Narrative:

I was operating as the pilot monitoring on the arrival. The first officer was pilot flying and had not flown for almost two weeks prior to the trip. Not only was there a large gap in flying; but he had just completed his consolidation as a new hire. While on the arrival our approach runway was changed from the left runway to the right runway. Instead of being vectored west as anticipated; we were vectored on a short downwind east of the field and placed behind a B777 aircraft. Air traffic control also informed us that a B737 would be joining us on the simultaneous visual approach to the adjacent left runway and to visually acquire the parallel traffic when able.at approximately 5;000 ft. AGL on downwind; we were vectored to our base leg. I visually acquired the B737 traffic and preceding B777 traffic to follow; and acknowledged the traffic to ATC. ATC instructed us to follow the traffic and maintain a speed of 180 kts. Until the san mateo bridge. I also made sure that the pilot flying was able to maintain visual contact with the B777; while I maintained visual contact with both the parallel B737 and preceding B777. Although the pilot flying was visual with the B777 ahead of our flight; the close proximity of the B737 parallel traffic seemed a distraction for him because of the inability to see cross cockpit and acquire the traffic from the left seat. This distraction may have further been exacerbated by the persistent TCAS traffic alerts from the same parallel traffic combined with the high volume of radio chatter. During the final phase of the approach I noticed that the aircraft was still high; at approximately 4;000 ft. As we approached with a flap setting of 5. Also due to our altitude above a normal VFR glide path we were encroaching on the lateral path of the adjacent B737. Noting the altitude; I pointed it out to the pilot flying and he acknowledged and stated that he was having trouble 'slowing down' the aircraft and visually acquiring the adjacent traffic. I began to offer more flaps to assist in the descent; as well as recommended the pilot flying to [extend] the speed brake to assist in the descent. I also informed him that I was visual with the adjacent B737 and that he was beginning to over fly the aircraft and to take a northerly heading and 'south-turn' away from traffic to reduce altitude and airspeed. The pilot flying called for gear and a flap setting of 15. I indicated that we were too high and suggested that he slow the aircraft so that I could [extend] more flaps and help the aircraft to descent. The pilot flying repeated that he was unable to slow down the aircraft so I disconnected the auto-throttle system and asked him to [extend] full flight speed brakes. Approaching the airfield I noticed that we were not descending rapidly enough until we were able to [select] flaps 25. Looking at the altimeter I stated that we were too high at an altitude of 2;500 ft. And approximately 3 miles from the threshold. Upon reaching flap 30 speed I [extended] flaps to 30 and noticed that at 2 miles we were approximately 1;500 ft. I stated again that we were too high and stated 'go around' at this time pilot flying stated that he was 'in the slot' and could make the approach. I asked if he was sure and at this point I ran the landing checklist; which wasn't complete until below 1;000 ft. The landing was continued and we landed. After reaching a safe taxi speed we turned off at the taxiway and brought the aircraft to a stop short of the left runway. At this time is when tower stated over 121.5 for us to hold short of the left runway. At this point is where we realized that we never changed the VHF radio to tower's frequency and that we landed the aircraft without clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported distraction; poor judgement; and time pressure resulted in an unstabilized approach and landing without clearance.

Narrative: I was operating as the Pilot Monitoring on the arrival. The First Officer was Pilot Flying and had not flown for almost two weeks prior to the trip. Not only was there a large gap in flying; but he had just completed his consolidation as a new hire. While on the arrival our approach runway was changed from the left runway to the right runway. Instead of being vectored west as anticipated; we were vectored on a short downwind east of the field and placed behind a B777 aircraft. Air Traffic Control also informed us that a B737 would be joining us on the simultaneous Visual Approach to the adjacent left runway and to visually acquire the parallel traffic when able.At approximately 5;000 ft. AGL on downwind; we were vectored to our base leg. I visually acquired the B737 traffic and preceding B777 traffic to follow; and acknowledged the traffic to ATC. ATC instructed us to follow the traffic and maintain a speed of 180 kts. until the San Mateo bridge. I also made sure that the Pilot Flying was able to maintain visual contact with the B777; while I maintained visual contact with both the parallel B737 and preceding B777. Although the Pilot Flying was visual with the B777 ahead of our flight; the close proximity of the B737 parallel traffic seemed a distraction for him because of the inability to see cross cockpit and acquire the traffic from the left seat. This distraction may have further been exacerbated by the persistent TCAS traffic alerts from the same parallel traffic combined with the high volume of radio chatter. During the final phase of the approach I noticed that the aircraft was still high; at approximately 4;000 ft. as we approached with a flap setting of 5. Also due to our altitude above a normal VFR glide path we were encroaching on the lateral path of the adjacent B737. Noting the altitude; I pointed it out to the Pilot Flying and he acknowledged and stated that he was having trouble 'slowing down' the aircraft and visually acquiring the adjacent traffic. I began to offer more flaps to assist in the descent; as well as recommended the Pilot Flying to [extend] the speed brake to assist in the descent. I also informed him that I was visual with the adjacent B737 and that he was beginning to over fly the aircraft and to take a northerly heading and 'S-turn' away from traffic to reduce altitude and airspeed. The Pilot Flying called for gear and a flap setting of 15. I indicated that we were too high and suggested that he slow the aircraft so that I could [extend] more flaps and help the aircraft to descent. The Pilot Flying repeated that he was unable to slow down the aircraft so I disconnected the Auto-Throttle system and asked him to [extend] full flight speed brakes. Approaching the airfield I noticed that we were not descending rapidly enough until we were able to [select] flaps 25. Looking at the altimeter I stated that we were too high at an altitude of 2;500 ft. and approximately 3 miles from the threshold. Upon reaching flap 30 speed I [extended] flaps to 30 and noticed that at 2 miles we were approximately 1;500 ft. I stated again that we were too high and stated 'GO AROUND' At this time Pilot Flying stated that he was 'In the slot' and could make the approach. I asked if he was sure and at this point I ran the Landing Checklist; which wasn't complete until below 1;000 ft. The landing was continued and we landed. After reaching a safe taxi speed we turned off at the taxiway and brought the aircraft to a stop short of the left runway. At this time is when Tower stated over 121.5 for us to hold short of the left runway. At this point is where we realized that we never changed the VHF radio to Tower's frequency and that we landed the aircraft without clearance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.