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M20F pilot reported unstable approach resulting in tire failure on landing.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1679084 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201907 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | M-20 F Executive 21 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
| Flight Phase | Landing |
| Route In Use | Direct |
| Flight Plan | None |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Tires |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Single Pilot |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Private |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30 Flight Crew Total 480 Flight Crew Type 381 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach |
Narrative:
During descent to our intended destination airport of ZZZ; we began having some minor engine issues. We elected to make a precautionary landing at a nearer airport and alerted ATC to our issue. As a result of concern for the engine issue; we elected to maintain speed and retain more altitude than normal during descent. We positions for a pattern entry on right base in order to speed our approach to the runway. Once established on base we had the runway made and dropped landing gear and tried to add flaps. At that time we discovered that our flaps would not stay down. We now were high; fast; with an unknown engine issue. We began an aggressive slip and delayed our turn to final. We touched down fast and approximately at the midpoint at ZZZ1. We began braking hard; and during the roll out our right main tire failed. Upon stopping we reached out to airport management and center by phone to advise them that the runway was obstructed.our caution over the engine made us retain too much energy on the approach nearly causing us to overshoot. Although I believe retaining energy was a good decision in the situation; we retained much more than was necessary and misjudged how much excess energy we had. Had we made a closer assessment of the amount of energy we needed in case of a full failure the excessive braking and more extreme speed bleeding would have been unnecessary while still retaining safety margins in case of a full failure. I also believe that the tire failure could have been avoided with better braking control. Finally my lack of currency with engine out procedures contributed to my misjudgment of the required safety margin. My biennial flight review (BFR) was due at the end of july and my previous BFR was an instrument check ride. I have not regularly practiced engine out procedures and my last practice was during my BFR approximately 3 years previous.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: M20F pilot reported unstable approach resulting in tire failure on landing.
Narrative: During descent to our intended destination airport of ZZZ; we began having some minor engine issues. We elected to make a precautionary landing at a nearer airport and alerted ATC to our issue. As a result of concern for the engine issue; we elected to maintain speed and retain more altitude than normal during descent. We positions for a pattern entry on right base in order to speed our approach to the runway. Once established on base we had the runway made and dropped landing gear and tried to add flaps. At that time we discovered that our flaps would not stay down. We now were high; fast; with an unknown engine issue. We began an aggressive slip and delayed our turn to final. We touched down fast and approximately at the midpoint at ZZZ1. We began braking hard; and during the roll out our right main tire failed. Upon stopping we reached out to Airport Management and Center by phone to advise them that the runway was obstructed.Our caution over the engine made us retain too much energy on the approach nearly causing us to overshoot. Although I believe retaining energy was a good decision in the situation; we retained much more than was necessary and misjudged how much excess energy we had. Had we made a closer assessment of the amount of energy we needed in case of a full failure the excessive braking and more extreme speed bleeding would have been unnecessary while still retaining safety margins in case of a full failure. I also believe that the tire failure could have been avoided with better braking control. Finally my lack of currency with engine out procedures contributed to my misjudgment of the required safety margin. My Biennial Flight Review (BFR) was due at the end of July and my previous BFR was an instrument check ride. I have not regularly practiced engine out procedures and my last practice was during my BFR approximately 3 years previous.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.