Narrative:

On flight xxx; we had dangerous goods (dg). The planned dangerous goods form arrived and I made mention of it to the international relief officer's and captain. Once the doors were closed and we were ready for push back the printer started to print. I inadvertently said; 'this must be the final dangerous goods'. Instead the ACARS service message printed. About a minute later the printer 'dinged' and this was surely the final dangerous goods (expectation bias) again it was the service message. This occurred three times. Finally; the ground crew called they were ready for pushback and I called for push. Once the pushback was complete and the parking break set we were cleared to start. I started both engines. In the middle of the engine start; one of the international relief officer's said to the other international relief officer's; 'should I tell her'; the captain turned around and said; 'always speak up; what is the problem?' the international relief officer stated we never got the final dg and we should not have pushed. The captain sent load planning a message. The engines were both started at this time and we were still waiting on final weights and the final dg.both engines were stabilized and we had two good starts. The captain ask if we were still flaps 5 and I stated we did not have finals but; were planned for 5. The captain stated; 'flaps 5; after start checklist.' I completed my flow and just as the checklist was started the ground crew chimed in. That is when the captain said; 'ok; that is two mistakes now we need to slow down and get things back in the correct flow.'the rest of the flight was uneventful. As for the dangerous goods; I am not sure why no one spoke up sooner about needing the final before push (we debriefed at end of flight) for my part; I had the expectation bias the dg was printing; as it always does; and did not make the fom 9.20.1 a part of my brief (PF). The maintenance release alert is a great reminder when the parking brake is released without a current maintenance release. Maybe a reminder for the dg?as for the after-start flow; the communication from the ground was non-standard; as the captain seemed to have to clarify a lot. The tug and driver were off to the right and not a word from the ground as we were working on the dg and final weights issues. The international relief officer's timing of mentioning the dg and the fact we should not have pushed was during a very critical phase. I am not sure why the iros did not mention the dg as soon as we released the parking brake and instead waited until we were fully pushed back and in the middle of the start.the captain runs a very open cockpit with input encouraged. She realized once we had made two critical mistakes we needed to stop and regroup. She made sure the four of us were firmly on the task at hand and in full compliance with SOP and not rushing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: First Officer reported flight pushed back prior to receiving and verifying the Dangerous Goods report.

Narrative: On flight xxx; we had dangerous goods (DG). The planned dangerous goods form arrived and I made mention of it to the IRO's and Captain. Once the doors were closed and we were ready for push back the printer started to print. I inadvertently said; 'This must be the final dangerous goods'. Instead the ACARS service message printed. About a minute later the printer 'dinged' and this was surely the final dangerous goods (expectation bias) again it was the service message. This occurred three times. Finally; the ground crew called they were ready for pushback and I called for push. Once the pushback was complete and the parking break set we were cleared to start. I started both engines. In the middle of the engine start; one of the IRO's said to the other IRO's; 'should I tell her'; the Captain turned around and said; 'Always speak up; what is the problem?' The IRO stated we never got the Final DG and we should not have pushed. The Captain sent load planning a message. The engines were both started at this time and we were still waiting on final weights and the final DG.Both engines were stabilized and we had two good starts. The Captain ask if we were still Flaps 5 and I stated we did not have finals but; were planned for 5. The Captain stated; 'Flaps 5; After Start Checklist.' I completed my flow and just as the checklist was started the ground crew chimed in. That is when the Captain said; 'OK; that is two mistakes now we need to slow down and get things back in the correct flow.'The rest of the flight was uneventful. As for the dangerous goods; I am not sure why no one spoke up sooner about needing the final BEFORE push (we debriefed at end of flight) For my part; I had the expectation bias the DG was printing; as it always does; and did not make the FOM 9.20.1 a part of my brief (PF). The Maintenance Release alert is a great reminder when the parking brake is released without a current Maintenance release. Maybe a reminder for the DG?As for the after-start flow; the communication from the ground was non-standard; as the Captain seemed to have to clarify a lot. The tug and driver were off to the right and not a word from the ground as we were working on the DG and final weights issues. The IRO's timing of mentioning the DG and the fact we should not have pushed was during a very critical phase. I am not sure why the IROs did not mention the DG as soon as we released the parking brake and instead waited until we were fully pushed back and in the middle of the start.The Captain runs a very open cockpit with input encouraged. She realized once we had made two critical mistakes we needed to stop and regroup. She made sure the four of us were firmly on the task at hand and in full compliance with SOP and not rushing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.