officer/pilot flying at the time landed normally on runway 36L in ZZZ; immediately after touchdown I noticed a change in pitch of the normal 'hum' on the flight deck. I didn't think much of it; so we continued our landing rollout and slowed to exit at the W7 high speed. First officer began the right turn then transferred the controls to me and took over the radios. As I began to apply brake pressure; I noticed a considerable reduction in effectiveness and steering control. At this point; we were clearing the runway environment but still on the high speed exit when we received a hydraulic 3 lo press caution message followed by the steering inoperative caution message and I believe the hydraulic pump 3A or B caution message came on intermittently as well but I'm not 100% sure. We had just began to bare right onto taxiway november to head towards the ramp; however; I realized if we did so and became disabled we would create a serious backup behind us. As a first officer I had been part of multiple inoperative steering events and was confident I could maneuver back to the left onto taxiway west without risking the safety of the flight. I told first officer I was making a left onto whiskey and asked him to inform tower of our intentions and to notify them we had lost steering ability. We were eventually able to get the aircraft clear of the whiskey/november intersection using differential thrust. Once stopped we discussed which messages we had seen; which QRH procedure was appropriate and elected to run the hydraulic 3 lo press checklist. We read through the whole checklist from start to finish; however; after step 5; all actions pertained to an aircraft in flight so we did not complete any of those steps. At step 4 we pulled up the hydraulic synoptic page to review effected systems; discussed the brakes/parking brake and saw that hydraulic system 3 was showing 0%. Once the QRH was complete we moved on to notifying maintenance control; the flight attendants/passengers and sent an ACARS message to dispatch. Once all that was complete we noticed we hadn't cleaned up the aircraft after landing; had a talk about possible hydraulic leaks inside or under the aircraft and decided to call maintenance back to double check we were okay to shut down our left engine and pull the flaps up without causing any harm or danger. They informed us that would be fine just as long as we kept the right engine running to maintain outboard brake pressure. After that first officer suggested that we may have left a streak of hydraulic fluid behind us so we informed tower of that possibility. Tower notified the aircraft on final approach and when that aircraft landed they informed us we had a puddle of fluid under us. After that; tower control gave us their frequency to talk to the ops truck; we are not sure if they continued landing aircraft on the runway or shut it down but we believe they switched everyone off of [runway] 36L. The tug driver arrived in under 20 minutes from initial contact and we worked with him to get the aircraft hooked up; then shut our right engine down before making our way to the ramp. Once at the gate; the tug driver was very good about communicating to us that if we opened the door early it would not reach the ground as we would still be jacked up on the tug. He instructed us to wait for him to chock the aircraft; then he would disconnect and then we would be okay to extinguish the seatbelt sign and open the door. I didn't get his name; but as I said he did a great job communicating with us exactly what he needed us to do and in what order. Despite making an announcement while being towed back that all passengers needed to remain seated until the seatbelt sign was off; they all got up as soon as we got to the gate. The flight attendants notified us and made another announcement to get them seated again; which was definitely a good thing as our drop from the tug did cause a good jolt. We then safely deplaned the aircraft and saw on the post flight that hydraulic fluid was leaking from the nose gear bay. I completed the logbook write up; spoke with maintenance and then turned the aircraft over to them. I believe we began losing hydraulic pressure as soon as we made ground contact as indicated by the change in cockpit noise; however our touchdown seemed well within normal limits so I would doubt it was caused by an abnormally hard landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported after landing aircraft had a hydraulic 3 failure.

Narrative: First Officer/Pilot Flying at the time landed normally on Runway 36L in ZZZ; immediately after touchdown I noticed a change in pitch of the normal 'hum' on the flight deck. I didn't think much of it; so we continued our landing rollout and slowed to exit at the W7 high speed. First Officer began the right turn then transferred the controls to me and took over the radios. As I began to apply brake pressure; I noticed a considerable reduction in effectiveness and steering control. At this point; we were clearing the runway environment but still on the high speed exit when we received a HYD 3 LO PRESS caution message followed by the STEERING INOP caution message and I believe the HYD PUMP 3A or B caution message came on intermittently as well but I'm not 100% sure. We had just began to bare right onto Taxiway November to head towards the ramp; however; I realized if we did so and became disabled we would create a serious backup behind us. As a First Officer I had been part of multiple inoperative steering events and was confident I could maneuver back to the left onto taxiway W without risking the safety of the flight. I told First Officer I was making a left onto Whiskey and asked him to inform Tower of our intentions and to notify them we had lost steering ability. We were eventually able to get the aircraft clear of the Whiskey/November intersection using differential thrust. Once stopped we discussed which messages we had seen; which QRH procedure was appropriate and elected to run the HYD 3 LO PRESS checklist. We read through the whole checklist from start to finish; however; after step 5; all actions pertained to an aircraft in flight so we did not complete any of those steps. At step 4 we pulled up the HYD synoptic page to review effected systems; discussed the brakes/parking brake and saw that hydraulic system 3 was showing 0%. Once the QRH was complete we moved on to notifying maintenance control; the flight attendants/passengers and sent an ACARS message to Dispatch. Once all that was complete we noticed we hadn't cleaned up the aircraft after landing; had a talk about possible hydraulic leaks inside or under the aircraft and decided to call maintenance back to double check we were okay to shut down our left engine and pull the flaps up without causing any harm or danger. They informed us that would be fine just as long as we kept the right engine running to maintain outboard brake pressure. After that First Officer suggested that we may have left a streak of hydraulic fluid behind us so we informed Tower of that possibility. Tower notified the aircraft on final approach and when that aircraft landed they informed us we had a puddle of fluid under us. After that; Tower Control gave us their frequency to talk to the Ops truck; we are not sure if they continued landing aircraft on the runway or shut it down but we believe they switched everyone off of [Runway] 36L. The tug driver arrived in under 20 minutes from initial contact and we worked with him to get the aircraft hooked up; then shut our right engine down before making our way to the ramp. Once at the gate; the tug driver was very good about communicating to us that if we opened the door early it would not reach the ground as we would still be jacked up on the tug. He instructed us to wait for him to chock the aircraft; then he would disconnect and then we would be okay to extinguish the seatbelt sign and open the door. I didn't get his name; but as I said he did a great job communicating with us exactly what he needed us to do and in what order. Despite making an announcement while being towed back that all passengers needed to remain seated until the seatbelt sign was off; they all got up as soon as we got to the gate. The flight attendants notified us and made another announcement to get them seated again; which was definitely a good thing as our drop from the tug did cause a good jolt. We then safely deplaned the aircraft and saw on the post flight that hydraulic fluid was leaking from the nose gear bay. I completed the logbook write up; spoke with Maintenance and then turned the aircraft over to them. I believe we began losing hydraulic pressure as soon as we made ground contact as indicated by the change in cockpit noise; however our touchdown seemed well within normal limits so I would doubt it was caused by an abnormally hard landing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.