Narrative:

Takeoff was initiated using contaminated runway procedures. After gear was selected in the up position and the flaps selected up, the first officer noted a left battery over temperature light illumination by calling 'battery overtemp.' being in the final segment of a critical phase of flight, normal climb procedures were continued through to the after takeoff checks. The battery switch was then selected 'off' immediately following the application of the essential power switch selected 'on'. The essential power selection was unnecessary since pc generators were still on line...and no loss of any electrical was experienced. My intention was to make sure essential power was available at all times before selecting battery power off. I then called for the abnormal procedures checklist. The checklist was west/O index and extremely difficult to locate a specific procedure. The first officer could not find the appropriate procedure. I then gave the flight controls to the first officer because my HSI compass card (dg) was nominally useful. We decided that a return to the departure airport would best serve the primary need of safety. ATC had not notamed 'out' or 'not in service' the runway and ILS we used for a landing just one hour prior to this departure. Nothing was mentioned of this closure on the ATIS. Our plans for takeoff contingency were to return to the departure airport via ILS 35R, already set up in navigation #1. We changed to ILS 31R and continued. A safe landing was made and the battery overtemp light went out as we taxied to the ramp. After consulting with maintenance control, and completing various system checks, another takeoff was attempted and the flight was completed successfully west/O any other battery over temperature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BATTERY OVERTEMP WARNING ON TKOF.

Narrative: TKOF WAS INITIATED USING CONTAMINATED RWY PROCS. AFTER GEAR WAS SELECTED IN THE UP POS AND THE FLAPS SELECTED UP, THE F/O NOTED A L BATTERY OVER TEMPERATURE LIGHT ILLUMINATION BY CALLING 'BATTERY OVERTEMP.' BEING IN THE FINAL SEGMENT OF A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, NORMAL CLB PROCS WERE CONTINUED THROUGH TO THE AFTER TKOF CHKS. THE BATTERY SWITCH WAS THEN SELECTED 'OFF' IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL PWR SWITCH SELECTED 'ON'. THE ESSENTIAL PWR SELECTION WAS UNNECESSARY SINCE PC GENERATORS WERE STILL ON LINE...AND NO LOSS OF ANY ELECTRICAL WAS EXPERIENCED. MY INTENTION WAS TO MAKE SURE ESSENTIAL PWR WAS AVAILABLE AT ALL TIMES BEFORE SELECTING BATTERY PWR OFF. I THEN CALLED FOR THE ABNORMAL PROCS CHKLIST. THE CHKLIST WAS W/O INDEX AND EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LOCATE A SPECIFIC PROC. THE F/O COULD NOT FIND THE APPROPRIATE PROC. I THEN GAVE THE FLT CTLS TO THE F/O BECAUSE MY HSI COMPASS CARD (DG) WAS NOMINALLY USEFUL. WE DECIDED THAT A RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT WOULD BEST SERVE THE PRIMARY NEED OF SAFETY. ATC HAD NOT NOTAMED 'OUT' OR 'NOT IN SVC' THE RWY AND ILS WE USED FOR A LNDG JUST ONE HR PRIOR TO THIS DEP. NOTHING WAS MENTIONED OF THIS CLOSURE ON THE ATIS. OUR PLANS FOR TKOF CONTINGENCY WERE TO RETURN TO THE DEP ARPT VIA ILS 35R, ALREADY SET UP IN NAV #1. WE CHANGED TO ILS 31R AND CONTINUED. A SAFE LNDG WAS MADE AND THE BATTERY OVERTEMP LIGHT WENT OUT AS WE TAXIED TO THE RAMP. AFTER CONSULTING WITH MAINT CTL, AND COMPLETING VARIOUS SYS CHKS, ANOTHER TKOF WAS ATTEMPTED AND THE FLT WAS COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY W/O ANY OTHER BATTERY OVER TEMPERATURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.