Narrative:

I was the first officer and the pilot flying. At FL290; we received a left low prop oil pressure caution indication. The checklist states crew awareness. Then we received a left low prop oil pressure warning. This requires an engine shut down and landing. [ATC was advised] and we chose ZZZ for the landing. As the pilot flying; I took over radio communications to allow the captain; pilot not flying; to run the checklist. I guarded the right; good engine; power lever with my left hand while flying with my right hand. The captain reduced the power on the left engine in preparation for left engine shut down. ATC gave us a heading and altitude change. I used my left hand guarding the right; good; condition lever to change the heading and altitude selector. At that time the captain continued the checklist without me confirming his actions. The captain pulled the condition lever on the right; good; engine; shutting down our good engine. I called for the airborne restart checklist. The captain ran the checklist while I was coordinating with ATC. The captain did not include me while he ran the checklist. The engine did not restart. I do not know if the checklist was followed properly. I called for the air start checklist. I increased airspeed to get N1 up. The checklist was run and the engine did restart. The left engine was then shut down. The captain was in such a hurry that he excluded me while running the checklists. CRM failed. We landed uneventfully at ZZZ. During the debrief the next day with the director of operations; the captain did not disclose the right; good; engine was shut down in error. I was not allowed input. When I attempted to speak; the director of operations put his hand up to silence me. The director of operations seemed only interested in the captain's statement. I resigned from the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: First Officer reported encountering an engine failure with the Captain shutting down the remaining good engine.

Narrative: I was the First Officer and the Pilot Flying. At FL290; we received a left low prop oil pressure caution indication. The checklist states crew awareness. Then we received a left low prop oil pressure warning. This requires an engine shut down and landing. [ATC was advised] and we chose ZZZ for the landing. As the Pilot Flying; I took over radio communications to allow the Captain; Pilot Not Flying; to run the checklist. I guarded the right; good engine; power lever with my left hand while flying with my right hand. The Captain reduced the power on the left engine in preparation for left engine shut down. ATC gave us a heading and altitude change. I used my left hand guarding the right; good; condition lever to change the heading and altitude selector. At that time the Captain continued the checklist without me confirming his actions. The Captain pulled the condition lever on the right; good; engine; shutting down our good engine. I called for the airborne restart checklist. The Captain ran the checklist while I was coordinating with ATC. The Captain did not include me while he ran the checklist. The engine did not restart. I do not know if the checklist was followed properly. I called for the air start checklist. I increased airspeed to get N1 up. The checklist was run and the engine did restart. The left engine was then shut down. The Captain was in such a hurry that he excluded me while running the checklists. CRM failed. We landed uneventfully at ZZZ. During the debrief the next day with the Director of Operations; the Captain did not disclose the right; good; engine was shut down in error. I was not allowed input. When I attempted to speak; the Director of Operations put his hand up to silence me. The Director of Operations seemed only interested in the Captain's statement. I resigned from the company.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.