Narrative:

First officer (first officer) contacted paine field clearance delivery for ATC clearance a digital pre departure clearance was unavailable. Clearance delivery passed 'cleared to ZZZ via the paine 6 departure; radar vectors to harob; eason; then as filed; climb and maintain 3;000 ft.' first officer mistakenly believed the waypoint in question was spelled harab and erroneously entered this spelling (i.e. A different waypoint) into the navigation system. Before taxi; four passengers were re-seated due to weight and balance considerations; resulting in a somewhat lengthy delay on company day; heightening the aircrew's sense of urgency prior to takeoff. Recognizing this threat; prior to taxi; the ca (captain) and first officer took an extra minute to review the originating and before start checklists; in attempt to ensure completeness; but this effort was rushed. During the initial climb out; ATC directed the aircrew to 'turn right heading 260 degrees and; once established in the turn; climb to 9;000 ft.' in response; the PF (pilot flying) set a 30 degree angle of bank right turn; the pm (pilot monitoring) increased the altitude pre-select to 9;000 ft.; and then the PF established a gradual climb. At that point; ATC re-directed to the aircrew to 'climb once established on heading 260.' so; the PF arrested the climb; topping out at 3;200 ft.; and then descended back down to 3;000 ft. (All while maintaining the turn). Upon reaching heading 260 degrees; the flight climbed up to 9;000 ft. Then; ATC cleared the flight direct to harob (to the south/southwest); but the aircrew incorrectly established a direct course to harab (to the east). Shortly thereafter; ATC queried the aircrew if they were direct to the assigned waypoint; and the PF responded the flight was direct to 'harab; spelled h-a-right-a-B.' ATC corrected the flight; spelling the waypoint 'H-a-right-O-B' and assigned an initial heading of 210 degrees. The PF turned to 210 degrees; the pm typed in the correct waypoint spelling; and an updated course was established. From that point forward; the flight continued without further incident.this report covers two separate deviations. The first is an altitude deviation caused by ATC communications that did not clearly specify the desired sequence for turning and climbing. The second deviation was the result of aircrew incorrectly spelling an assigned waypoint (provided via radio communications); during navigation system entry. This was largely driven by the aircrew's failure to qa the entirety of the navigation route; in part due to a false sense of urgency associated with a ground delay and heightened company scrutiny.for the first deviation; it is suggested that clearer; more specific ATC communications would have been 'once established on heading 260; climb to 9;000 ft.'; or the controller simply could have waited until the flight was established on proper heading before issuing clearance to climb. For the second deviation; on deck a full qa of the navigation route via the map page (i.e. By scrolling through each waypoint individually to ensure none was significantly off course; as was the case with harab) likely would have led the aircrew to recognize/correct the navigation error before takeoff. Furthermore; a digital pre-departure clearance capability at paine field likely would have prevented the confusion over waypoint spelling. Lastly; while harab and harob are separated by a significant distance; there remains inherent risk of confusion in the future; which could be resolved by renaming one of these waypoints.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-175 First Officer reported inputted wrong waypoint into Flight Management Computer.

Narrative: FO (First Officer) contacted Paine Field Clearance Delivery for ATC clearance a digital PDC was unavailable. Clearance Delivery passed 'Cleared to ZZZ via the Paine 6 Departure; radar vectors to HAROB; Eason; then as filed; climb and maintain 3;000 ft.' FO mistakenly believed the waypoint in question was spelled HARAB and erroneously entered this spelling (i.e. a different waypoint) into the navigation system. Before taxi; four passengers were re-seated due to weight and balance considerations; resulting in a somewhat lengthy delay on Company day; heightening the aircrew's sense of urgency prior to takeoff. Recognizing this threat; prior to taxi; the CA (Captain) and FO took an extra minute to review the Originating and Before Start Checklists; in attempt to ensure completeness; but this effort was rushed. During the initial climb out; ATC directed the aircrew to 'turn right heading 260 degrees and; once established in the turn; climb to 9;000 ft.' In response; the PF (Pilot Flying) set a 30 degree angle of bank right turn; the PM (Pilot Monitoring) increased the altitude pre-select to 9;000 ft.; and then the PF established a gradual climb. At that point; ATC re-directed to the aircrew to 'climb once established on heading 260.' So; the PF arrested the climb; topping out at 3;200 ft.; and then descended back down to 3;000 ft. (all while maintaining the turn). Upon reaching heading 260 degrees; the flight climbed up to 9;000 ft. Then; ATC cleared the flight direct to HAROB (to the south/southwest); but the aircrew incorrectly established a direct course to HARAB (to the east). Shortly thereafter; ATC queried the aircrew if they were direct to the assigned waypoint; and the PF responded the flight was direct to 'HARAB; spelled H-A-R-A-B.' ATC corrected the flight; spelling the waypoint 'H-A-R-O-B' and assigned an initial heading of 210 degrees. The PF turned to 210 degrees; the PM typed in the correct waypoint spelling; and an updated course was established. From that point forward; the flight continued without further incident.This report covers two separate deviations. The first is an altitude deviation caused by ATC communications that did not clearly specify the desired sequence for turning and climbing. The second deviation was the result of aircrew incorrectly spelling an assigned waypoint (provided via radio communications); during navigation system entry. This was largely driven by the aircrew's failure to QA the entirety of the navigation route; in part due to a false sense of urgency associated with a ground delay and heightened company scrutiny.For the first deviation; it is suggested that clearer; more specific ATC communications would have been 'once established on heading 260; climb to 9;000 ft.'; or the Controller simply could have waited until the flight was established on proper heading before issuing clearance to climb. For the second deviation; on deck a full QA of the navigation route via the map page (i.e. by scrolling through each waypoint individually to ensure none was significantly off course; as was the case with HARAB) likely would have led the aircrew to recognize/correct the navigation error before takeoff. Furthermore; a digital pre-departure clearance capability at Paine Field likely would have prevented the confusion over waypoint spelling. Lastly; while HARAB and HAROB are separated by a significant distance; there remains inherent risk of confusion in the future; which could be resolved by renaming one of these waypoints.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.