Narrative:

Soon after an uneventful departure and climb; and leveling at our final cruising of FL390; the captain's - PF (pilot flying) - ADI (attitude direction indicator) screen failed. We promptly transferred controls to the right seat ca (captain) and evaluated the situation. We doubled checked the QRH (quick reference handbook) but found no checklist; as expected. Just as we were to contact dispatch/[maintenance control]; we detected the classic burning electrical smell. The odor persisted and slowly intensified. We donned our O2 masks and [requested priority handling with] ATC. Due to the burning electrical smell; combined with a primary instrument failure; we elected to divert to the nearest suitable field; ZZZ. After receiving ATC vectors and descent instructions; the burning electrical smell further strengthened and was temporarily present while wearing the O2 mask. We then increased our rate of descent and began the smoke; fire; fumes QRH checklist. While completing the checklist; the alternate airport and approach were programed in the FMC (flight management computer); which was xxc; as directed by ATC as the best runway for crash fire rescue equipment (crash fire rescue) and our direction of arrival. Quickly; while completing these tasks; I looked over the circuit breakers to search for more clues as to the source of the fumes. At that time; no breakers were observed to be tripped. At about this time the ca's ADI flickered momentarily and blanked again. Due to the donned O2 mask; it was hard to determine if the fumes persisted throughout the remainder of the flight; but the intermediate and final approach segments were completed without any issues and according to SOP's. Crash fire rescue equipment met the aircraft on the runway and inspected the aircraft; noting no visible fire source. On the flight deck; we then checked if the fumes still existed; and there were none present. We exited the runway and coordinated parking. While waiting for parking instructions; we continued to monitor the aircraft for signs of fire; and clues as to what caused the fume event. During this time; the captain's ADI circuit breaker was found to be tripped. After approximately 1 hour of waiting; on an active taxiway; dispatch informed us; via ACARS; spot 3 was available and noted it was unconfirmed. We proceeded to the gate; with crash fire rescue equipment in tow; and parked the aircraft. First; we quickly debriefed the fire chief; then contacted local operations and maintenance. Local operations stated they were uninformed as to our arrival; and maintenance orally took our discrepancies. After this time; we were confined to the flight deck with very limited contact from any local personnel; and there was confusion as to our status from [operations control]. Dispatch was under the impression we would be able to depart only an hour after block-in; however the aircraft was not ready; awaiting a maintenance resolution; until at least xa:30 local.considering the inherent danger of electrical fires; and the required rapid action; the event went smoothly. The right seat ca and I divided the workload; as we were trained; and the outcome was proof of concept. The critiques of our flight were only for after we landed and it was confirmed there was no further fire risk. The coordination between [operations control]; dispatch; [maintenance control]; and local maintenance was disjointed at best. At no point did a company representative ask if we were fit to continue; considering the high stress situation; it should have been at least discussed. Furthermore; no accommodations were made for our; what turned out to be; 6 hour delay. All the while; dispatch expected us to operate; with no human factor consideration; as soon as possible. The other captain and I discussed the matter and attempted to remain with the aircraft; fit for flight. After 8 hours in ZZZ; on the flight deck; and over 10 total hours on the aircraft; we could no longer consider ourselves safe/fit to operate. There could have been multiple alternate options for recovering this aircraft and/or cargo; but none were considered; as far as we were informed. The lack [of] support was discouraging; and more so the absence of consideration of the crew. It was disappointing being forced to utilize the frmp (fatigue risk management plan) as opposed to alternate options.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain reported electrical burning smell with total loss of instruments resulting in a diversion and ATC providing priority handling.

Narrative: Soon after an uneventful departure and climb; and leveling at our final cruising of FL390; the Captain's - PF (Pilot Flying) - ADI (Attitude Direction Indicator) screen failed. We promptly transferred controls to the right seat CA (Captain) and evaluated the situation. We doubled checked the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) but found no checklist; as expected. Just as we were to contact Dispatch/[Maintenance Control]; we detected the classic burning electrical smell. The odor persisted and slowly intensified. We donned our O2 masks and [requested priority handling with] ATC. Due to the burning electrical smell; combined with a primary instrument failure; we elected to divert to the nearest suitable field; ZZZ. After receiving ATC vectors and descent instructions; the burning electrical smell further strengthened and was temporarily present while wearing the O2 mask. We then increased our rate of descent and began the Smoke; Fire; Fumes QRH checklist. While completing the checklist; the alternate airport and approach were programed in the FMC (Flight Management Computer); which was XXC; as directed by ATC as the best runway for CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) and our direction of arrival. Quickly; while completing these tasks; I looked over the circuit breakers to search for more clues as to the source of the fumes. At that time; no breakers were observed to be tripped. At about this time the CA's ADI flickered momentarily and blanked again. Due to the donned O2 mask; it was hard to determine if the fumes persisted throughout the remainder of the flight; but the intermediate and final approach segments were completed without any issues and according to SOP's. CFR met the aircraft on the runway and inspected the aircraft; noting no visible fire source. On the flight deck; we then checked if the fumes still existed; and there were none present. We exited the runway and coordinated parking. While waiting for parking instructions; we continued to monitor the aircraft for signs of fire; and clues as to what caused the fume event. During this time; the Captain's ADI circuit breaker was found to be tripped. After approximately 1 hour of waiting; on an active taxiway; Dispatch informed us; via ACARS; spot 3 was available and noted it was unconfirmed. We proceeded to the gate; with CFR in tow; and parked the aircraft. First; we quickly debriefed the Fire Chief; then contacted Local Operations and Maintenance. Local Operations stated they were uninformed as to our arrival; and Maintenance orally took our discrepancies. After this time; we were confined to the flight deck with very limited contact from any local personnel; and there was confusion as to our status from [Operations Control]. Dispatch was under the impression we would be able to depart only an hour after block-in; however the aircraft was not ready; awaiting a maintenance resolution; until at least XA:30 local.Considering the inherent danger of electrical fires; and the required rapid action; the event went smoothly. The right seat CA and I divided the workload; as we were trained; and the outcome was proof of concept. The critiques of our flight were only for after we landed and it was confirmed there was no further fire risk. The coordination between [Operations Control]; Dispatch; [Maintenance Control]; and local Maintenance was disjointed at best. At no point did a company representative ask if we were fit to continue; considering the high stress situation; it should have been at least discussed. Furthermore; no accommodations were made for our; what turned out to be; 6 hour delay. All the while; Dispatch expected us to operate; with no human factor consideration; ASAP. The other Captain and I discussed the matter and attempted to remain with the aircraft; fit for flight. After 8 hours in ZZZ; on the flight deck; and over 10 total hours on the aircraft; we could no longer consider ourselves safe/fit to operate. There could have been multiple alternate options for recovering this aircraft and/or cargo; but none were considered; as far as we were informed. The lack [of] support was discouraging; and more so the absence of consideration of the crew. It was disappointing being forced to utilize the FRMP (Fatigue Risk Management Plan) as opposed to alternate options.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.