Narrative:

After arriving at aircraft the flight crew noticed write-ups; including the left hand emergency escape rope velcro worn. I; (the captain;) wrote in the logbook; 'velcro on left side emergency rope worn. Requesting inspection.' maintenance personnel came on board and spent approximately thirty minutes working with the velcro to make it stick. I asked the mechanic; 'is it going to stick?' to which he responded; 'well; they told me to 'work my magic.' the only way I can get it to stay in is if I wedge it underneath the trim.' after this conversation; the mechanic called maintenance control who told him they will get back with him after they figure out a game plan. After approximately 10 minutes; the mechanic comes back on board and told me that they told him to 'tape up' the emergency door. After hearing that the game plan of maintenance is to tape the door; and my knowledge as I was reviewing the mels; I realized that the only one applicable to the emergency escape rope is an MEL regarding damage to the door itself; not the velcro holding the door up. Regardless; the velcro in and of itself is an imperative item for this MEL. This MEL is as follows: (MEL 25-xx-xx-xx lanyard; emergency exit rope cover. Exceptions: may be damaged provided velcro is intact; secure; and does not impede use of emergency escape rope. Placarding: escape rope cover.) I first made a call to assistant chief pilot X to see what he thought of this. He did not answer. I recognized this to be a very questionable decision by maintenance; and called my dispatcher asking to be put on with assistant chief pilot Y. Through dispatch; he did not answer the phone; and dispatch left a voicemail with his cellphone. However; he called moments later from his cellphone; which I answered. Assistant chief pilot X himself mentioned his hesitance towards that decision by maintenance; as well; and handed the phone to assistant chief pilot Y. I informed assistant chief pilot Y of what was going on; and how uncomfortable I was about this situation. Assistant chief pilot Y then went on to say; 'you are not a mechanic; and when they sign it off it is their certificates on the line; not yours.' I responded to him; 'yes; you are right; I am not a mechanic; but I am an airline transport pilot and captain; and I think this is a shady situation.' he then made implications about what would happen if I didn't take the aircraft; and said; 'the company is not going to lose thousands of dollars ferrying an aircraft because of velcro.' at this point; feeling as though my authority as captain was being undermined; as well as pressured into taking the aircraft; I ended the conversation and called my union representative. After talking with my union representative; I received a conference call from maintenance control regarding this situation. I requested my union representative to be present; and after he was patched in; we began the conference call. I expressed my concern with this decision by maintenance; particularly regarding the MEL and the requirement that the velcro needed to be intact and secure; and worried that the tape would impede the use of the emergency door; (be it in difficulty opening; or appearance by a passenger that it was not available for use.) during the conference call; the company claimed that the chief inspector was in a position with the FAA and possessed authority to approve the sign off for this revenue flight. Throughout this conference call; I was made to feel under duress to take the aircraft; even though I felt that the write-up was questionable; as it directly contradicted that of which I read in the MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 flight crew reported feeling pressured to accept an aircraft for service that they felt was not in compliance with the applicable MEL.

Narrative: After arriving at aircraft the flight crew noticed write-ups; including the left hand emergency escape rope Velcro worn. I; (the Captain;) wrote in the logbook; 'Velcro on left side emergency rope worn. Requesting inspection.' Maintenance personnel came on board and spent approximately thirty minutes working with the Velcro to make it stick. I asked the Mechanic; 'Is it going to stick?' to which he responded; 'Well; they told me to 'Work my magic.' The only way I can get it to stay in is if I wedge it underneath the trim.' After this conversation; the Mechanic called Maintenance Control who told him they will get back with him after they figure out a game plan. After approximately 10 minutes; the Mechanic comes back on board and told me that they told him to 'Tape up' the emergency door. After hearing that the game plan of Maintenance is to tape the door; and my knowledge as I was reviewing the MELs; I realized that the only one applicable to the emergency escape rope is an MEL regarding damage to the door itself; not the Velcro holding the door up. Regardless; the Velcro in and of itself is an imperative item for this MEL. This MEL is as follows: (MEL 25-XX-XX-XX Lanyard; Emergency Exit Rope Cover. Exceptions: May be damaged provided Velcro is intact; secure; and does not impede use of emergency escape rope. Placarding: Escape rope cover.) I first made a call to Assistant Chief Pilot X to see what he thought of this. He did not answer. I recognized this to be a very questionable decision by Maintenance; and called my Dispatcher asking to be put on with Assistant Chief Pilot Y. Through Dispatch; he did not answer the phone; and Dispatch left a voicemail with his cellphone. However; he called moments later from his cellphone; which I answered. Assistant Chief Pilot X himself mentioned his hesitance towards that decision by Maintenance; as well; and handed the phone to Assistant Chief Pilot Y. I informed Assistant Chief Pilot Y of what was going on; and how uncomfortable I was about this situation. Assistant Chief Pilot Y then went on to say; 'You are not a mechanic; and when they sign it off it is their certificates on the line; not yours.' I responded to him; 'Yes; you are right; I am not a Mechanic; but I am an Airline Transport Pilot and Captain; and I think this is a shady situation.' He then made implications about what would happen if I didn't take the aircraft; and said; 'The Company is not going to lose thousands of dollars ferrying an aircraft because of Velcro.' At this point; feeling as though my authority as Captain was being undermined; as well as pressured into taking the aircraft; I ended the conversation and called my Union Representative. After talking with my Union Representative; I received a conference call from Maintenance Control regarding this situation. I requested my Union Representative to be present; and after he was patched in; we began the conference call. I expressed my concern with this decision by Maintenance; particularly regarding the MEL and the requirement that the Velcro needed to be intact and secure; and worried that the tape would impede the use of the emergency door; (be it in difficulty opening; or appearance by a passenger that it was not available for use.) During the conference call; the Company claimed that the Chief Inspector was in a position with the FAA and possessed authority to approve the sign off for this revenue flight. Throughout this conference call; I was made to feel under duress to take the aircraft; even though I felt that the write-up was questionable; as it directly contradicted that of which I read in the MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.