Narrative:

Aircraft X was on final in front of aircraft Y. I observed aircraft X speed approximately 110 kts on radar and aircraft Y speed approximately 160 kts on radar. I asked aircraft X to increase speed 10 kts if able when the aircraft was approximately 5 miles on final in order to somewhat equalize the rate of compression knowing that aircraft X has a significantly slower landing speed than aircraft Y; which is one of the fastest aircraft we routinely work at 150 to 160 kts on average over the fence. Approach did not account for this in initial sequencing which happens routinely and is generally troublesome. I advised aircraft X to expect minimum time on the runway for traffic behind. As aircraft X landed; I expressed to him to exit at a specific taxiway in order to allow for his entrance to the ramp as I already had other aircraft at more northerly taxiways that would be problematic for ground control if aircraft X was at other taxiways. We routinely stage aircraft according to ramp entry to keep efficient movement for ground control. I expressed to aircraft X to exit at the taxiway and tighten up on the aircraft already staged there. The pilot acknowledged the instruction. I observed aircraft X pass up one taxiway and as he approached the next one the pilot appeared confused or hesitant. At this point I kept a close watch on the aircraft X and the aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was very fast at approximately 150 kts as it approached the runway and aircraft X was apparently not in a hurry to exit. As aircraft X approached the assigned taxiway I visually observed the aircraft turn off at the runway edge but not moving quickly off the runway. I still had a few seconds of time before aircraft Y would reach the threshold; but because aircraft X was hesitant during the entire landing roll; I instructed the pilot to 'keep going' meaning to keep moving away from the runway. As the aircraft was physically exiting the runway; which I confirmed visually; I went back to my next duty of scanning the inboard runway and clearing aircraft Z for takeoff. As I was doing that my cab coordinator advised me that aircraft X went back on to the runway. I looked up and verified the positions of the aircraft and then immediately issued the go-round instruction to aircraft Y. In fact I said 'go-around' three times rapidly to emphasize the instruction; to which the aircraft Y pilot immediately responded. Upon observing the aircraft on the go; I went back to aircraft Z on a parallel runway and instructed him to hold in position to ensure the aircraft did not roll and get airborne in the middle of the issue.I then crossed the staged aircraft to continue the airport movement. I observed the previous departure was not in any danger from the go-around aircraft Y so advised the departure of the trailing traffic and switched it to departure. Once aircraft Y was reconfigured for flight; I advised the pilot of the previous departing traffic and instructed a turn to heading 170 to provide divergence and spacing for the departure controller. Once the departure was out of 3;000 ft.; which is above the top altitude we use for the departures; I instructed aircraft Y to turn right to heading 220 to keep the aircraft in the departure controller's airspace because approach sector's airspace begins just to the east of the departure course. I then switched aircraft Y to departure. Shortly after; a number of pilot's waiting for departure chimed in with 'nice job' comments as they likely saw the situation as it occurred. I was briefly shaken by the event but continued to work. First; pilot training is terrible. I've been at this facility for many years and when I got here; if a pilot stayed on the runway longer than needed we would scold him and tell him don't ever do that again. Now; we would get disciplined for that. Kindness doesn't work at the critical; legacy airports where laissez-faire pilotage cannot be tolerated. If a pilot isn't ready and familiar with the airport and how tight we run airplanes; they shouldn't fly here. Second; stop building procedures and policies for the mega-airports and try to force them into capacity-maxed airports like this. It doesn't work and it's going to cause an accident. Finally it's not pleasant to be called downstairs and have to deal with administrative nonsense. Neither I nor the cab coordinator got a simple 'good job' from the FAA. Instead I get paperwork telling me there was a loss of separation. Well; don't tell me things I already know. We were lucky that the coordinator was doing his job and backing me up as the 'extra eyes'. The passengers on those planes were lucky that the aircraft Y pilot immediately responded to my go-around instruction. We were so good that we beat the airport surface detection equipment alert. If we had waited for that; this could have been a fatal accident. The fact is that our team saved the lives of the people on those aircraft. The pilots of aircraft X were obviously not familiar with the airport and were behind the situation. The approach controller did not catch the aircraft mix; speed-differential issue. And finally; I did not catch aircraft X getting back onto the runway after I observed the initial exit. There was a chain of events here that was nearly catastrophic. I have many years as an air traffic controller at multiple facilities. When I arrived here I was told that we run them tight and don't waste space. Well; that's the way I've operated. But now we can't trust that our pilot colleagues will do the right thing and operate as efficiently as us; so I now have to build in extra space to mitigate the risk. Policies; procedures and technology will take us only so far. Ultimately this is a risk mitigation game and I'll be doing my part.so; my recommendation is as follows. Call a meeting with the [airline] chief pilot to review this event. Involve our local safety council in that meeting and impress upon that pilot that it is unacceptable to have unprepared pilots fly into this airport. Then; at the next chief pilots meeting with all of the airlines; the same message needs to be passed. Forcefully. Also; approach needs to be more cognizant of aircraft mix impacts on final spacing. It's been a problem for as long as I've been here. Oh; and just maybe give your controllers a pat on the back once and awhile for the job they do. I was angry and disturbed by this event for a few days afterwards. Now after getting this performance review letter; I'm pissed again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EWR Tower Controller reported an aircraft failed to follow directions when exiting the runway causing a go-around and loss of separation.

Narrative: Aircraft X was on final in front of Aircraft Y. I observed Aircraft X speed approximately 110 kts on radar and Aircraft Y speed approximately 160 kts on radar. I asked Aircraft X to increase speed 10 kts if able when the aircraft was approximately 5 miles on final in order to somewhat equalize the rate of compression knowing that Aircraft X has a significantly slower landing speed than Aircraft Y; which is one of the fastest aircraft we routinely work at 150 to 160 kts on average over the fence. Approach did not account for this in initial sequencing which happens routinely and is generally troublesome. I advised Aircraft X to expect minimum time on the runway for traffic behind. As Aircraft X landed; I expressed to him to exit at a specific taxiway in order to allow for his entrance to the ramp as I already had other aircraft at more northerly taxiways that would be problematic for Ground Control if Aircraft X was at other taxiways. We routinely stage aircraft according to ramp entry to keep efficient movement for Ground Control. I expressed to Aircraft X to exit at the taxiway and tighten up on the aircraft already staged there. The pilot acknowledged the instruction. I observed Aircraft X pass up one taxiway and as he approached the next one the pilot appeared confused or hesitant. At this point I kept a close watch on the Aircraft X and the Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was very fast at approximately 150 kts as it approached the runway and Aircraft X was apparently not in a hurry to exit. As Aircraft X approached the assigned taxiway I visually observed the aircraft turn off at the runway edge but not moving quickly off the runway. I still had a few seconds of time before Aircraft Y would reach the threshold; but because Aircraft X was hesitant during the entire landing roll; I instructed the pilot to 'keep going' meaning to keep moving away from the runway. As the aircraft was physically exiting the runway; which I confirmed visually; I went back to my next duty of scanning the inboard runway and clearing Aircraft Z for takeoff. As I was doing that my cab coordinator advised me that Aircraft X went back on to the runway. I looked up and verified the positions of the aircraft and then immediately issued the go-round instruction to Aircraft Y. In fact I said 'go-around' three times rapidly to emphasize the instruction; to which the Aircraft Y pilot immediately responded. Upon observing the aircraft on the go; I went back to Aircraft Z on a parallel runway and instructed him to hold in position to ensure the aircraft did not roll and get airborne in the middle of the issue.I then crossed the staged aircraft to continue the airport movement. I observed the previous departure was not in any danger from the go-around Aircraft Y so advised the departure of the trailing traffic and switched it to departure. Once Aircraft Y was reconfigured for flight; I advised the pilot of the previous departing traffic and instructed a turn to heading 170 to provide divergence and spacing for the Departure Controller. Once the departure was out of 3;000 ft.; which is above the top altitude we use for the departures; I instructed Aircraft Y to turn right to heading 220 to keep the aircraft in the Departure Controller's airspace because approach sector's airspace begins just to the east of the departure course. I then switched Aircraft Y to departure. Shortly after; a number of pilot's waiting for departure chimed in with 'nice job' comments as they likely saw the situation as it occurred. I was briefly shaken by the event but continued to work. First; pilot training is terrible. I've been at this facility for many years and when I got here; if a pilot stayed on the runway longer than needed we would scold him and tell him don't ever do that again. Now; we would get disciplined for that. Kindness doesn't work at the critical; legacy airports where laissez-faire pilotage cannot be tolerated. If a pilot isn't ready and familiar with the airport and how tight we run airplanes; they shouldn't fly here. Second; stop building procedures and policies for the mega-airports and try to force them into capacity-maxed airports like this. It doesn't work and it's going to cause an accident. Finally it's not pleasant to be called downstairs and have to deal with administrative nonsense. Neither I nor the cab coordinator got a simple 'good job' from the FAA. Instead I get paperwork telling me there was a loss of separation. Well; don't tell me things I already know. We were lucky that the coordinator was doing his job and backing me up as the 'extra eyes'. The passengers on those planes were lucky that the Aircraft Y pilot immediately responded to my go-around instruction. We were so good that we beat the airport surface detection equipment alert. If we had waited for that; this could have been a fatal accident. The fact is that our team saved the lives of the people on those aircraft. The pilots of Aircraft X were obviously not familiar with the airport and were behind the situation. The Approach Controller did not catch the aircraft mix; speed-differential issue. And finally; I did not catch Aircraft X getting back onto the runway after I observed the initial exit. There was a chain of events here that was nearly catastrophic. I have many years as an air traffic controller at multiple facilities. When I arrived here I was told that we run them tight and don't waste space. Well; that's the way I've operated. But now we can't trust that our pilot colleagues will do the right thing and operate as efficiently as us; so I now have to build in extra space to mitigate the risk. Policies; procedures and technology will take us only so far. Ultimately this is a risk mitigation game and I'll be doing my part.So; my recommendation is as follows. Call a meeting with the [Airline] Chief Pilot to review this event. Involve our local safety council in that meeting and impress upon that pilot that it is unacceptable to have unprepared pilots fly into this airport. Then; at the next chief pilots meeting with all of the airlines; the same message needs to be passed. Forcefully. Also; approach needs to be more cognizant of aircraft mix impacts on final spacing. It's been a problem for as long as I've been here. Oh; and just maybe give your controllers a pat on the back once and awhile for the job they do. I was angry and disturbed by this event for a few days afterwards. Now after getting this performance review letter; I'm pissed again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.