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B767 flight crew reported an engine high pressure shutoff valve alert on takeoff; resulting in a rejected takeoff and return to gate.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1670933 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201908 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Takeoff |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187 Flight Crew Total 1862 Flight Crew Type 645 |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 171 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural MEL Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
On takeoff roll as power increased to takeoff thrust; we received a left engine hpsov (high pressure shutoff valve) EICAS annunciation. This was accompanied by the left bleed light on the overhead bleed air panel. I was pilot monitoring and I announced the EICAS message. The captain verbalized the EICAS; analyzed the situation and made the decision to reject takeoff. We had reached approximately 40 knots when the EICAS came on; and the reject was initiated at 60 knots; we reached a maximum speed of 70 knots before decelerating. We performed the rejected takeoff per the flight manual and taxied clear. We did not evacuate. The EICAS left engine hpsov light went out when power was reduced; so we elected to review that procedure in the QRH; but did not reconfigure the bleed panel. We contacted dispatch and [technical support maintenance control] via satcom and we were told we would need to return to the gate to allow maintenance to work on the left engine hpsov. This engine had recently been changed and this was the first flight after installation. It was an ETOPS verification flight. We had also been dispatched with a right recirc fan inoperative (MEL 21-xx).after maintenance looked at the engine; dispatch and [technical support maintenance control] concurrently recommended operating under MEL 36-xx in addition to the previous mels. The left engine hpsov was locked closed per the MEL and we were re-dispatched. We asked several questions about operating with concurrent mels. [Technical support maintenance control] informed us that operation with the right recirculating fan inoperative and the right pack in high flow was acceptable. They also informed us that the ETOPS verification under the new MEL was also acceptable as the ETOPS verification was only verifying displayed engine parameters such as EPR; N1; N2; fuel flow; and egt. With all of the MEL requirements complied with; we pushed back approximately 3 hours late and departed normally; per SOP.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767 Flight Crew reported an engine high pressure shutoff valve alert on takeoff; resulting in a rejected takeoff and return to gate.
Narrative: On takeoff roll as power increased to takeoff thrust; we received a L ENG HPSOV (High Pressure Shutoff Valve) EICAS annunciation. This was accompanied by the left BLEED light on the overhead bleed air panel. I was pilot monitoring and I announced the EICAS message. The Captain verbalized the EICAS; analyzed the situation and made the decision to reject takeoff. We had reached approximately 40 knots When the EICAS came on; and the reject was initiated at 60 knots; we reached a maximum speed of 70 knots before decelerating. We performed the rejected takeoff per the flight manual and taxied clear. We did not evacuate. The EICAS L ENG HPSOV light went out when power was reduced; so we elected to review that procedure in the QRH; but did not reconfigure the bleed panel. We contacted Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] via SATCOM and we were told we would need to return to the gate to allow Maintenance to work on the left engine HPSOV. This engine had recently been changed and this was the first flight after installation. It was an ETOPS verification flight. We had also been dispatched with a R RECIRC FAN inoperative (MEL 21-XX).After Maintenance looked at the engine; Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] concurrently recommended operating under MEL 36-XX in addition to the previous MELs. The L ENG HPSOV was locked closed per the MEL and we were re-dispatched. We asked several questions about operating with concurrent MELs. [Technical Support Maintenance Control] informed us that operation with the right recirculating fan inoperative and the right pack in high flow was acceptable. They also informed us that the ETOPS verification under the new MEL was also acceptable as the ETOPS verification was only verifying displayed engine parameters such as EPR; N1; N2; fuel flow; and EGT. With all of the MEL requirements complied with; we pushed back approximately 3 hours late and departed normally; per SOP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.