Narrative:

Enroute; the first officer noticed that the flap gauge show a slight split. The left indicator showed up while the right showed not quite up. We talked about how this was strange; but we showed no other indication that the flaps were other that fully retracted. On approach; the first officer asked for flaps 5. I moved the handle to 5 and the indicator did not move nor was there any transition lights on the overhead panel. We called approach and asked for a box vector to work through the QRH. I made a PA announcement stating the reason we broke off the approach and then got into the QRH. I called operations on the radio and told them the situation to pass on to dispatch. ATC asked if we needed anything and we requested the fire trucks to check the brakes after landing. Once we were all setup and down to the before landing checklist I made another PA stating we were set to land but at a higher speed and there was no need to panic. I failed to talk to the flight attendants directly to get them in the loop and to hear their concerns. I did not have the flight attendants prepare the cabin as I thought this would get passengers more nervous. I should have discussed this with the flight attendant; however; there was plenty of time to do so. I took the controls from the first officer and did the landing. The fire trucks looked us over and checked the brake temps. During this time we ran the brake cooling [checklist]; which told us not to approach the gate for 30 minutes. Fire crew measured the temps at 500 on the left; and 570 on the right. They offered to put fans on the brakes and we accepted. We called dispatch and maintenance control and discussed what happened. While going through the brake cooling checklist; we could not find what temperature was safe to proceed to the gate. Since we had the fire crews and fans we figured our time should be reduced; but we could not find what temperature was safe. Maintenance control came up with a time of one hour before going to the gate which contradicted our [checklist] time. The fire crews continued to give us updates on the temps. Maintenance eventually sent out a mechanic to check the fuse plugs and they confirmed we were good to head to the gate. By this time we had been on the ground for about 55 minutes. We stared the engines back up and proceeded to the gate. Later that evening I did find the max brake temperature for ground turnaround of 425 degrees in the aom chapter 3. Once I was there I remember the number; but it would have been nice to have had the number somewhere in the brake cooling procedures as a reminder.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported a trailing edge flap malfunction that resulted in a flaps up landing.

Narrative: Enroute; the First Officer noticed that the flap gauge show a slight split. The left indicator showed up while the right showed not quite up. We talked about how this was strange; but we showed no other indication that the flaps were other that fully retracted. On approach; the First Officer asked for flaps 5. I moved the handle to 5 and the indicator did not move nor was there any transition lights on the overhead panel. We called Approach and asked for a box vector to work through the QRH. I made a PA announcement stating the reason we broke off the approach and then got into the QRH. I called operations on the radio and told them the situation to pass on to Dispatch. ATC asked if we needed anything and we requested the fire trucks to check the brakes after landing. Once we were all setup and down to the Before Landing Checklist I made another PA stating we were set to land but at a higher speed and there was no need to panic. I failed to talk to the Flight Attendants directly to get them in the loop and to hear their concerns. I did not have the Flight Attendants prepare the cabin as I thought this would get passengers more nervous. I should have discussed this with the flight attendant; however; there was plenty of time to do so. I took the controls from the First Officer and did the landing. The fire trucks looked us over and checked the brake temps. During this time we ran the brake cooling [checklist]; which told us not to approach the gate for 30 minutes. Fire Crew measured the temps at 500 on the left; and 570 on the right. They offered to put fans on the brakes and we accepted. We called Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussed what happened. While going through the brake cooling checklist; we could not find what temperature was safe to proceed to the gate. Since we had the fire crews and fans we figured our time should be reduced; but we could not find what temperature was safe. Maintenance Control came up with a time of one hour before going to the gate which contradicted our [checklist] time. The fire crews continued to give us updates on the temps. Maintenance eventually sent out a mechanic to check the fuse plugs and they confirmed we were good to head to the gate. By this time we had been on the ground for about 55 minutes. We stared the engines back up and proceeded to the gate. Later that evening I did find the max brake temperature for ground turnaround of 425 degrees in the AOM Chapter 3. Once I was there I remember the number; but it would have been nice to have had the number somewhere in the brake cooling procedures as a reminder.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.