Narrative:

A normal flight to ZZZ. The first officer (first officer) was flying the aircraft. Approach had us keep our speed at 250kts on the descent. Then 5 miles prior to final approach course we were instructed to slow to 230 kts to keep us inside of traffic on an extended leg of the final approach course. ATC cleared us for the visual 18R approximately 5 miles from the final approach fix at 3000ft. At this point the first officer was clear to slow to our approach speed and altitudes. The first officer was flying and once cleared for the approach commenced a slowdown with throttle reduction and flaps at appropriate air speeds but was late in descending out of 3000 feet to 2100 feet at the FAF. He could not get down and be stable due to the excessive altitude and called a go around. All procedures were complied with according to the [flight manual] and gom. Tower cleared us to 3000 ft and gave us vectors and handed us over to approach. Fas (flight attendants) and passengers were briefed; go-around checklist was conducted and another approach ensued to another visual approach to 18R. All the while the first officer was flying; I let him call for the checklists and I complied with them. On base leg heading 090 degrees; approximately 5 miles from the FAF; 3000ft and 200kts; the first officer called field in sight as was communicated to approach control. Approach control cleared us for the visual runway xxr and then switch to tower. A switch to tower ensued and before I could check in for the visual xxr; I saw the first officer input a vertical speed of 2;700 fpm! I immediately instructed him to shallow his decent to no more than 1;500fpm. I then noticed the first officer increase the altitude bug to 3;300ft which was above our altitude of 2;100ft. I looked down and the autopilot was on and a descent rate of 1800fpm passing 1900ft with nothing to stop the autopilot from a continuous descent to the ground; at which point; I said; I have the controls and clicked off the autopilot and immediately arrested the decent at 1800ft by adding power and turning to intercept the proper approach course and glide path; whereby the first officer said 'I have it' and I retorted no you did not. I received clearance to land and was stable by 1000ft with checklists completed per the [flight manual] and gom. We completed the after landing checklists; the engine shutdown bulleted items; and at the gate the shutdown checklist. While at the gate; I calmly and politely debriefed the first officer on his lack of situational awareness and the importance of being ahead of the aircraft. I said that he needed to hand fly the airplane when the situation requires it such as a compressed timeframe. The first officer sat there quietly and did not say much as I politely debriefed him as to what he could improve upon. I did not notice the first officer writing down any possible lessons learned. After landing; dispatch was given an ACARS message notifying the company of the missed approach due to an unstable approach situation. ATC could have slowed us down or vectored us differently to preclude the unstable approach. However the task was not outside the skills of the pilots flying. As for the possible altitude deviation turning final approach course; the ca (captain) could have assumed the controls sooner as the first officer was unable to successfully land the plane on the first attempt?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported unstabilized approach and performed a go-around.

Narrative: A normal flight to ZZZ. The FO (First Officer) was flying the aircraft. Approach had us keep our speed at 250kts on the descent. Then 5 miles prior to final approach course we were instructed to slow to 230 kts to keep us inside of traffic on an extended leg of the final approach course. ATC cleared us for the visual 18R approximately 5 miles from the final approach fix at 3000ft. At this point the FO was clear to slow to our approach speed and altitudes. The FO was flying and once cleared for the approach commenced a slowdown with throttle reduction and flaps at appropriate air speeds but was late in descending out of 3000 feet to 2100 feet at the FAF. He could not get down and be stable due to the excessive altitude and called a go around. All procedures were complied with according to the [Flight Manual] and GOM. Tower cleared us to 3000 ft and gave us vectors and handed us over to Approach. FAs (Flight Attendants) and passengers were briefed; go-around checklist was conducted and another approach ensued to another visual approach to 18R. All the while the FO was flying; I let him call for the checklists and I complied with them. On base leg heading 090 degrees; approximately 5 miles from the FAF; 3000ft and 200kts; the FO called field in sight as was communicated to approach control. Approach control cleared us for the visual RWY XXR and then switch to tower. A switch to tower ensued and before I could check in for the visual XXR; I saw the FO input a vertical speed of 2;700 fpm! I immediately instructed him to shallow his decent to no more than 1;500fpm. I then noticed the FO increase the altitude bug to 3;300ft which was above our altitude of 2;100ft. I looked down and the autopilot was on and a descent rate of 1800fpm passing 1900ft with nothing to stop the autopilot from a continuous descent to the ground; at which point; I said; I have the controls and clicked off the autopilot and immediately arrested the decent at 1800ft by adding power and turning to intercept the proper approach course and glide path; whereby the FO said 'I have it' and I retorted no you did not. I received clearance to land and was stable by 1000ft with checklists completed per the [Flight Manual] and GOM. We completed the after landing checklists; the engine shutdown bulleted items; and at the gate the shutdown checklist. While at the gate; I calmly and politely debriefed the FO on his lack of situational awareness and the importance of being ahead of the aircraft. I said that he needed to hand fly the airplane when the situation requires it such as a compressed timeframe. The FO sat there quietly and did not say much as I politely debriefed him as to what he could improve upon. I did not notice the FO writing down any possible lessons learned. After landing; dispatch was given an ACARS message notifying the company of the missed approach due to an unstable approach situation. ATC could have slowed us down or vectored us differently to preclude the unstable approach. However the task was not outside the skills of the pilots flying. As for the possible altitude deviation turning final approach course; the CA (Captain) could have assumed the controls sooner as the FO was unable to successfully land the plane on the first attempt?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.