Narrative:

I was the radar controller observing an adjacent sector. This occurred during a major weather event along the eastern coast of florida. I was a witness to this near tragedy and feel a responsibility to report. The complexities of this airspace is too complicated to communicate in writing. The most pertinent of details would be that we have a 15 mile corridor in which to transition all the aircraft coming south and going north. This is because the military takes over the vast majority of our airspace on a daily basis and has no concern for the needs of the NAS (national airspace system). At the time of the incident there was widespread thunderstorms topping 40;000 ft. Throughout the airspace. The military had all of the warning areas active and would not accept point outs. The controller was working the volume of 3 or 4 sectors because aircraft were being routed that way because other routes were cut off because of storms. As if that wasn't enough of an issue; they also had storms and many aircraft had to shoot a hole only 4 or so miles from the warning areas. Our tmu (traffic management unit) was made aware of how unmanageable this was via landline from the d-side (radar assist) position. This was of no help and in fact they approved orlando approach releasing departures to climb above the arrivals coming in through the same gate. The arrivals and departures were using the same gate.the tmu is not receptive to our concerns and in fact makes our positions more difficult. They have half of their coordinators who have never been certified in this center with one never having been radar certified anywhere making these decisions. I wish I could say this was unusual; but in fact it's standard operating procedures for our tmu. They have in fact gone behind our back to approach; after we coordinated receiving instructions via landline; and told that facility to disregard because we did not need that. I was quick looking the sector; because they needed an extra set of eyes; when I saw that the controller had a southbound aircraft at 26;000 ft. Indicating it had a descent to 22;000 ft. There was a northbound aircraft; deviating for weather; at 25;000 ft. At first I believed the controller must have had the data block 'dressed up' instead of the clearance actually being issued. This is not a legal practice; but one that does occur. Then I saw the northbound 25;000 ft. Aircraft had H320 is the data block. I determined that this vector would work; yet there was thunderstorms upon that heading. I watched for a moment and took note that the FL250 aircraft was not turning. The aircraft at 26;000 ft. Then vacated their altitude for 22;000 ft. They were about 10 miles apart. I told the radar controller that I did not believe that that was going to 'work.' this; along with conflict alert; brought the situation to his attention he later told me. The controller vectored both aircraft sharply with one violating military airspace; because that is how close the weather had pushed us. One vector and you're in. This was the closest loss I've seen in person in nearly 14 years. I would start by requiring our tmu to be certified from within this building. The tmu should instead of working for the airlines and 'keeping pressure on the system;' should work with safety in mind. The command center is also a huge issue with not having any understanding of the complexity in this building. Regarding an airspace change. The warning areas need to be moved 15 miles further east so that we have more room to work aircraft when in thunderstorm season. The warning areas closest to shore should also be re callable to center. Currently we cannot recall any airspace along the east coast.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A ZJX Center Controller reported the Traffic Management Unit did not manage the flow to another sector causing Warning Area airspace violations and a traffic confliction during a period of weather deviations.

Narrative: I was the radar controller observing an adjacent sector. This occurred during a major weather event along the eastern coast of Florida. I was a witness to this near tragedy and feel a responsibility to report. The complexities of this airspace is too complicated to communicate in writing. The most pertinent of details would be that we have a 15 mile corridor in which to transition all the aircraft coming south and going north. This is because the military takes over the vast majority of our airspace on a daily basis and has no concern for the needs of the NAS (National Airspace System). At the time of the incident there was widespread thunderstorms topping 40;000 ft. throughout the airspace. The military had all of the warning areas active and would not accept point outs. The Controller was working the volume of 3 or 4 sectors because aircraft were being routed that way because other routes were cut off because of storms. As if that wasn't enough of an issue; they also had storms and many aircraft had to shoot a hole only 4 or so miles from the warning areas. Our TMU (Traffic Management Unit) was made aware of how unmanageable this was via landline from the D-Side (Radar Assist) position. This was of no help and in fact they approved Orlando Approach releasing departures to climb above the arrivals coming in through the same gate. The arrivals and departures were using the same gate.The TMU is not receptive to our concerns and in fact makes our positions more difficult. They have half of their coordinators who have never been certified in this Center with one never having been radar certified anywhere making these decisions. I wish I could say this was unusual; but in fact it's standard operating procedures for our TMU. They have in fact gone behind our back to Approach; after we coordinated receiving instructions via landline; and told that facility to disregard because we did not need that. I was quick looking the sector; because they needed an extra set of eyes; when I saw that the controller had a southbound aircraft at 26;000 ft. indicating it had a descent to 22;000 ft. There was a northbound aircraft; deviating for weather; at 25;000 ft. At first I believed the Controller must have had the data block 'dressed up' instead of the clearance actually being issued. This is not a legal practice; but one that does occur. Then I saw the northbound 25;000 ft. aircraft had H320 is the data block. I determined that this vector would work; yet there was thunderstorms upon that heading. I watched for a moment and took note that the FL250 aircraft was not turning. The aircraft at 26;000 ft. then vacated their altitude for 22;000 ft. They were about 10 miles apart. I told the Radar Controller that I did not believe that that was going to 'work.' This; along with Conflict Alert; brought the situation to his attention he later told me. The Controller vectored both aircraft sharply with one violating military airspace; because that is how close the weather had pushed us. One vector and you're in. This was the closest loss I've seen in person in nearly 14 years. I would start by requiring our TMU to be certified from within this building. The TMU should instead of working for the airlines and 'keeping pressure on the system;' should work with safety in mind. The Command Center is also a huge issue with not having any understanding of the complexity in this building. Regarding an airspace change. The Warning Areas need to be moved 15 miles further east so that we have more room to work aircraft when in thunderstorm season. The Warning Areas closest to shore should also be re callable to Center. Currently we cannot recall any airspace along the east coast.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.