Narrative:

The event began with an unusually long approach for runway 36L to clt. We began the approach outside of welet; the furthest fix on the published approach. While on a base leg; clt approach asked if we had the preceding 'airbus or airfield in sight' to which I; as pilot monitoring; stated '[we] have both the airbus and the airfield in sight.' at this time approach cleared us to intercept the localizer for [runway] 36L. We intercepted the course beyond welet and shortly after; passed inside of welet and the needles automatically swapped from white to green at roughly 17.8 NM. The captain and I commented on our surprise that the plane was able to receive and swap over to green that far out; as neither of us have tested the localizer limits of the aircraft. As we intercepted the localizer; we started experiencing wake turbulence from the A319 in front of us. Approach had us slow to 170; cleared us for the approach; informed us to fly 170 kts until nlson and contact tower on 133.35 there. I repeated back; '170 til nlson; then tower 33.35.' I had 133.35 in the standby since sometime on radar downwind. When cleared for the approach; the captain and I both performed our flows. We intercepted the glide slope and started down. The clearance and instruction of 'contact tower' were received at least 5NM prior to the FAF. On glide slope at 170 kts; the aircraft was consistently in the wake of the other aircraft the entire way down; enough to cause a passenger to get sick; which we were informed of on landing. The wake also made airspeed control difficult. At idle; the airspeed increased up to 190kts at one point before slowing back to 170 again. So much time had passed outside what we both normally experienced; that while at 3500ft; I was thinking it was time to make the 1000ft call; yet we were still outside he FAF. I commented that I was zoning out because this approach was taking forever (I was 10 hours into my day at this point.) upon reaching nlson; I stated; 'nlson; 2500 checks.' after a few seconds; we had not started to slow to vref so I told the captain we can slow down now; we're at the FAF. He slowed the aircraft; we configured and ran the before landing checklist. Still in the wake of the airbus and above 1;000 feet AGL; I dialed up 126.4 in standby; expecting to be told to monitor that after landing to cross [runway] 36C. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful despite the constant wake. We exited the runway at W7 and taxied onto north. I was waiting for tower to tell us to switch and halfway down north; called ATC; told them our location; and asked if they wanted us to monitor 126.4. ATC said that 'this is approach and monitoring 126.4 sounds like a good idea.' in shock about being on approach; we started to realize we never switched to tower at nlson. The captain said his lights were not on as he does when cleared for the approach at which point we were certain we never switched or got clearance to land. We called up tower on 126.4 and given taxi instructions to go to the ramp. The rest of the taxi was uneventful; with the exception of the flight attendant calling up while on the ramp to ask us to call medical for an air sick passenger who was starting to feel dizzy after vomiting throughout the approach and landing.I believe the root cause for my mistake was the instruction to contact tower at nlson over 5 miles prior to the FAF. Contributing factors were distractions due to wake turbulence and its effect on aircraft performance; the length of the approach being the longer than anything I've experienced in the airlines to date; and experiencing mild fatigue during a natural circadian low on the third leg of the day after being awake for 9 hours into the duty day. I was ahead of the jet all day on all three of these flights. The drawn out approach turned into a lapse in my perception of time. I got so far ahead that I missed the here and now during a very important radio change. I forgot to change to tower due to these factors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 First Officer reported landing without clearance; citing distraction from wake turbulence and fatigue as contributing factors.

Narrative: The event began with an unusually long approach for Runway 36L to CLT. We began the approach outside of WELET; the furthest fix on the published approach. While on a base leg; CLT Approach asked if we had the preceding 'Airbus or airfield in sight' to which I; as Pilot Monitoring; stated '[We] have both the Airbus and the airfield in sight.' At this time approach cleared us to intercept the LOC for [Runway] 36L. We intercepted the course beyond WELET and shortly after; passed inside of WELET and the needles automatically swapped from white to green at roughly 17.8 NM. The Captain and I commented on our surprise that the plane was able to receive and swap over to green that far out; as neither of us have tested the localizer limits of the aircraft. As we intercepted the localizer; we started experiencing wake turbulence from the A319 in front of us. Approach had us slow to 170; cleared us for the approach; informed us to fly 170 kts until NLSON and contact Tower on 133.35 there. I repeated back; '170 til NLSON; then tower 33.35.' I had 133.35 in the standby since sometime on radar downwind. When cleared for the approach; the Captain and I both performed our flows. We intercepted the glide slope and started down. The clearance and instruction of 'contact Tower' were received at least 5NM prior to the FAF. On glide slope at 170 kts; the aircraft was consistently in the wake of the other aircraft the entire way down; enough to cause a passenger to get sick; which we were informed of on landing. The wake also made airspeed control difficult. At idle; the airspeed increased up to 190kts at one point before slowing back to 170 again. So much time had passed outside what we both normally experienced; that while at 3500ft; I was thinking it was time to make the 1000ft call; yet we were still outside he FAF. I commented that I was zoning out because this approach was taking forever (I was 10 hours into my day at this point.) Upon reaching NLSON; I stated; 'NLSON; 2500 checks.' After a few seconds; we had not started to slow to Vref so I told the Captain we can slow down now; we're at the FAF. He slowed the aircraft; we configured and ran the before landing checklist. Still in the wake of the Airbus and above 1;000 feet AGL; I dialed up 126.4 in standby; expecting to be told to monitor that after landing to cross [Runway] 36C. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful despite the constant wake. We exited the runway at W7 and taxied onto N. I was waiting for Tower to tell us to switch and halfway down N; called ATC; told them our location; and asked if they wanted us to monitor 126.4. ATC said that 'this is Approach and monitoring 126.4 sounds like a good idea.' In shock about being on Approach; we started to realize we never switched to Tower at NLSON. The Captain said his lights were not on as he does when cleared for the approach at which point we were certain we never switched or got clearance to land. We called up Tower on 126.4 and given taxi instructions to go to the ramp. The rest of the taxi was uneventful; with the exception of the FA calling up while on the ramp to ask us to call medical for an air sick passenger who was starting to feel dizzy after vomiting throughout the approach and landing.I believe the root cause for my mistake was the instruction to contact Tower at NLSON over 5 miles prior to the FAF. Contributing factors were distractions due to wake turbulence and its effect on aircraft performance; the length of the approach being the longer than anything I've experienced in the airlines to date; and experiencing mild fatigue during a natural circadian low on the third leg of the day after being awake for 9 hours into the duty day. I was ahead of the jet all day on all three of these flights. The drawn out approach turned into a lapse in my perception of time. I got so far ahead that I missed the here and now during a very important radio change. I forgot to change to Tower due to these factors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.