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Attributes | |
ACN | 1686083 |
Time | |
Date | 201909 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
After being delayed for 30 minutes; 40 minutes by the time we actually pushed; we received our load closeout via ACARS and notices hazmat listed on board. We had not been given any notification nor a nopic [notice to PIC] form up to that point. We were running late due to ramp loading; so the jet way had been pulled. All doors had also been closed/armed and the flight attendants had given their safety demo. We were essential just waiting for the close out. Immediately upon receiving the load close out with the performance numbers for [runway] xxr we overheard ATC advise that the airport was being turned around to a [runway] xy/xz takeoff and landing configuration. Although an interruption to the review of our takeoff performance was warranted; we should have continued to follow up with the load closeout and query why there was hazmat indicated even though we had no notice of it up until this point. We reviewed all else on the load closeout per sops; but failed to follow up on the hazmat portion.we were advised by dispatch that we had not signed a nopic for our onboard hazmat approximately 45 min after departure vis ACARS.there were three main factors in the cause of our incident. The first was a lack of communication with the agent regarding the hazmat (i.e. No nopic had been sent to the flight deck). The second factor was us being already late. There was added pressure to be as ready as possible for push (i.e. Jet way pulled away). The third factor which stopped us from taking appropriate action for the miscommunication was the distraction from the change in airport operation.deviating from sops can be prevented by slowing ourselves down and having shared attention on important tasks; such as the review of the load closeout. As a crew we work to minimize delays; but in this case it; it became a contributing factor of our incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A321 First Officer reported a communication breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch that resulted in departure without completion of Hazmat documentation procedures.
Narrative: After being delayed for 30 minutes; 40 minutes by the time we actually pushed; we received our load closeout via ACARS and notices HAZMAT listed on board. We had not been given any notification nor a NOPIC [Notice to PIC] form up to that point. We were running late due to ramp loading; so the jet way had been pulled. All doors had also been closed/armed and the flight attendants had given their safety demo. We were essential just waiting for the close out. Immediately upon receiving the load close out with the performance numbers for [Runway] XXR we overheard ATC advise that the airport was being turned around to a [Runway] XY/XZ takeoff and landing configuration. Although an interruption to the review of our takeoff performance was warranted; we should have continued to follow up with the Load Closeout and query why there was HAZMAT indicated even though we had no notice of it up until this point. We reviewed all else on the Load Closeout per SOPs; but failed to follow up on the HAZMAT portion.We were advised by Dispatch that we had not signed a NOPIC for our onboard HAZMAT approximately 45 min after departure vis ACARS.There were three main factors in the cause of our incident. The first was a lack of communication with the agent regarding the HAZMAT (I.E. no NOPIC had been sent to the flight deck). The second factor was us being already late. There was added pressure to be as ready as possible for push (I.E. jet way pulled away). The third factor which stopped us from taking appropriate action for the miscommunication was the distraction from the change in airport operation.Deviating from SOPs can be prevented by slowing ourselves down and having shared attention on important tasks; such as the review of the Load Closeout. As a crew we work to minimize delays; but in this case it; it became a contributing factor of our incident.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.