Narrative:

We conducted a flight to ZZZ. While en route to ZZZ; we were cleared initially to zzzzz. During cruise; both the first officer (first officer) and I reviewed; discussed; and briefed our plan for our approach and arrival. In the brief; we highlighted the concerns with high terrain surrounding ZZZ and that it is a special airport. It was a thorough brief. To mitigate and manage the terrain risks; we loaded and briefed the RNAV (rnp) Y xxr from ZZZZZ1 intersection. Shortly after checking in with TRACON; I requested direct ZZZZZ1 or ZZZZZ2 for the RNAV Y xxr approach. TRACON indicated he wasn't sure if the timing would work out because of traffic arriving from the north; he then cleared us direct ZZZZZ1 stating he would see how it looked.after arriving at ZZZZZ1 and before ZZZZZ2; TRACON told us the RNAV Y xxr would not work out because of traffic coming in over ZZZZZ3. We were cleared to fly our present heading (basically tracking the course between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2). In my opinion; it was at that point where my situational awareness broke down (meaning how far extended on the approach we became). While flying the heading; we were advised to look for traffic at 11 o'clock. Being a clear night (VMC); we easily spotted this traffic and reported it. TRACON then cleared us to follow this traffic for the visual approach to xxr. I didn't want to head further north because of the terrain; so I suggested we turn base behind the company traffic; extending our course from ZZZZZ4 (since we still had the RNAV (rnp) runway xxr loaded into the FMC; and we cannot join course from an arc). I also suggested using ZZZZZ5 altitude as a reference for terrain avoidance (6500 ft. MSL) thinking we were in its vicinity. We both had terrain selected; using it as a tool.while joining final outside of ZZZZZ4; I noticed the terrain icon ahead go from green to yellow. I directed the first officer to level and started to direct a climb. At about that same time; the GPWS alerted. The first officer added power and climbed clear. As we were clearing; we were still on course and now on glide slope. I stated we were clear and that we can continue the approach. The first officer flew the remainder of the approach stabilized without incident.we cleared the runway and taxied safely to the gate. In summary we were farther extended from ZZZ1 than I thought during our base turn. As a result; the 6500 ft. MSL altitude was inadequate. This caused us to be too low. After the GPWS alert cleared; we were still in a position from which to make a stable landing; which we did uneventfully; however; procedurally we should have conducted a go-around.I never expected to experience such an event in ZZZ. I know it is a special airport with terrain. I have trained and discussed its challenges since flying at [company]. I have been studying and replaying the events since landing. In retrospect: 1) once I learned the RNAV Y (rnp) runway xxr was not going to be available to us; I should have reloaded the FMC with the ILS Z runway xxr. This would have given us many additional points from which to join the final. It also would have improved my situational awareness regarding how far extended we were from the end of the runway. In other words; we were in the vicinity of ZZZZZ6 instead of ZZZZZ5. Having this fix in the FMC would have compelled a higher MCP altitude as required. Not causal to our situation; but contributory to my decrease in situational awareness is the construction of the approach plates. My habit pattern is to scroll down from the final approach segment to find the profile view. At the time of the incident; I did have the ILS Z runway xx approach plate up for review (switching between it and the rnp); however; when I scrolled down on the ILS plate the minimums section was centered underneath the final approach segment with the profile view off to the left.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew reported failure to execute a go around after receiving a ground terrain warning.

Narrative: We conducted a flight to ZZZ. While en route to ZZZ; we were cleared initially to ZZZZZ. During cruise; both the FO (First Officer) and I reviewed; discussed; and briefed our plan for our approach and arrival. In the brief; we highlighted the concerns with high terrain surrounding ZZZ and that it is a special airport. It was a thorough brief. To mitigate and manage the terrain risks; we loaded and briefed the RNAV (RNP) Y XXR from ZZZZZ1 intersection. Shortly after checking in with TRACON; I requested direct ZZZZZ1 or ZZZZZ2 for the RNAV Y XXR Approach. TRACON indicated he wasn't sure if the timing would work out because of traffic arriving from the north; he then cleared us direct ZZZZZ1 stating he would see how it looked.After arriving at ZZZZZ1 and before ZZZZZ2; TRACON told us the RNAV Y XXR would not work out because of traffic coming in over ZZZZZ3. We were cleared to fly our present heading (basically tracking the course between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2). In my opinion; it was at that point where my situational awareness broke down (meaning how far extended on the approach we became). While flying the heading; we were advised to look for traffic at 11 o'clock. Being a clear night (VMC); we easily spotted this traffic and reported it. TRACON then cleared us to follow this traffic for the visual approach to XXR. I didn't want to head further north because of the terrain; so I suggested we turn base behind the Company traffic; extending our course from ZZZZZ4 (since we still had the RNAV (RNP) Runway XXR loaded into the FMC; and we cannot join course from an arc). I also suggested using ZZZZZ5 altitude as a reference for terrain avoidance (6500 ft. MSL) thinking we were in its vicinity. We both had terrain selected; using it as a tool.While joining final outside of ZZZZZ4; I noticed the terrain icon ahead go from green to yellow. I directed the FO to level and started to direct a climb. At about that same time; the GPWS alerted. The FO added power and climbed clear. As we were clearing; we were still on course and now on glide slope. I stated we were clear and that we can continue the approach. The FO flew the remainder of the approach stabilized without incident.We cleared the runway and taxied safely to the gate. In summary we were farther extended from ZZZ1 than I thought during our base turn. As a result; the 6500 ft. MSL altitude was inadequate. This caused us to be too low. After the GPWS alert cleared; we were still in a position from which to make a stable landing; which we did uneventfully; however; procedurally we should have conducted a go-around.I never expected to experience such an event in ZZZ. I know it is a special airport with terrain. I have trained and discussed its challenges since flying at [Company]. I have been studying and replaying the events since landing. In retrospect: 1) Once I learned the RNAV Y (RNP) Runway XXR was not going to be available to us; I should have reloaded the FMC with the ILS Z Runway XXR. This would have given us many additional points from which to join the final. It also would have improved my situational awareness regarding how far extended we were from the end of the runway. In other words; we were in the vicinity of ZZZZZ6 instead of ZZZZZ5. Having this fix in the FMC would have compelled a higher MCP altitude as required. Not causal to our situation; but contributory to my decrease in situational awareness is the construction of the approach plates. My habit pattern is to scroll down from the final approach segment to find the profile view. At the time of the incident; I did have the ILS Z Runway XX Approach plate up for review (switching between it and the RNP); however; when I scrolled down on the ILS plate the minimums section was centered underneath the final approach segment with the profile view off to the left.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.