Narrative:

The flight originated in ZZZZ and our destination was ZZZZ1. The cargo hold was loaded with 96;378 kg of hazardous cargo. We arrived at the aircraft late due to a road closure. We began normal preflight duties and complied with the flight plan requirement to notify dispatch that the subsequent flight plan leg was onboard. During this time I took the opportunity to request approach plates for ZZZZ1 as when I entered this airfield identifier on the ipad it would not show any information. Dispatch acarsed us back and instructed us that to get the airfield to appear you must utilize the alternate airfield entry; not the primary destination field. We attempted this and it worked. However the only information provided here is an airfield diagram; no instrument approaches are available to crew members here. This is confirmed in the station guide and charter message and thus a daylight visual approach is required into this airfield.after a slight delay due to fueling; temporary loss of ground crew; and a slot time the aircraft departed at XA45z and was scheduled to arrive in ZZZZ1 at XH21z. I was the pilot flying and the first officer was the pilot monitoring during this leg. The forecast weather at ETA was wind 070 degrees at 9 kts; 8;000 meter visibility with haze and no clouds (VFR). About an hour before arrival the visibility began to drop to 2;600 meters (1.6 mi) and was projected to be below VFR minimums at our ETA. I inquired dispatch via ACARS to clarify the diversion plan. They confirmed that they did in fact want us to utilize ZZZZ2 in the event of a diversion. As we began our descent; the first officer and I began to prepare to go into holding. We agreed upon and set a bingo fuel of 22;000 kg (14;000 to get to ZZZZ2 with a 8;000 landing minimum). Once we arrived in the terminal area; we were instructed by ATC that ILS approaches were being conducted to runway xxr and visibility was 2;000 m and projected to drop to 800 m in the next hour. The last aircraft to shoot an approach advised tower that they had broken-out at 300 feet. This was a very different weather picture than what our dispatcher had initially provided in the flight plan and subsequently sent to us. The weather that ZZZZ1 tower was providing was much lower than all the weather that dispatch was providing to us. I wasn't even sure they had access to ZZZZ1 weather information because of the great disparity. The first officer and I elected to abide by what the airfield tower/ground was calling only.at this point we joined a holding pattern and attempted to wait until the weather was sufficient. During the one hour and twenty minute hold the crew persistently inquired about the current weather situation. The visibility never reached above 4;000 meters (2.5 mi). As we never reached VFR minimums we were unable to shoot the visual approach to runway xxl into ZZZZ2. After we neared our bingo fuel of 22;000 kg I notified dispatch we had 10mins remaining on station. They attempted to piece another closer alternate which they suggested as ZZZZ3. I told them we were unable to use this. This was way too late to begin this process. This should have been accomplished two hours ago when I asked if they still wanted ZZZZ2 as the alternate before we even began our descent into ZZZZ1. Now we were forced to initiate a diversion to ZZZZ2 which was our designated alternate on our flight plan. It was estimated at being an additional one hour and twenty minutes to fly to the alternate airfield. During the 511 nm diversion; ATC held us at FL260 even though we requested FL340. Once we arrived in the terminal area; the first officer contacted ramp control and they denied us entry to their ramp stating that our ppr# on the flight plan was only valid for passenger military flights not hazardous cargo nonmilitary flights. So to be clear we had hot cargo and no place to safely park. We were cleared to shoot the ILS to runway xxl and I began intercepting the localizer and glide slope. We [requested priority handling] and told them it was for low fuel. About 15 nm on final; ZZZZ1 ATC told us to go-around because there was confusion about where we would be able to park the aircraft once on the ground. We followed ATC instructions and turned back to the south and went into holding again this time however with significantly less fuel remaining about 11;000 kg. We attempted to find a solution to the multi-layered problem of where to park but time was running out and eventually we utilized priority handling and began a turn back to the airfield by now we were 25-30 nm to the south of the field inbound descending out of 5;000 ft with about 8;500 kg left. The controller kept telling us to standby and I sternly told him to clear all traffic between us and the runway we were landing regardless of his instructions. The ILS xxl was flown and the aircraft landed with no problems. We landed with 7;700 kg remaining. Ground control directed the crew to taxi the aircraft clear of the runway and wait till a flow me car showed up to direct them to parking. After 30 mins of waiting we eventually taxied to parking and shutdown. At shutdown we had 5;500 kg of fuel remaining between all four main tanks.1. A good company policy might be to not accept charters to locations without all required information. Perhaps [company] should have a charter feasibility checklist which should be completed before agreeing to accept the charter. Some of these required items might include: jeppesen plates; types of available approaches; possible parking locations; air-stairs and tow bar availability; lighting for night ops etc. The company doesn't need to accept charters that set us up to fail. By not providing us approach plates for ZZZZ1 with the possibility of fog and having us scheduled to arrive early morning set us up to have to divert. This made all of us look bad. The process by which we protect the company from dead-end charters needs to begin at the point of acceptance. This will lead to more satisfied customers and better margins for safety.2. Dispatch must select alternates with the nature of the charter in mind. Hazardous cargo flights are especially sensitive to this. We must have a viable alternate that we can actually land at and proceed to a hot cargo spot on the airfield without having to declare priority handling or cause an international incident. A fake ppr# and no actual coordination with airport authority is simply unacceptable for charter service of this type.3. Remind dispatch to not direct the crew to continue to hold until the fuel reaches FMC reserves. That isn't their job. They have a supporting role; not a directive role. Had we listened to them we would have had a worse situation with an unplanned and less coordinated diversion and possibly an international incident.4. Instruct dispatch to not bring up a new possible divert field less than 10 min from beginning the diversion. There simply isn't enough time to review this. This has to be done earlier so the PIC can assess the option fully. Also there needs to be awareness on protecting the pics train of thought during a critical phase of flight. A type of 'sterile cockpit' from dispatch might help this. If the crew had a procedure to give a '10 min from diversion' ACARS maybe dispatch could treat that as a temporary sterile cockpit. There are a great many things that have to happen as you begin a diversion. Distractions that detract from the task at hand can cause errors. A procedure like this might help prevent this.5. The weather needs to be accurate. If there is a disconnect between the weather the tower/ground is showing and what the weather dispatcher is showing this could create confusion and lead to bad decisions.6. Tell mod not to ask the crew to illegally exceed flight time on a two man crew after a diversion and subsequent emergency. Our total flight time after flying to ZZZZ1 and then diverting was 9+20. This is well overthe limit. There is no way we could have legally continued to operate this flight on from ZZZZ2. They shouldn't have even suggested it. I would recommend that the company adopt a policy that anytime pilots have an emergency; afterward they need to be entered into rest immediately no questions asked. This is because most major emergencies tend to overload a pilot with information. It can sometimes take pilots some time to process what just happened and during that processing cognitive skills and reaction times can be significantly degraded.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 flight crew reported that poor weather caused a diversion; and hazardous cargo without proper paperwork created an issue when parking.

Narrative: The flight originated in ZZZZ and our destination was ZZZZ1. The cargo hold was loaded with 96;378 kg of hazardous cargo. We arrived at the aircraft late due to a road closure. We began normal preflight duties and complied with the flight plan requirement to notify dispatch that the subsequent flight plan leg was onboard. During this time I took the opportunity to request approach plates for ZZZZ1 as when I entered this airfield identifier on the iPad it would not show any information. Dispatch ACARSed us back and instructed us that to get the airfield to appear you must utilize the alternate airfield entry; not the primary destination field. We attempted this and it worked. However the only information provided here is an airfield diagram; no instrument approaches are available to crew members here. This is confirmed in the station guide and charter message and thus a daylight visual approach is required into this airfield.After a slight delay due to fueling; temporary loss of ground crew; and a slot time the aircraft departed at XA45z and was scheduled to arrive in ZZZZ1 at XH21z. I was the Pilot Flying and the First Officer was the Pilot Monitoring during this leg. The forecast weather at ETA was wind 070 Degrees at 9 kts; 8;000 meter visibility with haze and no clouds (VFR). About an hour before arrival the visibility began to drop to 2;600 meters (1.6 mi) and was projected to be below VFR minimums at our ETA. I inquired dispatch via ACARS to clarify the diversion plan. They confirmed that they did in fact want us to utilize ZZZZ2 in the event of a diversion. As we began our descent; the First Officer and I began to prepare to go into holding. We agreed upon and set a Bingo fuel of 22;000 kg (14;000 to get to ZZZZ2 with a 8;000 landing minimum). Once we arrived in the terminal area; we were instructed by ATC that ILS approaches were being conducted to Runway XXR and visibility was 2;000 m and projected to drop to 800 m in the next hour. The last aircraft to shoot an approach advised Tower that they had broken-out at 300 feet. This was a very different weather picture than what our Dispatcher had initially provided in the flight plan and subsequently sent to us. The weather that ZZZZ1 Tower was providing was much lower than all the weather that Dispatch was providing to us. I wasn't even sure they had access to ZZZZ1 weather information because of the great disparity. The First Officer and I elected to abide by what the airfield tower/ground was calling only.At this point we joined a holding pattern and attempted to wait until the weather was sufficient. During the one hour and twenty minute hold the crew persistently inquired about the current weather situation. The visibility never reached above 4;000 meters (2.5 mi). As we never reached VFR minimums we were unable to shoot the visual approach to Runway XXL into ZZZZ2. After we neared our Bingo fuel of 22;000 kg I notified Dispatch we had 10mins remaining on station. They attempted to piece another closer alternate which they suggested as ZZZZ3. I told them we were unable to use this. This was way too late to begin this process. This should have been accomplished two hours ago when I asked if they still wanted ZZZZ2 as the alternate before we even began our descent into ZZZZ1. Now we were forced to initiate a diversion to ZZZZ2 which was our designated alternate on our flight plan. It was estimated at being an additional one hour and twenty minutes to fly to the alternate airfield. During the 511 nm diversion; ATC held us at FL260 even though we requested FL340. Once we arrived in the terminal area; The First Officer contacted Ramp Control and they denied us entry to their ramp stating that our PPR# on the flight plan was only valid for passenger military flights not hazardous cargo nonmilitary flights. So to be clear we had hot cargo and no place to safely park. We were cleared to shoot the ILS to Runway XXL and I began intercepting the localizer and glide slope. We [requested priority handling] and told them it was for low fuel. About 15 nm on final; ZZZZ1 ATC told us to go-around because there was confusion about where we would be able to park the aircraft once on the ground. We followed ATC instructions and turned back to the south and went into holding again this time however with significantly less fuel remaining about 11;000 kg. We attempted to find a solution to the multi-layered problem of where to park but time was running out and eventually we utilized priority handling and began a turn back to the airfield by now we were 25-30 nm to the south of the field inbound descending out of 5;000 ft with about 8;500 kg left. The Controller kept telling us to standby and I sternly told him to clear all traffic between us and the runway we were landing regardless of his instructions. The ILS XXL was flown and the aircraft landed with no problems. We landed with 7;700 kg remaining. Ground Control directed the crew to taxi the aircraft clear of the runway and wait till a flow me car showed up to direct them to parking. After 30 mins of waiting we eventually taxied to parking and shutdown. At shutdown we had 5;500 kg of fuel remaining between all four main tanks.1. A good company policy might be to NOT accept charters to locations without all required information. Perhaps [Company] should have a charter feasibility checklist which should be completed before agreeing to accept the charter. Some of these required items might include: Jeppesen Plates; types of available approaches; possible parking locations; air-stairs and tow bar availability; lighting for night ops etc. The company doesn't need to accept charters that set us up to fail. By not providing us approach plates for ZZZZ1 with the possibility of fog and having us scheduled to arrive early morning set us up to have to divert. This made all of us look bad. The process by which we protect the company from dead-end charters needs to begin at the point of acceptance. This will lead to more satisfied customers and better margins for safety.2. Dispatch MUST select alternates with the nature of the charter in mind. Hazardous Cargo flights are especially sensitive to this. We must have a viable alternate that we can actually land at and proceed to a hot cargo spot on the airfield without having to declare priority handling or cause an international incident. A fake PPR# and no actual coordination with airport authority is simply unacceptable for charter service of this type.3. Remind Dispatch to NOT direct the crew to continue to hold until the fuel reaches FMC reserves. That isn't their job. They have a supporting role; not a directive role. Had we listened to them we would have had a worse situation with an unplanned and less coordinated diversion and possibly an international incident.4. Instruct Dispatch to not bring up a new possible divert field less than 10 min from beginning the diversion. There simply isn't enough time to review this. This has to be done earlier so the PIC can assess the option fully. Also there needs to be awareness on protecting the PICs train of thought during a critical phase of flight. A type of 'sterile cockpit' from Dispatch might help this. If the crew had a procedure to give a '10 min from diversion' ACARS maybe Dispatch could treat that as a temporary sterile cockpit. There are a great many things that have to happen as you begin a diversion. Distractions that detract from the task at hand can cause errors. A procedure like this might help prevent this.5. The weather needs to be accurate. If there is a disconnect between the weather the Tower/Ground is showing and what the weather Dispatcher is showing this could create confusion and lead to bad decisions.6. Tell MOD not to ask the crew to illegally exceed flight time on a two man crew after a diversion and subsequent emergency. Our total flight time after flying to ZZZZ1 and then diverting was 9+20. This is well overthe limit. There is no way we could have legally continued to operate this flight on from ZZZZ2. They shouldn't have even suggested it. I would recommend that the company adopt a policy that anytime pilots have an emergency; afterward they need to be entered into rest immediately no questions asked. This is because most major emergencies tend to overload a pilot with information. It can sometimes take pilots some time to process what just happened and during that processing cognitive skills and reaction times can be significantly degraded.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.